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Preface 
 
This book is rather like the clinic, a space of crossing and translation, between medical 
sociology and science studies, both anthropological and sociological.  Thus the book draws 
attention to and helps deconstruct the dichotomy between the laboratory and the clinic, 
and between science and medicine.   
 The book draws on 25 years as a medical sociologist, researching acute medicine, 
primary care, accident and emergency, intensive care, paediatric genetics, geriatric 
medicine and biomedical science. My ‘ethnographic’ immersion in medicine and health 
care practice, however, began earlier by working for ten years in the British National 
Health Service, as a cleaner and nursing auxiliary in a geriatric hospital before I trained and 
practiced as a nurse and ward sister in both acute and primary care settings. While my 
close reading of the discourses of science and medicine owes much to my original training 
in English at the University of London, I have tried never to lose my grounding in everyday 
practice, my experiences with patients and that eye for detail that served me so well in 
those early days.  
 The core research material comes from a longitudinal study of an evolving discursive 
practice in medical genetics known as dysmorphology. This is the study of abnormal 
forms, historically called congenital abnormalities. Thus the analysis of the book locates 
itself in those effects in persons identified as  "existing from birth" and as relating to 
genitus, or "begetting". As it happens, dysmorphology’s roots are in paediatrics and the 
objects and subjects of clinical practice are mainly children and their families. Indeed 
many clinical geneticists I met were trained in paediatrics and the underpinning discourses 
in the clinic are the science of growth and form in humans, such as embryology, and 
conceptions of child development.  
 Critically, dysmorphology is concerned with the description and recognition of  
‘syndromes’. At the time of the study there were over 3,000 syndromes recorded in 
databases, and many of these descriptions were still in the making.  So the book is to 
some extent about shape and form in contemporary medicine; and, further, how 
deviations from normal human development are being identified and named. ‘Dysmorph’ 
literally means misshapen, and is concerned with begetting when the coming together of 
processes of reproduction go wrong and do so in ways that produce abnormal forms. It 
should be noted that these syndromes typically involve very small numbers of people, and 
come under the new rubric rare disorders.  Consequently, the availability of molecular and 
cytogenic tests was limited.  
 The field of dysmorphology is also emerging at a time, the first decade of the new 
millenium, when biological understandings of the genetic and the congenital are changing 
and shifting. Hence dysmorphology is also busy relocating in relation to those 
understandings. Like biology, and no doubt because of its direct links to the biology of 
human development (specifically growth and form), dysmorphology is becoming more 
and more engrossed in the correlations between the genetic and deviations in growth and 
form.  In so doing, dysmorphologists claim to be helping to shape the science of human 
development.  So the first story I have to tell is about how the relations between medicine 
and science, the clinic and the gene, are in the process of being constructed in 
dysmorphology and in genetic medicine.   
 We might think these syndromes may simply re-present difference – difference in 
one set of children and their parents from another; that where these differences are 
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associated with pathology and reconstituted as problematic, what we have is a case study 
of abnormality or deviation that walks the tightrope of identity politics. What emerges 
however is how the genetics of normal human development relies on this mapping of 
deviations in growth and form, with the observation and description of congenital 
abnormality. So much so, that what seems to be evident is that it is the normal that is 
itself shrinking. So that, as one geneticist put it to me: from his perspective, we all have a 
syndrome.  
 But what is so extraordinary is how in these new kinds of medical entities, 
syndromes, something so tiny as genetic mutation is being held responsible for the 
extraordinary disruption seen in some children’s physical and intellectual growth and 
development, and across so many of their bodies systems.   
 This brings me to the second story I have to tell, which is about how we are all 
becoming drawn into these studies on growth and form and how the findings in 
dysmorphology are likely to affect choice of partners and alter decisions about 
procreation in the future. The critical issue is thus of grasping the significance of these 
imaginaries – syndromes and other forms of classification - through which forms of life get 
constituted as malformations; and, further, understanding when and why they bother us, 
literally and conceptually. What matters is what we do with these imaginaries, particularly 
in terms of ideas of family and relatedness, of personhood and conceptions of what it is to 
be human.     
 A third story concerns my interest in how medical power works. What I help to 
show, contrary to the predictions of other observers, is how medicine is retaining its 
dominance in society partly through the clinic. In a large part this has involved me in 
recognising that the power of medicine rests not so much in its ability to help generate 
cures – important as these discoveries are – but rather in its sticking to classification and 
the method of doubt as forming the twin bases of science. What I hope to show is that 
medical power works as much through deferral as decision; and that this is what helps to 
retain the clinic – with its intimate links to the family - as the final arbiter. 
 All three stories I have to tell draw from formal fieldwork, but are tempered by what 
Anthony Cohen calls ‘post-fieldwork fieldwork’.  The earlier fieldwork included 
observation of clinical process and practice across a regional genetics service, observation 
of local, national and international academic meetings such as London Dysmorphology 
Club at which dysmorphologists present their cases, formal and informal interviews with 
leading experts in dysmorphology, examination of dysmorphologists’ papers and websites, 
syndrome websites and interviews with family members in their homes. Much of this was 
undertaken in collaboration with other researchers and I have also been working closely 
with biologists and geneticists on another study that has influenced my interpretation and 
understanding of the present material.   
 Throughout the book I have illustrated the text with the kinds of images used by 
dysmorphologists to help get readers inside the world dysmorphologists both inhabit and 
help create. This is because dysmorphology is ‘very visual’ in its procedures – and because 
each syndrome has its own special ‘face’.  Many of these images include the actual faces 
of babies and children; these actual faces being what clinicians call ‘representative 
subjects’. While I have not specifically analysed each image, my analysis of the social, 
cultural and existential significance of the visual practices of this world appears in 
Chapters 9 &10.   
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 A book like this is of course not possible without enormous help from others. My 
thanks, and huge gratitude, are first due to all the families, doctor-scientists and nurses 
whose lives and work informed this book. I must also warmly thank my collaborators in 
the initial study, Paul Atkinson, Angus Clarke, Daniella Pilz, as well as Katie Featherstone, 
the research fellow on the study – although I should stress that they are not responsible 
for the analysis I present here, nor do they necessarily agree with my findings.  
 The following people at many different times and in many different ways have also 
given valuable commentary, support, and encouragement: Barbara Adam, Huw Beynon, 
Ruth Chadwick, Adele Clarke, Emma Clavering, Sophie Davies, Yulia Egorova, Faye 
Ginsberg, Adam Hedgecoe, Alexandra Hillman, Illana Löwy, Janice MacLaughlin, Mike 
Michael, Mara Miele, Dimitris Papadopoulos, Maria Puig de la Bellacasa, Rayna Rapp, 
Michael Schillmeier, Bev Skeggs, Paul Rabinow, Gareth Thomas, and Paul White.   
 Marilyn Strathern as ever informs, reforms, and shifts my perspective. I am 
also most grateful to the ESRC, who funded the initial fieldwork and have supported 
me as a member of Cesagen for the last three years. I would also like to record how 
much I appreciate the ongoing scientific education I am being given by the zoologist, 
ecologist, geneticist, photographer, wit and friend, David Kipling and note the 
importance of being introduced to the Philosophy and Epistemology of Science in 
the ESRC doctoral programme at the University of Edinburgh. Finally, where would I 
be without my husband, the philosopher Rolland Munro?  Not anywhere very 
interesting, that is for sure.   I also need to thank both him, and my daughter, 
Arabella, for their spectacular editorial work on the final draft of the book, as well as  
my son, Jamie, for helping me keep body and soul together throughout its 
conception.  An army marches on its stomach, after all! 
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
 
'[T]he new genetics will prove to be an infinitely greater force 
for reshaping society and life than was the revolution in physics, 
because it will be embedded throughout the social fabric at the 
microlevel by medical practices and a variety of other discourses' 
(Rabinow, 1992, p.241, emphasis added).  
 
The new genetics promises great things: things that are absolutely central to the Euro--
American pre-occupation with health, wealth and longevity. Indeed, only two decades 
since Paul Rabinow made this prediction about the new genetics ‘reshaping society and 
life’, its impact on society is already being felt everywhere: in food, in clothing, in politics, 
in lifestyle, and in health care. So much so that it seems safe to say the new genetics is 
already having this ‘infinitely greater’ impact on society than the revolution in physics 
accomplished. But how is this happening? And what exactly is the place of medicine in all 
this?   
 Analysts used to argue that medicine drew its authority and power from its 
jurisdiction over acute illness, enacting the heroic saving of lives rather than engaging 
with everyday ailments.  This line of analysis was crucial in cementing understandings of 
what sociologists and anthropologists described as medical dominance. This is the view 
that, of all the professions, medicine had the greatest influence; and, further, that its 
consequent shaping of society was pervasive and profound. This was not merely to note 
that doctors were pre-eminent in rank, say to lawyers and accountants; or simply to 
recognise that health care systems, such as the British National Health Service, are the 
largest employers in the world. It is to hold that the very fabric and mores of our social 
institutions, including government as well as family, have been radically, if 
surreptitiously, altered by the ideas, methods and practices of medicine.  
 Yet this idea of medicine as a cultural and economic powerhouse was not to last. 
According to Olshansky and Carnes (2001), an earlier revolution in longevity involved 
technologies that radically changed how we live in terms of sanitation, diet and so forth. 
These gave us progressive control over ‘environmental sources of mortality, but which 
had nothing to do with our basic biology’ (p. 84). These changes permitted a ‘relatively 
unprecedented number of people to enter into the relatively unexplored older regions of 
the lifespan’ with the consequence of this being a transition to ‘causes of death that arise 
from flaws, breakdowns, and failures of the biological processes within our bodies’ (p. 
84). 
 By the end of the 20th century the big story had changed in both politics as well the 
academy, recounting instead how medicine is now emasculated in the face of the long 
term, chronic disorders and degenerative illnesses of the West. Populations in Western 
nations might be living longer, but the aged are consequently plagued with expensive 
chronic and degenerative diseases that drain their wealth as well as their health. As Bech, 
the hero of John Updike’s trilogy, states ‘If the muggers don’t get your wallet, the nursing 
homes will’ (1998, p.32). 
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 In this scenario of incurable cancers, and a multiplicity of diseases affecting those 
living longer, doctors are portrayed as reduced to little more than an administrative role 
of delivering protocols that have been devised elsewhere. In their place, a motley crew of 
other professions, including carers, dieticians, homeopaths, nurse practitioners, 
physiotherapists, and lifestyle gurus – even patients themselves – are becoming the 
indispensible experts for people to go to for therapy and solace.  
 
A new frontier? 
 
Against this prospect of a terminal decline in the influence of medicine, the new genetics 
augurs a new and very different frontier. The prospect before us is that interventions at 
the level of the genes offer solutions to problems Western medicine once saw as 
intractable:  
Nature is fallible and her works are imperfect. Human beings are no exception; 
our bodies decay and perish and our powers are limited. Seemingly from the 
beginning, human beings have been alive to the many ways in which what we 
have been given falls short of what we can envision and what we desire. 
(President’s Council on Bioethics, 2003a, p.1) 
 Contrastingly to this background, the new genetics is haunted by eugenic dreams of 
eliminating diseases as part of its mission to eradicate all physical and mental disability. 
Some of these interventions involve old technologies – such as pre-natal testing for 
hereditary and other congenital disorders and termination of pregnancy – and even 
forms of therapy (Kass 2002). However, since the emergence of the new genetics, more 
radical interventions being contemplated seem almost god-like in their will to go well 
beyond selection techniques that supposedly procure better children: 
We are human, but can imagine gods. We die, but can imagine immortality. 
But human beings have more than longings and imaginations. Although we are 
far from omnipotent, we have extraordinary powers, unique among the earth’s 
creatures, to shape our environment and even ourselves according to our wills. 
(President’s Council on Bioethics, 2003a, p.1) 
Interventions in this re-making of the human involve the genetic engineering of embryos, 
or ‘reprogenetics’ (Pray, 2008), technologies that alter a person’s genetic makeup, as well 
as the development of personalised, tailor-made biomedicines that literally reorder 
behaviour (Hedgecoe 2004). These possibilities range from interfering directly with 
disordered bodies – for instance by putting a stop on the reproduction of faulty genes - 
to more indirect changes – by, say, reproducing genetically compatible donors or even by 
inventing ways to modify and engineer the genes themselves.  
 Discoveries and technologies associated with the new genetics thus open up, 
among other things, possibilities for overcoming the intractable chronic and degenerative 
disorderings of Western bodies and minds. There is also much discussion for instance of 
the ‘farming’ of replacement body parts, as well as talk of finding ways to ‘switch’ the 
genes that power the ageing process and chronic diseases, turning them on and off like 
lights (e.g. Wynford-Thomas 2003).  
 11 
 In this tsunami of discovery there is continuous debate over the profound 
questions that arise as a consequence of the new genetics. Specifically, many questions 
address the issue as to whether or not we should condone this pursuit of enhancement:  
 
It is perhaps not surprising, therefore, that also from the beginning human 
beings have struggled with two opposing responses to our lot. Should we try to 
mould the imperfection we have been given into something closer to our 
ideal? Or should we content ourselves with beholding and enjoying it as it is? 
And what about our own natures? Does our ability to flourish as human beings 
depend on our ability to improve upon the human form or function? Or might 
the contrary be true: does our flourishing depend on accepting—or even 
celebrating—our natural limitations? (President’s Council on Bioethics, 2003b, 
p.1)   
  
 As this book will show, it is not enough to raise these questions in the abstract. 
Room has also to be given to explore, in depth, how the potential of the new genetics is 
also changing the very nature of what we view to be human. I then go on to discuss that, 
if claims about the new genetics are to carry, and the promises and hopes of 
enhancement bear fruit, there is also going to be a radical shift in the ways in which 
diseases and bodily ‘disorderings’ are represented and classified.   
  
 
The alignment of clinical medicine with the new genetics  
 
This is where the story of this book begins. Far from becoming relegated to being the 
handmaiden of genetic science – trained technicians applying the instructions on the 
pack – doctors and medical researchers are busy surfing these waves of innovation and 
making themselves pivotal to decisions as to who (or what) should be enhanced. Or, 
indeed, disposed of. 
 My adoption of Rabinow’s prediction as the epigram for this chapter is thus not 
simply to highlight the advent of the new genetics, whose importance today is hardly in 
dispute even when its more fanciful claims are dismissed. Rather the point is to draw the 
reader’s attention to the explanation Rabinow offers for the impact of the new genetics 
on society overshadowing the revolution in physics. What Rabinow anticipates is that, in 
order to have any real impact, the new genetics needs to ‘be embedded throughout the 
social fabric at the microlevel’. Critically, as Rabinow points out, this embedding will be 
accomplished by ‘medical practices and a variety of other discourses' (emphasis in the 
original).  
 A highly respected cultural anthropologist before he turned his attention to science 
and medicine, Rabinow is emphasising medicine as the agent by which the much 
heralded changes in the new genetics become embedded in the social fabric. For it is 
medical practice, rather than ideas of genetics themselves, that he argues will transform 
society. What he clues us into is the obvious fact that the new genetics cannot work 
alone. It must align itself with medicine if it is to rework society in the various ways the 
pundits anticipate.  
 The statement by Rabinow cited at the opening of this chapter therefore invites 
reconsideration of a profound and long-standing relation: that which is established 
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between medicine and society. This is after all his key point: medicine does not simply 
serve society. Medicine, particularly in the form Rabinow calls biomedicine, reforms and 
changes the social. Simply put, medicine dominates society.  
 In all this Rabinow has been more prescient than others in his anticipation of what 
the new genetics will accomplish. Against stories of a decline in the importance of 
medicine, including its geneticization and moleculairazation augured by, amongst others,  
Nikolas Rose (2007), Rabinow’s signal contribution is to identify the means by which the 
new genetics will reshape society and life – and so alert us to the conditions of possibility 
for this reshaping.  
 My own contribution is to go further than Rabinow.  I demonstrate that the means 
by which the new genetics is reshaping society and life involve an extension and 
revitalisation of the work of medicine. Indeed, as I go on to show, there is also what am 
calling a ‘rebirth’ of the clinic. 
 
Medicine and its engrossment 
 
The present book addresses this question of the relation between medicine and the ‘new 
genetics’. I am doing so at the end of the first decade of a new millennium, a time when 
genetics has been rapidly changing itself in light of the emergence of post-genomic 
biology. Significantly, where recent commentators have focussed on the relation between 
medicine and science, they have tended to beg the question in failing to examine 
medicine’s own scientific standing.  
 This debate about medicine’s relation to science is particularly lively in the context of 
assertions about the relationship between the laboratory – as the site of science on the 
one hand - and the clinic – as the site of medicine on the other - in what has been termed 
the ‘geneticization’ of medicine (Abbey Lipman in Miller, 1999). Such assertions invite a 
potentially false dichotomy between the laboratory and the clinic in order to separate 
science from medicine. Some pundits also rely on the dubious notion that we are 
witnessing the passing of modernity, a contemporary decline of the power of rationalism 
and science (Ballard and Elston, 2005, drawing on Schneider 2003) that leads to our 
putting our faith in alternatives to medical power.   
 To the contrary, I show how the reviving of medical power is made possible through 
contemporary conditions that speak for the intensification, not the waning, of all that is 
modern. As I explain later in detail, what makes medicine a science is the same as what 
keeps it modern: it is the construction of systematic forms of classification that can be 
used to ‘categorise’ persons. It is the work of classification that requires science to be 
conducted within the walls of the clinic – and in the presence of the persons being so 
classified – that makes glib separations of medicine from science so palpably false. 
 In this book I will unfold a somewhat different view to those such as Rabinow,  
arguing that medicine engrosses itself through keeping the clinic as key to science and, 
though this engrossment, makes itself indispensible to both science and society. Much as 
money expands an economy and, in so doing, ‘grows’ our dependence upon it, medicine 
advises us over how we are to see the world and directs us over what is to be valued.  
 Since the 19th Century, if not before, medicine has made the clinic the ‘obligatory 
passage’ (Latour 1987) in exercising its expertise over the identification of health need. 
As the fieldwork I draw on demonstrates, this is because it is medicine - not the biological 
sciences - which defines when, and at what moments, something constitutes a need in 
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people. This is proving to be as true today as it has been for almost the last two 
centuries. The research I draw on illustrates how doctors may do this work of 
categorization in different ways, but underlines how they continue to accomplish their 
classifications on persons in the realm of the clinic.  
 Consequently, as I go on to show, it is through the clinic that the new genetics must 
pass in order to have any real impact on society. This categorical work of the clinic is thus 
infrastructural to the organization of not just health care systems, such as the NHS, but 
also to body-world relations, and ideas of personhood, identity and belonging (Latimer 
1999, 2005, 2011).  That is, in providing ‘categories’ for people to understand the vectors 
and limits under which their lives are being lived, medicine is doing much more in the 
clinic than merely riding the wave train generated by the seismic progress of the new 
genetics. Indeed, through its processes of classification, far from medicine being made 
redundant, its key institution – the clinic - is at the heart of the seismic activity of the 
genetic.  
 
 
Identifying the pathological 
 
In entering this realm of the clinic, I shadowed doctors and observed how they 
distinguish and differentiate what they see. In so doing I followed them as they 
uncovered the manifold varieties of the pathological.  
 The term pathological here is being used in the everyday, implicit and taken-for-
granted sense of medical practice, not in reference to the domain of laboratory-based 
sciences of pathology (Atkinson 1995, Mol 2000, 2002). That is, I am using it to denote 
those processes at the heart of the medical matter when the effects someone displays 
are figured as signs of something clinically wrong with a person (which may or may not 
be corroborated by laboratory and other investigations).  By way of example, you may go 
to your doctor with a rash that is red and itchy. To the doctor, this symptom is not yet a 
sign of a disease. For the rash to be translated into a sign, for it to have the impetus to be 
treated as the sign of a disease, the doctor must be able to ‘see’ it, potentially at least, as 
pathological.  This seeing is a process of establishing the significance of the rash.  
 Identifying something as potentially ‘pathological’ is a corollary of what clinicians 
call ‘differential diagnosis’. This is the process through which they name and identify the 
signs and symptoms someone displays as belonging to one or another diagnostic 
category; or not.  There may be tests that can be done as a part of establishing whether 
or not a symptom is indeed a sign.  These may include an intensification of the inspecting 
gaze through technologies of visualization – such as x-rays and scans, as well as 
measurements, such as blood and other pathological tests.  But each of these also 
requires interpretation.  It is through these diagnostic processes that people are included 
and excluded from a diagnostic category.    
 As I show throughout the book, in this work of differentiating the pathological, 
medicine is conducting a form of identity work on persons that leads on to admitting 
people to, or excluding them from, diagnostic categories. Think back to the red and itchy 
rash: given the apprehension that it may be the sign of something more, there is a  
mixture of relief and displacement when the doctor says, after questioning, that it is 
probably to do with your washing powder or shower gel.  You are so ready to offer up 
accounts – protestations that you have never had any allergies or trouble before, how 
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you have been to the pharmacy and used their recommended anti-itching creams, how 
you have altered your diet and tried changing your washing power, washing-up liquid, 
shampoo, shower gel and so on.  You have your arm on display: the red itchy rash is plain 
to see.  You are full of apprehension, anticipation and hope. These only to be dashed as 
the doctor sends you home with no diagnosis: the move disposes you and the rash – 
there is nothing pathological there, it isn’t, yet at least, a clinical problem.  The clinic is 
thus both a moment of immersion in the real – ‘look here it is, my arm, red, and itchy’ - 
and a site of agonistics (Latimer 2005, Lyotard 1984) of who or what can account for the 
underpinnings of the real.   
 Please do not mistake me here as saying the categorical work of the clinic is purely 
clinical; as other studies have shown, diagnostic work serves and is effected by many 
agendas (Berg 1992, Dingwall and Murray 1983, Hillman et al 2011, Latimer 1997).  
Rather, my point is that these processes of inclusion and exclusion in what counts as 
pathological are central to medicine’s claim to being a science. The diagnostic categories 
constitute the ‘categorical work’ of medicine: it is the realm of what is sometimes 
referred to as ‘clinical judgement’ and is the domain of the clinic. And, critically, this 
centrality of classification is as much about doubt, and the precarious nature of 
diagnosis, as it is about certainty. There is always a tension between the existence of 
doubt and the desire for certainty (Charon and Wyer 2008), a tension that, I suggest, 
opens up and institutes an endless demand for medical discretion and judgement.    
 The everyday work of establishing whether or not something is pathological, and of 
inclusion and exclusion to and from diagnostic categories in the clinic, is therefore key to 
understanding medical power as a particular form of power, which revolves around the 
retention and redistribution of discretion.  As I go on to show not only do clinicians 
transform themselves into ‘centres of discretion’ (Munro 1999) by transfering much of 
the discretion in diagnosis from the patient to themselves, they also retain discretion in 
diagnosis by postponing the meaning of laboratory findings back to their clinical 
judgment.  
 
Power and deferral   
 
It is helpful before continuing to emphasise that the site under study has two 
interdependent interfaces. The first interface takes place between the institutions of 
genetic techno-science and clinical medicine, namely the laboratory and the clinic, and 
between the participants therein, namely the biologist and the doctor. The second 
interface is between the clinic and that other key social institution, the family. It is here 
that the classification practices of medicine are not only put into practice, but are 
themselves being constructed and reconstructed by way of interchanges and interactions 
between the doctor and the patients. 
Understanding the clinic as a ‘centre of discretion’ refers to the first of these two 
interfaces and helps balance off Bruno Latour’s (1987) exegesis of the laboratory as a 
‘centre of calculation’. Power is never mastered though measurement alone. While it is 
certainly the case that much measurement has moved from the clinic to the laboratory, 
calculation for Latour means both measurement and decision.  
For the clinicians to retain power it is necessary for there to be processes of deferral 
that return decision-making to the clinic. It is crucial to medicine’s fate that its 
arrangements defer the moment of decision away from laboratory results. For all the 
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measurements in the laboratory, this aspect of calculation must wait upon the discretion 
of clinicians.  Crucial to medicine retaining its power, is the mundane fact that this identity 
work of categorising persons is never finalised ahead of the consultation with the family in 
the clinic. 
We need to be careful with what we think is going on here. This is not just me 
observing an everyday form of deferral that proceeds by way of patients granting 
authority to clinicians – giving way as in the case of the rash discussed above to those who 
hold themselves out to have knowledge that we ourselves do not possess. This latter form 
of deferral, akin to agricultural labourers doffing their cap to the farmer, is certainly a 
mainstay of the second kind of interface – relations between the clinic and the family. But 
it is, in the dysmorphology clinic at least, not entirely a one-way street. As I hope to show, 
that something is or is not pathological (and that it then belongs or doesn’t to a diagnostic 
category) has also to be made to hold in the clinic in the face of potentially contradictory 
evidence that comes from the family, not just the laboratory.  
Bringing these two interfaces into consideration with one another helps to explain 
how medicine orders and re-orders scientific work in the laboratory. Only at the moment 
of diagnosis is ‘opinion’ delivered, consecrating the patient as having (or not having) this or 
that pathology; and as belonging (or not belonging) to this or that diagnostic category.  
Even after this consecration, there is room for doubt. After all, what has been 
delivered to patients in the context of the clinic remains, expressly, an opinion! Medicine 
always holds itself out as ready for a ‘second opinion’. Doctors are not automatons and a 
different doctor may disagree, exercising what I call their ‘powers of discretion’. As I show 
throughout the book, this deferral of knowledge to the clinical moment is absolutely key 
to medicine’s power. It is this process of deferral that keeps the clinic pivotal - not only to 
the integration of genetic science with society - but because it makes the family the 
essential point of delivery, and discovery, of scientific knowledge in human genetics.  
 
The culture of enhancement 
 
A key focus on these two interfaces is the emergent space of what Adele Clarke and her 
colleagues (2003, 2010) call biomedicalization, an era of even more intense 
medicalization covering all aspects of life, health and death. In unpicking this thesis of 
biomedicalization, and showing the extent to which medical dominance has never really 
declined, it is necessary to watch closely how ideas, as well as people’s bodies and their 
parts, travel backwards and forwards between these two interfaces for examination, 
categorization, and intervention. 
 To fulfil its promise, the new genetics has not only to understand the molecular 
basis of disease: it has to crash through the barriers constructed around the current 
reality of greater longevity being drained of health and wealth by chronic and 
degenerative illness. This is why the promise of the new genetics sits so well with, and 
indeed is so very much a part of a culture of enhancement, in which techno-science is 
figured as empowering and enabling (Strathern 1995 and 1996).  
 Yet all this promise rests upon medical practitioners re-representing the origins of 
disease and disorders of the body, their aetiologies and natural histories, as genetic, 
rather than as the effects of lifestyle or environment.  As illustrated in the example I give 
next of a syndrome, there have to be practices of distinction through which particular 
effects found in bodies can be ascribed as having a genetic origin.  That is, there needs to 
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be a subterranean shift in the grounds of explanation, and aetiology, of disease, and in 
the very ways in which phenomena are identified and categorised as clinically 
pathological. The proposed causes of ill health, disability and disease have to change. 
 In order to be persuasive, these new grounds of explanation must be compelling. 
As at the same time as authoritative statements circulate about what is already known, 
they must also be inventive – offering something new that gives hope. So shifts in 
explanatory grounds need to occur not only within medicine itself, but also in society, 
particularly in terms of how people imagine themselves and appear to each other.   
 As I go on to show, for all that dysmorphology begins with the abnormal, these 
shifts are likely to end up affecting a much wider array of persons. There are changes 
afoot in terms of how both doctors and ordinary people imagine the origins of how our 
bodies look or function. The various chapters in this book draw on my field study of 
dysmorphology to explore how this subterranean shift is being accomplished. What is 
changing are ideas about what it is that makes up the normal as well as the abnormal; 
and, of course, with this, the categories that make up the pathological.  
 
Dysmorphology: a study in medical power 
 
Am I being nostalgic in hanging onto the notion of the clinic and its intimate relations 
with the family? As already mentioned, views that champion the laboratory as the key 
site of the new genetics beg the question of how medicine might be in a better position 
to embed the new genetics into society, to say nothing of the vexed issue of medical 
dominance. Nonetheless, it is fair to question the place of the family here. Could social 
life really be reshaped by an alliance of the laboratory and the clinic that by-passes the 
family and makes medicine entirely beholden to the new genetics?  
 To ground my themes of medical power in an empirical field, and avoid the kind of 
abstraction that too often glosses over the intricacies and complexities involved, I draw 
on a field study of dysmorphology throughout the book. The fieldwork for this study 
tracked dysmorphology through all its interfaces, alignments, occasions, discourses, 
processes, practices and technologies.   
The clinical definition of dysmorphology is the professional discipline of delineating 
disorders affecting the physical development of individuals, before or after birth (Aase 
1990). In Europe dysmorphology has evolved as a sub-discipline, or knowledge practice, 
within medical or human genetics. Importantly for understanding how dysmorphology 
works as a science, classification takes place not in the diagnosis of diseases, but in terms 
of syndromes. 
Here is a brief example of the kind of talk by experts which illustrates their focus on 
syndromes: 
Dr Casey, Specialist Registrar in Genetic Medicine: He’s (Simon) an autistic boy, very 
autistic.  They [Simon’s parents] need a long chat. 
Dr Smith, Consultant Geneticist:  Yes . . I am just wondering if he should remind me 
of anything. (Pause).  Not at the moment. 
Dr Casey: A lot of it [medical perception in dysmorphology] is pattern recognition. 
Dr Smith: The only other thing.  He wasn’t typical; he was too like his family. I’m 
always very cautious.   
Dr Casey: We’ve all got a syndrome. 
 17 
Dr Smith: Yes, we have a unique syndrome.  There is a condition with fleshy earlobes 
but he didn’t even have constipation problems so we can’t go down that route.  
[They both look at their notes]. 
Dr Casey: I know what I am thinking of - Coffin-Lowry; they tend to have cone shaped 
epiphysesi, but he’s not hyperteloric (widely spaced eyes) enough. 
In what kind of classificatory system do ‘fleshy earlobes’ sit alongside ‘constipation’? And 
how would ‘widely spaced eyes’ be significant? How can someone like Simon not be 
‘typical’ (of what? a syndrome?) and yet be ‘too like’ his family? And what does it mean 
that a syndrome is something we all have, something that it is unique to each of us? Can 
we ‘be’ a syndrome that is unique, but also belong to another kind of syndrome, that is 
shared, like Coffin-Lowry? 
It is striking that these doctors are not talking about a disease – diseases are 
something that people or their bodies have – someone has meningitis, or cancer, or 
multiple sclerosis. These doctors are talking differently. Critically, a syndrome is both 
something that someone is, and/or belongs to.  
So what is a ‘syndrome’? Syndromes are combinations and associations between 
diseases, and other signs and symptoms, including unusual features, which may or may 
not represent pathologies or deformities.  They are ‘associations’, a ‘concourse’ of things, 
that live alongside each other, or fit together.  For example, Coffin-Lowry syndrome is 
described as: 
a rare genetic disorder characterized by craniofacial (head and facial) and skeletal 
abnormalities, mental retardation, short stature, and hypotonia. Characteristic facial 
features may include an underdeveloped upper jaw bone (maxillary hypoplasia), a 
broad nose, protruding nostrils (nares), an abnormally prominent brow, 
downslanting eyelid folds (palpebral fissures), widely spaced eyes (hypertelorism), 
large ears, and unusually thick eyebrows. Skeletal abnormalities may include 
abnormal front-to-back and side-to-side curvature of the spine (kyphoscoliosis), 
unusual prominence of the breastbone (pectus carinatum), and short, 
hyperextensible, tapered fingers. Additional abnormalities may also be present. 
Other features may include feeding and respiratory problems, developmental delay, 
mental retardation, hearing impairment, awkward gait, flat feet, and heart and 
kidney involvement. The disorder affects males and females in equal numbers, 
however, symptoms may be more severe in males. Females may show mild mental 
retardation. The disorder is caused by a defective gene, RSK2, which was found in 
1996 on the X chromosome (Xp22.2-p22.1). The gene codes for a member of a 
growth factor regulated protein kinase. It is unclear how changes (mutations) in the 
DNA structure of the gene lead to the clinical findings. (National Institute of 
Neurological Disorders and Stroke, 
http://www.ninds.nih.gov/disorders/coffin_lowry/coffin_lowry.htm, accessed July 
2005) 
Many syndromes like Coffin-Lowry have a particular look or ‘face’.  In Figure 1.1 I have 
included a ‘picture’ of Davis James Illa.  His photograph is reproduced with kind permission 
of his mother, Mary C. Hoffman, Founder of the Coffin-Lowry Syndrome Foundation.  The 
family portrait of James doubles as a clinical picture of someone whom clinicians call a 
‘representative subject’: they have the typical face and features of the syndrome.   
The picture is also on the Coffin-Lowry Syndrome Foundation Webpage – described 
as a resource for families, teachers, relatives and clinicians:   
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Welcome to The Coffin-Lowry Syndrome Foundation (CLSF). The purpose of CLSF is to provide a 
clearinghouse for information on Coffin-Lowry Syndrome (CLS), and to provide families affected by 
CLS a general forum in which to exchange information, ideas and advice.  CLSF provides family 
matching services, telephone support, online discussion forum , an informational database and 
publishes an on-line newsletter, CLSF News. The newsletter is available in hard-copy free of charge to 
members without internet access. The online discussion forum is restricted to families, caregivers, 
teachers and medical professionals who have direct connections with CLS individuals. (Coffin-Lowry 
Syndrome Foundation, undated) 
 
 
 
Fig. 1.1 Welcome to the Coffin Lowry Syndrome Website 
 
Classification in dysmorphology proceeds, not in terms of diseases, but syndromes, which 
includes both pathological and non-pathological signs and features. What I want to stress 
here is that people like James in the photograph cannot simply enter the clinic and hold 
out or point to the part of them that isn’t working properly – the rash on their arm for 
example. There is nothing pathological about James’ face in itself, albeit that the 
photograph of him has become representative of the diagnostic category that he has in 
common with some others.   
Pathology at the genetic level is productive of syndromes, and syndromes are holistic 
– they work across systems - and are something that someone is.  But they may also be 
more than this.  They may also be something that a family is.  Thus diagnostic categories 
are very complex and – as can be seen from the above description of Coffin-Lowry 
syndrome - associated with genetic mutations. However, for many syndromes no mutation 
has yet been made visible at the molecular level. Indeed, as can be seen from the citation 
above, even in a syndrome where the mutation at the genetic level has been made visible, 
the pathway from the mutation to clinical picture is still ‘unclear’ – ‘It is unclear how 
changes (mutations) in the DNA structure of the gene lead to the clinical findings’.   
Syndromes such as Coffin Lowry were mapped to chromosomes and to what is called 
a ‘single gene’.  The basis of this syndrome thus concerns what is rapidly beginning to look 
like old knowledge – in the wake of post-genomic understanding the genetic component 
of syndromes begins to look more complex. While ‘genomics encompasses everything 
from sequencing genomes, ascribing functions to genes, and studying the structure of 
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genes (gene architecture)’, post-genomics ‘takes these techniques further’, to be able to 
study a person’s ‘entire genome’ (Coleman 2006). But as will be seen, the genetic needs 
more than this – it needs more than individuals, it needs families.   
For example, the Coffin Lowry foundation (including its website) is what Callon and 
Rabeharisoa (2008) describe as an emergent concerned group, a new social formation that 
is in part a response to the uncertainties of genetic diagnosis, in which associations of 
families, techno-science and the clinic can be seen to co-produce Coffin-Lowry as a genetic 
condition and as a pressure group.  But what I want also to point to is how ‘Coffin-Lowry’ 
as a network of associations is also helping to produce and circulate the conception of 
syndromes as a new kind of clinical entity but one that still has so much that is undecided 
about it.   
As is discussed later, particularly in chapter 7, genetic medicine is one of the sites in 
which the shift – from single genes to genotype, from individuals to families, from diseases 
to syndromes  - is being executed. This is because it is in the clinic that an (aberrant) 
genotype is being made visible as having its own clinical picture, not one simply located in 
the body of an individual, such as James Illa, but across the bodies of people who are 
biologically related, that is families.   
For the moment, I want to stress how this science is embryonic and busy shrinking 
the field of the so-called normal. As the clinician in the above extract from the study says 
‘everyone has a syndrome’ and, while many syndromes may not be as distinct as the 
picture of James Illa suggests, it is hard to see how many who currently think of 
themselves as normal will escape the net being created by dysmorphology as each 
genotype is made visible as having its own clinical picture. 
 
 
A revival of medical dominance? 
 
For these reasons, among others, I think dysmorphology offers a contemporary example of 
how medicine appears to be reviving its power in the wake of genetic discoveries in 
biology.  Specifically, dysmorphology deploys methods of genetic profiling, such as genetic 
techno-scientific discourse and technology, as well as discourses of embryology and 
human development, and draws all these together into its classic clinical methods for 
making pathology visible.  But pathology here is at the level of the genes.   
In terms of what I have called the first interface – the laboratory and the clinic - 
dysmorphology thus provides medicine with new as well as old alignments and new as 
well as old extensions. Through these alignments and extensions, medicine gains more 
grounds as a system of explanation, not less, including a place at the new frontier of 
genetic science.  In addition, as a social institution – the interface between the clinic and 
the family - it gains even greater access to persons and families, becoming the managers of 
procreation strategies aimed at putting a stop on the reproduction of the abnormal and 
the proliferation of chronic disabling illness.    
Ironically, then, my thesis of a percipient revival in medical power depends less on 
any process of natural selection and evolution. While the species of discourse we call 
medicine shows itself to be extraordinary at adapting to survive whatever a hostile 
environment throws at it, I am not suggesting it does so through some kind of Darwinian 
process of mutation.  Nor do I suggest that medical dominance is accomplished through 
any essential or inherent fitness.  
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As I discuss in the next chapter, medical dominance is accomplished through 
medicine aligning itself with other institutions in ways that lead to its own engrossment in 
society. This is not to suggest that this process of engrossment is necessary or automatic. 
There is much hard graft involved in appropriating practices and discourses that can carry 
and move the social.   
Nor does this graft just include simple processes of medicalization, or a colonisation 
of other systems or of the life world.  Similarly, dominance cannot be accomplished solely 
through practices of exclusion, although both medicalization and processes of exclusion do 
figure in my story. But it does depend upon moments of exclusion, moments when other 
systems, other grounds of explanation or possibilities for interpretation and conduct, get 
squeezed out.   
My argument is that what is happening constitutes not only a medicalization of the 
biosciences, but sees the emergence of a new gaze (Foucault 2003b), a ‘way of seeing’ that 
is helping to constitute the genetic as a domain of explanation for the (mis)shaping and 
(de)forming of bodies, and the pathologies that flow from these deformations. In its focus 
on defining the misshapen, and the deformed, dysmorphology performs itself as a space of 
differentiation: as having a gaze that can distinguish between different aetiologies for 
pathologies in growth and form, even those molecular entities, the genotype, that are as 
yet invisible to laboratory science.  
At the same time the clinic creates a space of deferral that legitimates the need for a 
future of more science and more technology. So let me say ahead I am not going to 
suggest that simply because medicine appears to involve an archaeology of different 
discourses, and a genealogy of multiple explanatory frameworks, that it represents a loss 
of purity; it has always been so. In the chapters that follow I show how in the clinic 
geneticists attach and detach themselves both to and from the knowledge offered by 
other scientific and technical domains of knowledge.   
As I say, this is nothing new – medicine has always aligned itself with other scientific 
and technical domains. Social medicine and public health, for example, developed out of 
the alignment of clinical medicine, methods of population statistical analyses and 
engineering in the form of mains water and sewage works (Webster 1996).  But what is of 
interest here is how clinical medicine is working its relations with the domain of an 
emerging and developing genetic techno-science.   
Engaging with dogmatic ideas about the purity of domains (Latour 1990) is to 
misunderstand the relation between knowledge and power. So the study that follows 
abandons any notion that there is a purely clinical medical domain, or the dream of a 
purely laboratory-based science of genetics. Indeed, as will be seen, the laboratory of 
genetic science is distributed across many moments, occasions and locations, including the 
interactions between the clinic and the family - the very site in which medicine commands 
most power. 
In this way the book explores the relation between medicine and genetic science in 
their co-constitution of the genetic as an emergent domain of culture and explanation.  In 
particular it illuminates what this co-constitutive relation between clinical medicine and 
genetic science affords each in terms of authority, legitimacy and power.  
 
An outline of the chapters 
 
There are four parts to the book. The first part, Introduction and Background,  
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chapters 1 to 3, offers an introduction and background to the books three main themes. 
Chapter 2 sets out the four perspectives on medical power and elaborates on why the 
interaction of the gene and the clinic may be pivotal to my theme of a revival in medical 
dominance. While this chapter is critical to understanding the themes of the book, some 
readers might prefer to turn back to this chapter later in order to see first how 
contemporary doctors are performing genetic science. Chapter 3 reviews the relationship 
between medicine and science, illustrating how this relation is performed in genetic 
medicine generally and by dysmorphology in particular.  
 In the second part of the book, The Gene and Medicine, Chapter 4 describes 
how the relation between the laboratory and the clinic is specifically being constituted in 
genetic medicine as one of translation and co-construction in discovery, knowledge and 
innovation in genetic science. Chapter 5 shows how medicine in dysmorphology appears 
to not just be contributing to new understandings of genetic disease but to the 
relationship between genes and the growth and form of human beings.   
 In Part 3, The Clinic and Visibility, Chapter 6 takes us inside the clinic as an 
immersion in the real worlds of fleshy bodies, families, and persons to show how 
dysmorphology creates its clinic pictures of syndromes. Chapter 7 presses how the clinic 
through its immersion in the family differentiates genetic from non-genetic disorders so 
that the clinic emerges as a kind of laboratory in which doubt and deferral emerge as 
important as decisions and disposal, while the actual laboratory is relegated to the 
mundane production of tests and reports. Chapter 8 examines the visual culture of 
dysmorphology to suggest that it constitutes a new form of medical portraiture. What 
becomes visible in how dysmorphology constructs its portraits is the genotype-phenotype 
relation, a relation that cannot yet be revealed by techno-science alone.  Thus I suggest 
that the clinic in dysmorphology is helping to provide a space of crossing for the 
ambiguous and elusive relation between the codes and digits of molecular biology and the 
substance of fleshy bodies: that is between information, deformation and formation.  
In the fourth part of the book, The Family and Identities, Chapter 9 explores how the 
alignment of the gene and the clinic reconstructs the relation between bodies, persons, 
and the human.  It explores contemporary debates around how the recombinant 
biopolitics of the new genetics is eroding the very notion of the human. In this chapter, I 
show how there would be no point in a gene medicine that was only concerned with 
persons as biologically determined: gene medicine would have no power if it did not also 
reaffirm the human as of a higher order than mere substance. Specifically, paediatric 
genetic medicine, in all its crossings, reperforms the clinic as at the ‘pinnacle’ of the 
specifically human (Foucault 2003b), not the biological, or newly fashioned, ‘life’ sciences.  
Chapter 10 revisits the relationship between medicine and the family, particularly in 
the context of contemporary discourses that institute parenting as an extension of actor-
networks of public health. I show how the bodies of children become the visible 
manifestation and measure of good parenting, both in terms of looking good, being good 
and being healthy. However I also show how good parenting in these discourses is directed 
at lifestyle choice. I then go on to explore what family becomes in the genetics clinic and 
how at the same time as clinical processes intensify the responsibalization of parents as 
reproducing the future of healthy progeny, the alignment of the genetic clinic and the 
family institutes parents not merely as agents providing the right kind of environment for 
their child, but as family members whose biological matter may or may not need 
reforming.  
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Chapter 11 examines consultations in the clinic with the family, described by 
dysmorphologists as ‘genetic counselling’, a twin process of differential diagnosis and the 
calculation of risk of recurrence in other pregnancies. Focussing on interactions between 
families and clinicians, I show that family members are not so much disciplined in these 
encounters but are enrolled in the everyday work of clinical differentiation. I examine the 
nature and extent of this participation to show how they constitute relations of exchange, 
in which family members gift the clinic access to the family, both virtual and literal, in the 
form of bodies, photographs, histories and accounts, while parents are given a 
perspective, a way to knowledge that gives hope of a future of classification for what is 
wrong with their child/family. Specifically, family members are not simply informed about 
‘what is’, rather, the clinic becomes a site of gathering, which engages parents in the 
epistemological work of objectification and differentiation, through which what is 
abnormal about their child is defined alongside clinician’s performance of deferral. The 
chapter shows how participation in this motility of clinical work moves parents between 
definition and deferral to excite consciousness of the riskiness of reproduction elicit 
moments of reflexivity and accomplish shifts in perspective.  
 In the final part of the book, Medicine and Power, Chapter 12 summarises the 
preceding chapters and returns to my initial argument of how medicine’s dominant place 
is being reinvigorated by its alignment of the clinic, the gene, and the family.  I review 
theories of the erosion of medical dominance, including the geneticization of medicine.  I 
show how in aligning the clinic and the new genetics, medicine is not simply being enrolled 
in a project coming from science but is itself complicit in the emergence of the genetic as a 
new domain that is engrossing medicine, science, social science and the social body.  It 
concludes the book by summarising my argument and offering a new way of thinking 
about medicine and power. I stress how the clinic is a site of bridging, crossing and 
gathering, between irreducible yet partially connected domains:  the molar and the 
molecular, the flesh and informational codes, the social and the biological, the phenotype 
and the genotype, the individual and the family. I suggest that it is in its switches in 
extension with other domains, in its intermittent and temporary attachments and 
detachments, to genetic techno-science one moment, to the clinic the next, and to the 
family the next, that medicine reinvigorates its power. I argue that commentators who 
augur the erosion of medicine completely underestimate its place as an institution whose 
authority is reinvigorated by its partial connection to science, and its partial connection to 
the family, and its partial connection to capital, and its partial connection to governing, 
and its partial connection to family and persons. Here I reiterate how we are in the midst 
of a return to a very functional approach to knowledge, rooted in ideas of need and 
impact, through which we are experiencing an intense medicalization of the biosciences.  I 
then return to my theme of medicine’s humanism, and the kinds of human being enacted 
in the clinic, to end the book with some thoughts on all the forms of life, ways of being and 
becoming, and the relationalities that the reinvigoration of the particular form of 
humanism in genetic medicine cuts out. 
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Chapter 2 
 
 
The Clinic as the Site of Science 
 
The signs and symptoms of disease do something more than 
signify the functioning of our bodies: they also signify critically 
sensitive and contradictory components of our culture and 
social relations. Yet, in our standard medical practices this social 
“language” emanating from our bodies is manipulated by 
concealing it within the realm of biological signs. (Taussig 1980, 
abstract)  
 
Introduction 
 
The previous chapter discussed how the path taken by the new genetics may be greatly 
affected by whether or not medicine retains its dominance in society. Ahead of explaining 
how the clinic is key to science, this chapter examines explanations for the rise of medical 
dominance and points out how it is classification – and its production of categories - that 
makes medicine both scientific and socially relevant. 
 The idea of medical dominance has long been debated in sociology and other 
fields.  The thesis is based on an idea that there is a ‘medical model’, which in turn 
explains illness as a biophysiological phenomenon.  Gabe et al (2004) summarise the 
medical model thus: 
 
The medical model refers to the conception of disease established in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, based on an anatomo-pathological 
view of the individual body.  (P.p. 125) 
 
Often referred to as ‘Western medicine’, modern medicine emerged from the ‘new 
sciences’ of the 18th and 19th century and, subsequently, its associated group of clinical 
practices grew to dominate the treatment of illness in all the more developed nations. 
 According to Gabe et al, this medical model: a) incorporated the multiple 
paradigms in the eighteenth century for diseases and their causes; b) developed 
pathological anatomy in the mid-nineteenth century to locate specific diseases in 
particular organs or tissues; and c) demonstrated through bacteriology at the end of the 
nineteenth century that microbes caused major infections, such as tuberculosis and 
cholera. Together these culminated and coalesced around the clinical practice of making 
a correct identification of any pathology, or ‘clinical diagnosis’. 
 As Gabe et al suggest, clinical consultations increasingly focussed on the individual 
bodies of patients ‘to the neglect of the wider social context’ and they identify three core 
assumptions that established pathology within the corporality of the body: 1) that each 
disease has one cause for each disease (aetiology); 2) that diseases cause lesions in 
anatomy and physiology of the body – later to be broken down further into mechanisms 
of development (pathogenesis) and the structural alterations of cells (morphologic 
changes); 3) that these processes underlie the ‘signs’ observed on the body and the 
patient’s presentation of ‘symptoms’ (clinical manifestations).  
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 For all this focus on the individual body, it is the search for accurate diagnosis, 
rather than the cures themselves, that becomes the crucial part of the ‘physician’s craft’ 
and enables medicine to shape and influence society much more generally. For instance, 
the kind of identity work mentioned in Chapter 1 about who we are, and what life we 
might expect to enjoy, becomes increasingly entangled with this propensity for clinicians 
to offer a diagnosis. Similarly it is its ability to classify diseases, rather than cure persons, 
that allows medicine to act as the gatekeeper to many conceptual as well as material 
social goods. This is a role that, in turn, deepens its alignments with forms of governing 
on the one hand, and political economies on the other.  
 The fact that medicine also then became omniscient as a social institution (despite 
its apparent neglect of what Gabe et al term the social context) calls for further 
explanation, and four perspectives can be delineated as the mainstays to this wider 
understanding of medical dominance: the sick role (Parsons), professional dominance 
(Freidson), medicalization (Foucault, Illich and Zola), and biopolitics, including processes 
of normalization (Foucault). These perspectives not only help elaborate the view that 
medicine has become the leading profession in terms of both status and monetary 
rewards; they also help explain how medicine became the most important functional 
organisation through its focus on healing and repairing bodies. The upshot is that 
medicine acts as a dominant system of thought throughout society, as well as being a key 
social institution in its own right.  
 In the next four sections I explicate this wider thesis of medical dominance, taking 
in turn each perspective: the sick role, professional dominance, medicalization, and 
biopolitics. I do so partly to illuminate the importance of the clinic in linking medicine to 
society, but I also do so in order to challenge the current big story, mentioned in Chapter 
1, that we are seeing a decline in medical dominance (for example, Rose 2007 a&b). I also 
want to address the corollary idea that we are witnessing the ‘death of the clinic’ 
(Rabinow 1992 drawing on Haraway, see also Latimer et al 2006). As the later chapters 
unfold, it will become clear why I believe both these stories to be profoundly mistaken.  
 In the second half of this chapter, I go back through two of the perspectives of 
medical dominance, namely medicalization and biopolitics, to unpick more carefully the 
key contribution of the clinic. My aim here is to examine closely how it is that clinical 
practices radiate out into society and so affect its wider governance and culture. As I 
show, much of the prognosis about a decline in medical power lies in a poor 
understanding of how the clinic remains pivotal to medicine’s own status of being 
scientific in its methods and procedures. Once this is better understood, it will become 
clear not only how the clinic acts as the cornerstone of the biological sciences’ impact on 
society, but also why work in the clinic is proving key to developments in the new 
genetics.  
 
 
Medicine and the sick role 
 
There is a long history of theories that seek to explain how medicine came to be so 
dominant, and so align itself powerfully with other institutions,. In particular Talcott 
Parsons, one of the major figures of mid-20th century sociology, argued that medicine 
occupied an important place in the social system. His idea of a social system was based on 
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the premise that every subject, and every institution, had a ‘part’ to play that articulated 
with the whole.  
This holistic theory presumed that there was a social contract of rights and 
obligations between individuals (the parts) and society (the whole), and, in his conception 
of the sick role, Parsons (1951) is offering a way of understanding how society and its parts 
act when the individual is unable to fulfil their usual duties and obligations: 
 
 . . illness is a state of disturbance in the "normal" functioning of the total 
human individual, including both the state of the organism as a biological 
system and of his personal and social adjustments. It is thus partly biologically 
and partly socially defined. Participation in the social system is always 
potentially relevant to the state of illness, to its aetiology and to the conditions 
of successful therapy, as well as to other things. (Parsons 1964, p.431) 
 
Medicine’s status as a social institution thus flows, according to Parsons, not simply from 
its power to cure the sick, but rather from its having the authority to differentiate.  In the 
case of the sick role clinical differentation distinguishes between deviation from normal 
roles, obligations, and duties that are legitimate on the one hand and illegitimate 
deviations due to time wasting and irresponsibility on the other: 
 
 . . for common sense there may be some question of whether "being sick" 
constitutes a social role at all - isn't it simply a state of fact, a "condition"?  . . 
Things are not quite so simple as that. The test is the existence of a set of 
institutionalised expectations and the corresponding sentiments and sanctions. 
(Parsons 1991, p.293)   
   
In this model, as many commentators have pointed out, patients have to pass as 
legitimately sick: that is their troubles have to be made visible by a doctor both as clinically  
pathological and as a disease. Entry to the sick role had to be taken as temporary and 
doctors were accorded the right to physically examine patients’ bodies and to inquire into 
intimate areas of their personal and physical life. In time doctors came to be used by other 
institutions, government, companies, schools, hospitals and even family, to help them to 
distinguish people faking it from the genuine thing; the hyperchondriacal, the hysterical 
and the malingerers from people with real illness.  
 In acting as ‘gatekeepers’, doctors were increasingly guided by rules of professional 
practice. The obligations and duties of the doctor, as a professional, were to apply a high 
degree of skill and knowledge to this problem of illness, to act for the welfare of the 
patient and the community, rather than self-interest or a desire for money or 
advancement. In return, doctors were granted considerable autonomy in their 
professional practice and placed in a position of authority in relation to patients. 
Consequently, as well as having a desire to get well, patients had to comply with ‘doctor’s 
orders’. This encouraged a growing passivity within the populace in the face of medical 
authority. 
While failure to perform normal duties threatens the smooth working of other social 
institutions, such as the workplace or the family, to be sick enjoys a certain status. It is 
itself a social category; a state of being that occupies a ‘structural’ position (Turner 1967).  
This is evident in the issuing of ‘sick notes’ to those deemed by doctors to be ill enough to 
 27 
gain all the rights and privileges of the sick person. It is also what Seale et al (2001) call a 
‘blameless category’. It absolves the sick person temporarily from blame. To be sick is 
distinct from a general class of behaviour that would otherwise be seen as deviant or 
morally reprehensible (e.g. not going to work).  
Medicine is thus much more than an important social institution in its own right. In 
Parsons’ analysis, doctors appear as both the moral guardians of society and as 
gatekeepers to sickness as a role (and a blameless category provided certain conditions are 
met). Nonetheless, within this relation, sickness still has to be temporary. Problems arise 
for both the smooth running of medicine and for society, when the temporality of sickness 
shifts to predominately chronic conditions. However, I still want to stress how, in this 
analysis, medicine is instuted as a site of differentiation - in this case differentiating the 
really ill from the rest.   
 
 
Medicine as professional dominance 
 
In contrast to Parsons, Eliot Freidson argues medicine is not so much a working institution 
that fits functionally into society, as it is a social institution that becomes self-interested in 
its own right. He shows how medical dominance depends for its power not upon a system 
of rights, duties and obligations, but upon professional dominance as a process of 
territorialization, monopolisation and exclusion. Over time this dominance has sedimented 
the medical profession’s status in ways that grant it not only control over its own work, 
but dominion over the work of other health workers, as well as over health resource 
allocation, health policy, and the way hospitals are run.  
Within this view medical dominance is accomplished through a relationship between 
the medical profession and the state. Specifically, the medical profession is on the one 
hand characterised by its autonomy from the state; for instance it defines its own ethical 
codes of practice and sets its own entry requirements to its various disciplines. On the 
other hand, it owes its exalted station within the social system to the licence that grants it 
authority to define and legitimate – including such matters as life and death, sickness and 
health (Freidson 1988). 
More expansively, Irving Zola (1972) and Ivan Illich (1976) press the idea of 
medicine’s authority in terms of how it has come to dominate people’s ways of thinking: of 
how it works at the cultural level. Each questions the extent to which the medical model 
does not just influence, but takes over our ways of imagining what is normal. Their 
concern is over how medicine begins to shape identities, particularly in terms of what are 
appropriate ways of being and doing: 
  . . medicine is becoming a major institution of social control, nudging aside if 
not incorporating the traditional institutions of religion and law.  It is becoming 
the new repository of truth, the place where absolute and often final 
judgements are made, not in the name of virtue or legitimacy, but in the name 
of health. Moreover, this is not occurring through the political power 
physicians hold or can influence, but is largely an insidious and undramatic 
phenomenon accomplished by “medicalizing” much of daily living, by making 
medicine and the labels “healthy” and “ill” relevant to an ever increasing part 
of human existence’.  (Zola 1972)  
For Zola, medicine as an institution produces, and reproduces, culturally dominant ideas of 
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normality and colonises domains of existence that would come more appropriately under 
the authority of other institutions. As the repository of truth, Zola is suggesting that 
medicine has a normative function: in which final judgements are made about people in 
terms of their health. Thus Zola begins to draw out the relation between medicine and 
practices of normalization, in which people can be marked as healthy or ill.   
 Illich (1976), in the context of industrial forms of organization that create ill health, 
further emphasises how medicine changes how we think about ourselves and what we do.  
Medicalization, Illich suggests, is achieved by ‘social iatrogenesis’, the process by which: 
[M]edical practice sponsors sickness by reinforcing a morbid society that 
encourages people to become consumers of curative, preventive, industrial 
and environmental medicine (p.42).  
Critically, for Illich this dependency on medicine is self-serving for the medical profession 
and its allies, such as the pharmaceutical industry. Indeed, as it deskills people, a kind of 
cultural iatrogenesis ensues, which destroys ‘healthy responses to suffering, impairment 
and death’, thus creating more ill health and a vicious circle in the need for more 
medicine.   
More recent theories of medical dominance also stress how medicine is implicated in 
dividing practices through which the normal and the abnormal (as well as notions of the 
natural and the unnatural) are produced and reproduced (see for example, Fraser and 
Greco 2006; Lambert and Macdonald 2009).  Yet for all that these theories expand our 
awareness of medical dominance, what they do not explain is how the medical model has 
become so insidious to everyday life. 
 
 
Medicalization and the medical gaze 
 
In discussing the theme of medicalization, I want to stress how the clinic is a site in which 
medicine figures itself as increasingly associated with the scientific method in the pursuit 
of truth. This is important, since it is this association that gives medicine its authority and 
institutes the clinic as the key site of discovery of truths about the body and about disease. 
Michel Foucault is a French philosopher whose wide-ranging studies of key 
institutions, including the prison, the asylum and the hospital, have been much discussed 
in recent years. As he suggests in The Birth of the Clinic (2003b), it is in medicine 
associating itself with empiricism, and the supremacy of perception, that it both exercises 
its power and enables its practitioners to perform as sovereign subjects able to develop 
their methods and ways of seeing that, in turn, help constitute medicine as a form of 
positive knowledge.   
In this way the hospital and the bedside are transformed into spaces of observation. 
However, Foucault is not describing medical perception as something that simply happens, 
as if ‘seeing’ was a process of direct unimpeded sight. To the contrary, the importance of 
his archaeological work on medical discourse through the ages is to show us that medical 
perception is an effect of a discursive formation. Specifically, Foucault traces and analyses 
modern medicine’s accounts of itself as a new discursive formation, one that radically 
distinguishes itself from its past.  
What Foucault sees as being argued in modern medicine’s writings about itself is the 
possibility of medicine becoming a pure ‘gaze’, uncluttered by theory or superstition. 
Critically, though, what is ‘seen’ is not being held out to be a representation, an 
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interpretation of what lies beneath the eye. Instead, modern medicine grants its doctors 
direct sight and experience of the real. The gaze is figured as a way to truth because of its 
distancing objectivity – accomplishing what Haraway (1991) calls the ‘godtrick’ – a 
detached objectivity that can read the book of nature (Birke 1998). And, furthermore, does 
this through the passive voice, in which any ‘implication of their own agency is silenced’ 
(Birke 1998).   
The perfection is what Foucault terms a ‘disciplined gaze’, a syncretic mix of 
interpretation and observation in which ‘seeing’ becomes ‘saying’ and ‘saying’ becomes 
‘seeing’. The ‘gaze’ as intricately conjoined modes of perception and annunciation makes 
the invisible visible (cf. Long 1992). Seeing, experience and knowing are different stages – 
but once it is part of the disciplinary gaze, seeing must then be pure. In Foucault’s analysis, 
seeing is actually saying; and thus for medical perception to be able to see the real is a 
matter of semantics.  
Foucault’s point is that the medical gaze, medical perception, medical judgement, 
and clinical discretion are a part of the realities that speak and enact them. However, 
within modern medicine’s framing of experience, discovering the truth can only be arrived 
at through direct perception of the real - as if this were possible prior to any ‘map making’.  
So here we have the expression of the capacity of the gaze as being able to see the real: no 
longer a mere representation of the real.  
Drawing on his ethnography of medical training at Harvard medical school, Byron 
Good (1997) captures something of this epistemological-ontological relation in his study of 
medicine and rationality. He states that, ‘medicine formulates the human body and 
disease in a culturally distinctive fashion’ (Good 1997: 65), and explains: 
 
Doctors of course come to some extent to embody these formulations. . learning 
medicine is about learning quite fundamental practices through which medical 
practitioners engage and formulate reality in a specifically medical way. These 
include specialised ways of ‘seeing’, ‘writing’ and ‘speaking’  (p71). 
 
The message is clear: only by neophyte doctors following this path to knowledge can new 
knowledge of the body, and the truth about disease, be discovered.  
For all this, the gaze does not simply discover facts and make disease visible. Rather, 
its expression is constitutive: both of the objects of which it speaks, and critically, for my 
purposes here, of itself. Here I am borrowing a notion of performativity from Michel Callon 
(2006) who states, “a discourse is indeed performative if it contributes to the construction 
of the reality that it describes.”  I explore this issue of what medicine is performing 
through its discourses further in the next section. 
 
Medicine as biopolitics  
While the performance of the medical gaze as scientific gives medicine its respectability, it 
is medicine’s other associations that afford its more intense processes of medicalizing 
society. In his later work, Foucault is more particularly concerned with the relationship 
between science (including medicine) and forms of governing, than with the relations 
between medicine and science. Specifically, what he helps us to see is that medicine is 
deeply involved in the growth of the institutions that make up liberal forms of 
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government, such as the hospital, the asylum, social medicine and public health 
(2000a&b).  
Within this perspective the hospital is not simply to be conflated with the clinic: 
rather it is a site that is an effect of relations between medicine, the clinic and the state, 
including the panoptic apparatus of surveillance and the survey. For example, with the 
emergence of public health in the 20th century as an alignment of medicine and public 
policy, there is extension of the medical gaze to the population and of the topology of 
medicalization to the home and the city: for instance through the apparatus that 
Armstrong (1983) describes as the dispensary. This alignment of public health, policy and 
medicine is experienced in such technologies as immunization and screening programs.  
Foucault argues that the emergence of medicalization appears with the shift to 
capitalism, but that, ironically, medicine remains social in orientation because it includes 
the association of policy with the legitimation of the management of the health of 
populations:   
 
For capitalist society, it was biopolitics, the biological, the somatic, the corporeal, 
that mattered more than anything else.  The body is a biopolitical reality: medicine is 
a biopolitical strategy. (Foucault 2000a: 137).  
Indeed for Foucault there are three strands that need to be considered in 
understanding what he calls the ‘take off’ of medicine at the end of the eighteenth 
century, composed of the development of a medical model and medical system (Foucault 
2000a p.134). These are: 1) biohistory - the ‘effects of medical interventions at the 
biological level’ (p.134); 2) medicalization – ‘that is the fact that starting in the eighteenth 
century human existence, human behaviours, and the human body were brought into an 
increasingly dense and important network of medicalization that allowed fewer and fewer 
things to escape’ (p.135); and 3) the economy of health – ‘that is, the integration and 
improvement of health, health services, and health consumption in the economic 
development of privileged countries’ (p.135).  Specifically, he argues that it is after World 
War II, and the subsequent articulation of welfare medicine, that medicine’s 
institutionalization is complete (Foucault 2004).  
In all this, the emphasis on bio-politics goes well beyond the spatiality and 
temporality of the medical gaze; including the individuation of body-persons, or the 
advent of the clinic and the hospital. It is about how government’s access to persons is 
legitimated by medicine and its attachments, including but not exclusive to biology.  As 
Foucault stresses, ‘it is understandable that medicine should have had such importance in 
the constitution of the sciences of man—an importance that is not only methodological, 
but ontological, in that it concerns man’s being as object of positive knowledge’ (1976, p 
197).   
Critically then, on the pretext of discovering how to prolong life and relieve suffering, 
medicine legitimates incorporating man’s being as subject to forms of surveillance that run 
much wider than the medical gaze. For example, the birth of social medicine (or public 
health) is made possible through medicine’s alignment of biomedical analysis of bodies 
and their parts, and statistical technologies in the constitution of populations (Foucault 
2000a, Curtis 2002), and of a normalizing judgment bodied forth in surveillance 
technologies such as we find in child health (Bloor and Mackintosh, 1990; Purkis 2002 & 
2003), or pregnancy screening programs (Ginsberg and Rapp 1991).  
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Armstrong (1983) and Silverman (1987) have each emphasised extensions to the 
scope of the medical gaze to include more than the body, so that the clinical work no 
longer simply abstracts the patient as a social being. On the contrary, Armstrong and 
Silverman stress the emergence of a ‘discourse of the social’ that gives medical 
practitioners access to more extensive grounds upon which to call patients to account, so 
that 'a science of the subject has merely extended the range and disciplinary power of the 
professional gaze' (Silverman, 1987: 202).  
This extension of the medical gaze can be seen in many areas of clinical work, 
including general practice, care of the dying (May 1992), and geriatric medicine (Latimer 
2000). It is a process that does not just balance multiple perspectives, but can 'extend 
medicine's gaze to all aspects of bodily, mental, and social existence' (Kaufman 1994 p. 
430). This helps us to understand how medicine has become an agent of what Zola termed 
social control.   
Having covered these four strands of the thesis of medical dominance, I use the rest 
of this chapter to develop the key aspects which, for me, explicate more fully the nature 
and extent of medicine’s dominance in society.  Particularly, I want to go back over and 
underline firstly the specific way in which medicine works as a science, and then secondly 
the idea that it is a technology. 
 
 
The clinic as science 
 
Critically, it is the clinic, not the laboratory, which is the locale for the discovery of modern 
medical knowledge. In The Birth of the Clinic Foucault shows us a medicine that not only 
draws on science, but performs its field as if this is itself scientific. To accomplish its own 
way of seeing truly, the emergent clinic performs its ‘detachment’ from the knowledge of 
everyday life and thereby enacts a displacement of the social as being ‘outside’ medicine.   
It is this aspect of Foucault’s study that I want to press, that what he calls the birth of 
the clinic is the emergence of a way of writing and performing medicine that lays down the 
foundations for the association between medicine and the epistemological-ontological 
relation, which has become so valued and dominant in Euro-American culture.  
 
A scientific practice, in Foucault's account, is a particular set of codified relations 
between a precisely constructed knower and a precisely constructed object, with 
strict rules which govern the formation of concepts. One of these was that 'science' 
had set itself up as the ultimate form of rational thought. With the Enlightenment, 
scientific reason became the privileged way of accessing truth. According to this view 
for knowledge to acquire value as 'truth', it had to constantly strive to become 
'scientific', to construct and organize concepts according to certain rigorous criteria 
of scientificity. (Clair O’Farrell http://www.michel-foucault.com/concepts/index.html 
2007). 
 
While O’Farrell goes on to note that for Foucault scientific knowledge is not inherently 
'superior' or more 'true' than other forms of knowledge, it remains the case that a 
disciplined way of seeing is a way to positive knowledge about the body and disease.  
In this perspective, medicine’s power to dominate comes from its capacity to 
perform itself as methodologically scientific, through its medical texts, as well as its 
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diagnostic practices such as the ‘clinical history’ and the ‘clinical examination’. The 
‘diagram’ (Hetherington 2011, drawing on Deleuze) for this practice is the clinic: 
 
Clinics not only enabled comparative observations of disease manifestation; even 
more importantly, they reorganized the procedures of knowing or what Foucault 
called enunciative functions. Clinics were set up for the operation of the gaze, with 
patients lined up and laid out for inspection in a context understood to be the site of 
research and teaching as much as of the delivery of treatment. The individuality of 
cases became more important under the increased attentiveness and authority of 
the gaze, and clinics authorized the gaze and authorized the physician to ask to see, 
away from the social norms of domestic spaces. Out of this, new classifications 
emerged for organizing patients, medical knowledge, and authority. New 
possibilities of analogy and new relations of similarity and of relevance were 
developed. The subject positions of physician and patient were altered, with the 
individual physician gaining in authority. Disease as an object was reformulated, 
making possible the appearance of new theories of aetiology. (Alcoff, undated)  
 
It is the clinic that becomes the key site for the production of truth about the human 
organism, and of disease, and, critically, it is here that new classifications began to emerge 
for organizing patients, medical knowledge, and authority.   
Additionally, as noted earlier, the clinic is where the real – not representations of the 
real - can be experienced and observed. Indeed, Foucault notes, drawing on Roucher-
Derette (1807), that ‘ . . the observer reads nature . . [h]e who experiments questions’. 
Consequently, the doctor has no use for the laboratory as a part of the observation:  
To this extent observation and experiment are opposed but not mutually exclusive. It 
is natural that observation should lead to experiment, provided that experiment 
should question only in the vocabulary and within the language proposed to it by 
things observed (Foucault: p.131).      
In this line of thinking, clinical truth not only precedes experimentation, it also legitimates 
it – providing the experimentation also derives from the same kind of direct observation 
that is integral to the ‘disciplinary gaze’. To repeat, observation and experiment are 
opposed but not mutually exclusive: “observation should lead to experiment, provided that 
experiment should question only in the vocabulary and within the language proposed to it 
by things observed” (Foucault, 2003, p.131). As is discussed in Chapter 3, this means that 
laboratory science can never stand alone, but has to legitimate itself in terms of directing 
its work at clinical outcomes. 
 
 
The clinic as a technology of governance  
 
I now raise how the clinic’s authority and power goes beyond its discursive performance of 
the medical gaze. Not only does the clinic become a site in which the non-relation/non-
identity between the real and representation is acted out, there is a continuous acting out 
of a central paradox at the heart of Euro-American values: that the truth is to be found in 
the real. In all this I want to press something implicit to the source of medicine’s power, 
matters that go back to the notion of categorical work in the introductory chapter.   
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The early knowledge produced by the clinic was used to create anatomical maps of 
the body and classificatory systems of disease and its effects on/in the body.  These 
methods are now recognizable as the traditions of clinical nosography and the 
classificatory mentality of medical thinking (King 1982).  Significantly, alongside this clinical 
work of observation and categorization, knowledge and method became standardised and 
codified. Thus the possibility arose for clinicians to be (re)presented not merely as natural 
scientists ‘listening, deciphering, interpreting’ but more grandly as sovereign subjects 
‘looking according to a grid of perceptions, and noting according to a code’ (Foucault, 
1991:56).  Crucially, alongside processes of objectification, the doctor as observer is both 
detached and has a fine, concrete sensibility (BOC 148): the clinical moment is performed 
as a possibility of detachment and purity.  
This said, it is also the building and fabrication for the ‘medical model’ as a way of 
knowing that constitutes particular realities (including the difference between the normal 
and the abnormal) for its diagnostic categories, and what is called ‘the medical body’ 
(Leder 1992). Through a correct and systematic reading of the body, signs and symptoms 
can be identified (or read), which are then ‘recognized’ as those of a particular diagnostic 
category (Atkinson 1997). Thus, exercised and disciplined in ways of seeing/saying, the 
gaze of the clinician becomes, via processes of sedimentation, a technology.  
Within this view the doctor is both a disciplined and a sovereign subject. While any 
other member of the profession should be able to step up and say that they also see, in a 
process of affirmation, it is also open to each of them to say that they do not. Exactly how 
important it is for doctors in the clinic to be granted this power of discretion will be 
discussed throughout the rest of the book, but ahead of this it is worth making some 
preliminary explanation.  
 
 
Powers of discretion 
 
The methods of knowledge production developed in the clinic thus lie across two axes. The 
first axis allows the doctor-as-natural-scientist to move between their methods of 
classification, which read nature for signs, and their requisite technologies for making 
visible the inside of the body as the location of disease. The second axis allows the doctor 
to move between the naturalist observation of the causes and effects of disease on/in the 
body as modes of categorizing on the one hand, and classificatory systems that fix medical 
science as ‘grids and codes’ on the other.   
Certainly medicine performs itself as the sole discipline that can read the book of 
nature on the body, especially whenever nature itself has gone adrift. For this to happen it 
is necessary for its practitioners to exercise their authority to make a diagnosis more or 
less in conformity to how any other well-trained clinician would. Each professional is 
expected to ‘say’ what there is to ‘see’.  
As Barnes (1988) explains, Weberian powers of authority relies on authorities being 
exercised along pre-set lines of delegation – rather like the way an electrical ‘relay’ 
conducts power along its circuits (see also Clegg 1989). Conjointly, however, medicine sees 
itself as granting its practitioners significant powers of discretion (Barnes 1988; Munro 
1999a). Not only do doctors have the authority to say what they see, as ‘sovereign 
subjects’ (Foucault 1994), they also have the power to say they ‘do not see’ what others 
before them have said. Diagnostic classification appears at one moment stabilized (Bowker 
 34 
and Star 2000) by doctors acquiring a ‘disciplinary gaze; and at the next as needing 
remedial bolstering up by virtue of the discretion exerted by the doctor as sovereign 
subject.   
Medicine, then, is a science that lies not just between deduction and induction, but 
which also constantly requires both the real as supplement, and the erasure of the real to 
be credible. This is the nature of medical classification.  To go back to the Introduction, and 
my discussion of the pathological, the red and itchy rash on the arm held out for clinical 
inspection is simultaneously real and yet its reality is erased wherever its significance as 
clinical is put in doubt by its not ‘seen’, that is recognised, as the sign of a pathology.   
It is in this interstitial space, between the real as supplement and its erasure, that 
clinical discretion can be found.  The birth of modern medicine, that is scientific medicine, 
is thus simultaneously and paradoxically empirical and transcendent (Fuller 2007). 
 
Ordering and reordering science 
 
Reading Foucault helps us to see two important things.  Firstly, that it is the association of 
the clinic with science (“scientific medicine“) that gives medicine its authority.  Secondly, 
Foucault’s analysis also helps us to see how medicine does not act alone. This is to say that 
medicine becomes instituted as a ‘centre of discretion’ (Munro 1999a, Munro and 
Mouritsen 1996) through its associations with policy, and other discourses and 
technologies. This is in part why the alignment of the clinic and biological science can have 
such significant power effects in biopolitics.   
In this chapter I have argued that medicine’s power is partially an effect of its 
categorical work in the construction of diagnostic categories. Additionally, I have discussed 
how the clinic is instituted as a ‘centre of discretion’ in the naming and identification of the 
pathological. This is also key to medicine’s power. As a centre of discretion, the clinic 
incorporates calculation in the creation of medical categories, but any calculation requires 
rooting in the real to differentiate the pathological. This is effected through the ‘medical 
gaze’, which can read the book of nature.  I have particularly been stressing that it is when 
the clinic is pivotal to the scientific nature of medicine that medicine is so dominant.   
Medical dominance relies, then, on its alignments with other bodies and discourses 
in networks of ‘associations’ (Callon 1986, Latour 1986), such as those with governments 
and markets, as well as with other disciplinary formations, such as engineering, religion or 
statistics, as described above. This much is clear.  
In the remaining chapters, I go on to illustrate how the new genetics is being 
embedded into society - not through discoveries made in the laboratory as many expect, 
but rather through the identity work that is performed in the clinic. In this context, I show 
medicine as ordering and reordering the work of biological scientists on the one hand and 
the family and ideas of personhood on the other.  This revival of medical power is 
illustrated in the rest of the book through a close examination of the embryonic discipline 
dysmorphology. As I go on to demonstrate, the dysmorphology clinic acts as a centre of 
discretion over the making of genetic clinical categories. Hence the ways in which the clinic 
works are infrastructural, not just to health services, but to new scientific enterprises. 
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Chapter 3: 
 
‘Medicine’ & ‘Science’ 
 
 
Biology is destiny, the destiny of the individual and of the race . . . This is a very real 
and immanent issue. If steps are not taken within a generation or two, disease and 
mental deficiency could very well run like wild fire through the entire species. 
(Mathews, Vienna Blood, 1999, p. 222) 
 
Introduction 
 
The following two chapters examine the various relations between science and medicine, 
and trace how science has become increasingly beholden to medicine for its classification 
of needs, but also how their relation is projected onto markets of the future in a reshaping 
of society. Throughout, I use the term ‘the genetic’ to encompass both medical and 
bioscientific knowledge and so build a perspective on the genetic as a socio-technical 
domain in the making. 
Medicine and science co-constitute the genetic as a new domain of explanation 
about bodily effects, through their respective institutions - the clinic and laboratory. This 
perspective requires consideration of how relations between medicine and science get 
performed in the context of genetic medicine, and in this book I limit my focus to the 
production, consumption, and disposal of evidence in dysmorphology as a branch of 
genetic medicine.   
I want to stress that the field denominated by the genetic is emergent and unsettled 
and, further, that its flourishing and embedding in wider society, depends upon much 
more than discoveries in the biosciences or advances in molecular technologies. The more 
complex the genetic is in its influence on persons and disease, the better for both science 
and medicine.  In this field we are not going to see the O-GOD approach to genetics 
popularised by the media (Conrad 1999): the very simplistic notion of genetics as the 
discovery of one gene, one disease.  Rather, my point is to show how medicine’s power is 
being re-established and reinvigorated through this opening up of the genetic as a new 
and complex frontier.  Contrary to popular belief (e.g. Appleyard 2012), the more complex 
and problematic the frontier, the better for medicine! 
My aim is to show how doctors in genetics perform themselves as helping to make the 
genetic happen. As such, they do not see themselves as merely ‘applying’ science.  
Specifically, what gets performed by specialists in genetic medicine, and by 
dysmorphologists in particular, is a special medical gaze that affords the recognition and 
description of naturally occurring (as opposed to experimentally produced) forms of life that, 
in turn, imply a problem with their biological development.  This work typically involves 
looking for, and investigating, the visible expression of aberrations at the genetic level. As I 
have already indicated, these clinical geneticists claim to be helping to shape the science of 
growth and form. They are participating in the mapping of the genetic in relation to human 
development, one of the most fundamental areas of the biosciences - the other two being 
reproduction and ageing.   
Holding my exploration of how relations between the clinic and the laboratory are 
enacted in dysmorphology against contemporary debates on science and medicine, this 
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chapter begins to build a picture of how dysmorphology is helping to reinvigorate the place 
of clinical medicine as a site for the production of knowledge, not just its consumption. It 
may well be the case that the clinic’s hold on knowledge has been somewhat attenuated in 
recent years through its alignment with managerial and audit cultures (Armstrong 2002, 
Bury and Taylor 2008) but, as we see in the following chapters, pronouncements about the 
death of the clinic are certainly too hasty. 
 
 
(Dis)locating dysmorphology: from backwater to metropolis 
 
The study I undertook radiated out from the clinical genetics service of one major UK 
teaching hospital providing clinics across a large region of the British Isles. This regional 
medical genetic service was one of 12 in the UK (details of each service can be found by 
visiting Genetic Alliance UK - http://www.geneticalliance.org.uk/services.htm#WA). The 
services, which are part of the National Health Service, are free at the point of delivery, 
and are a sites of University medical research and education, providing training and 
courses in genetic counseling. 
 The regional service that formed the focus of the current study includes experts, 
laboratories and genetic counselors, some of which are located in the main department. 
Practitioners located in the main department also travel to other hospitals to hold clinics; 
while others are based in other hospitals.  All members of the service communicate and 
meet regularly at meetings, discussing and sharing cases. Some members of the medical 
staff may be employed as NHS doctors, but are also university lecturers or professors. 
While most are engaged in research, some doctors are still learning to be clinical 
geneticists. This is reflected in the organization of medical genetics. Teams acting under a 
consultant are made up of specialist registrars, specialist nurses, trainees and so on and so 
forth.   
 At first sight, dysmorphology hardly looks like a discipline - for instance, there is no 
department of dysmorphology. In my first visits to the Medical Genetics Institute  (the 
home of the regional service that was the starting point for my ethnography)  it did not 
seem possible that my intuitions could be right. Located in a National Health Service 
teaching hospital, as it is called in the UK, the Medical Genetics Institute was difficult to 
find in the chaotic labyrinth of buildings and roads that make up the departments, 
laboratories, and Medical School.  
The Institute is housed in a small building about ten years old at the back of the main 
hospital, opposite the paediatric and obstetric unit. As a first impression it did not appear 
to be anything that was going to turn out to be a critical site. However, as things turned 
out, its location here signifies the first of dysmorphology’s important relations – with 
paediatrics and reproductive medicine, and through them, to human development.   
The entrance to the institute is in a sub-basement. The waiting room and the 
consulting room contain no clinical equipment. There is no bustle, and there are no beds, 
no white surfaces, no brash and bold machines - nor, indeed, any of the paraphernalia 
usually associated with the spectacle of modern medicine. Little to suggest, therefore, that 
there would be much reward in following around the consultants as a key part of my 
ethnography.  
Here I meet two consultants in a small, dull interview room with boxes of toys, a few 
comfortable chairs and a coffee table. My impression is of a medical backwater.    
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Everything reflects the story of the NHS in terminal decline: doing research and 
medicine on a shoestring. Later when I visit the main protagonist’s office to plot the 
research design, I am shocked at just how tiny it is: partitioned off by glass at the back of 
an open plan office of secretaries, it consists of about 4 square metres of floor space.  This 
space has no natural light and is largely taken up by a desk and two chairs, some filing 
cabinets, and a computer, with every available surface covered in files and papers. All this 
hardly seems compatible with the consultant’s reputation as an eminent geneticist of 
international renown.  
Later when I visited other consultants in their home institutes and departments 
some, like Dr White, were located in cubbyholes in dreary and old-fashioned hospital 
departments of medical genetics. Others, however, met me in the much more 
contemporary buildings of the Genetics Knowledge Parks, like those at Cambridge or 
Newcastle.  While these parks are a part of university medical schools, they also represent 
a new site of medicine. For example, the one in Newcastle is in the ‘International Centre 
for Life’ (http://www.life.org.uk/), which opened in 2002, ‘with funding of over £10M over 
five years, enabling the University to draw on its research strengths in the fields of cancer, 
ageing and human development’ (http://www.ncl.ac.uk/1834/history/timeline/).   
 I am suggesting that this apparent range of investment, from cubbyholes in 
departments in teaching hospitals to these contemporary monuments, signifies something 
about the emergence of medical genetics at this time. Locating medical genetics in Gene 
Parks symbolises the manufacture of a new culture of science and medicine around 
interdisciplinarity, closely tied to contemporary ideas about openness and innovation 
(Strathern, 2008).   
 With the double helix displayed iconically in logos and sculptures (see figure 3.1) like 
a homogenizing brand (Myers 1990), the scale of these contemporary architectural 
structures associates genetics with ‘tech’. The alignment between tech, the genetic, and 
medicine is constituted as positive, giving a message about the future, as well as promising 
economic and social value.  Heralded as public spaces, epitomised by calling them parks or 
villages with events and exhibitions dedicated to education and public engagement, these 
sites associate an idea of science and medicine with creativity, technology, and innovation, 
rather than with sick bodies and minds, or the hospital or clinic (see also Strathern 2004b).  
In creating possibilities for interaction with science there is a sense that public 
engagement is being put at the heart of this new science culture.   
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What I take from this range of homes for medical genetics – and from the 
dysmorphologists who dwell there - is the sense that medical genetics during the first 
decade of the new millennium was a variable space of investment and competition for 
universities, medical schools, and governments.  Creating, as well as responding to, a 
growing ‘market’, medical genetics is located in an emerging political economy of science, 
health research and clinical practice. In the UK, it is positioned explicitly at an intersection 
between medical schools and the National Health Service. Increasingly in England the 
emphasis is on links between public and private finance motored by an impact discourse of 
the need to boost failing capitalist economies.   
I should add that much of this massive investment has happened since my first visit 
to my ‘home’ department, described earlier. Indeed, this institute also now has a new 
building, if nothing quite so grand as those to be found at Newcastle’s Life Centre, or at 
the Cambridge Knowledge Park. The Institute is also associated with, rather than located 
in, a Genetics Knowledge Park. Such changes symbolize how much medical genetics has 
been a growth industry.   
Critically, it is the technological spaces of the Genetics Knowledge Parks, rather than 
the Intensive Care Unit of the high tech hospital, which form the new ‘spectacle’ of 
medicine. They advertise, promote and magnify an investment in the idea that it is 
knowledge and science – far from the bedside of the sick - that can help cure the ills of 
modern societies: the cancers, the Alzheimer’s, the ageing, and even, perhaps, the 
economic downturns.  They constitute the new ‘fronts’ of medicine, seemingly forcing the 
clinic and the hospital, and even to some extent the laboratories, backstage.   
Despite all this, as will be seen, the consultants still go to the backstage to do their 
clinical work. Each of the consultant geneticists I visited, no matter their location, were 
practising clinicians as well as publishing researchers.  
Surprisingly, in the building up of their knowledge base and in the defining of their 
discipline and expertise, I show in what follows how much dysmorphologists rely on 
immersion in the clinic and the family. Like ethnographers, the scientists and clinical 
scientists each still need engagement with the ‘mess’, materialities and socialities of 
everyday life. However, there is more to be examined here in regard to how the relations 
between medicine and science are being performed by these new spaces, and I press this 
aspect next.   
 
 
Engineering the ‘good (healthy/wealthy) society’ 
 
The next aspect of medicine’s relation to science to which I draw attention is connected to 
that other facet of medicine: its humanism and its place in European intellectual, social 
and political history. In addition to its key place in terms of biopolitics, discussed in 
Chapter 2, medicine has played an integral role, as Charles Webster (1996) asserts, in “the 
formation of Western culture” (p. 34).  
Medicine’s complex status as an institution is important here. This status, as both a 
site of scientific methodology and as important to intellectual, social and political history, 
helps constitute medicine as an obligatory passage of legitimation for governmental 
strategies as well as for science. As discussed in Chapter 2, Foucault claims this history is 
strongly associated in Europe with the relationship between welfare and capital: the idea 
that what is good for the individual is good for society and for capital. The underpinning 
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ethic demands that the distribution of responsibility and resources has to be accounted for 
in terms of the meeting of needs (shifting between individual, societal, and capital).   
As indicated in my earlier discussion in Chapter 2, one amongst many technologies 
legitimated by medicine is the experiment. The key point here is that the need for 
experimentation requires legitimatizing, particularly in terms of funding experimental 
science. This legitimation does not come from the observation of causal relations, or from 
the development of hypotheses that require testing (and which may or may not have 
profound implications for the design of interventions). In a more functionalist world, the 
need for experimentation requires legitimation in terms of social need. Specifically, the 
material and embodied genealogy of the intermingling of science and medicine is 
intertwined.  
Indeed, health and wealth have this long and entangled trajectory in the history of 
medicine and its alliance with governments. This is due to the association between the 
need for knowledge about the body and disease, and their relation to wealth and 
enhancement.  It is worth remembering here that the clinic is only one of medicine’s sites 
of operation: there are many others, for example the home, the family, government health 
and social policy, the law, and increasingly ‘www//http’. While there is merit in the view 
that these operate as satellite sites orbiting around the production of knowledge radiating 
from the clinic, medicine appears and reappears intermittently across these sites as a 
‘distributed and multi-sited knowledge system’, which includes ethical plateaus and civic 
political contests embedded in disputes over government health and social policy mantras 
(Fischer 2005).  
Medicine’s place as a social institution, and its promotion of particular values and 
metaphysical ideas, is part of the translation of innovation into a force for good.  This goes 
as far back as the alchemists’ laboratories of the Medieval and Renaissance periods in 
Europe. While these laboratories had a practical function, their significance was also 
connected to wider metaphysical ideas: they were experimental sites associated with the 
making of the philosopher’s stone – ‘the magical substance for transforming base metals 
into gold and indefinitely prolonging life’ii.  
 
There is also an operative and practical alchemy, which teaches how to make 
precious metals and pigments, and many other things better and more plentifully 
than they are made by nature." (Bacon, my emphasis, cited in Pinkowski, 2004) 
 
Implicit in this is that the legitimation for laboratory work was seldom only functional or 
economic: its legitimation rested as much in the idea of its pursuit of a cure for morbidity 
and mortality, and, as such, in finding a way to improve on nature.  
 
 
Re-medicalizing science 
 
One of the most important sources of legitimation for science continues to be an idea of 
enhancement through the improvement of health. As Shapin raises the issue: 
 
That is one – blindingly obvious – reason why the ability to prevent and cure disease, 
to alleviate suﬀering and to extend human life has recurrently been used as a public 
 40 
test of the truth and power of philosophic and scientiﬁc systems, and why the 
learned too might share in that public assessment. (2000 p.132) 
 
Quite so. However, I want to invert Shapin’s argument to suggest that, in the 
contemporary relation between the so-called basic biological and clinical sciences, we can 
see a remedicalization of science. It is not so much that the science today simply gets 
tested by its capacity to prevent and cure disease, or alleviate suffering. Rather, the life 
sciences are being called upon to develop and hone their foci and practices in relation to 
medically defined needs in advance.   
What is being done inside what we call science – as though it were one hegemony of 
practices - has also to be examined for the translation of interests effected by these 
relations between medically defined needs and science practice and process. By 
committing to research programs whose aims and objectives are to ‘alleviate suﬀering and 
to extend human life’, it is not merely productivity [that is to] [which will] grow. In the 
endless cycle of production, consumption and growth upon which capitalist economies 
depend for their survival, basic science is being translated and changed in its nature.  
We must acknowledge here how scientific funding programs and government 
strategies are increasingly engineering these domains - medicine and science - in order to 
intertwine their organization into close knit ‘partnerships’. This is to not just to note how 
medicine is being reorganised by new discoveries in science. Instead it is to understand 
how the biosciences are being reorganized in relation to this re-defining of needs; and that 
for their own survival, they need to demonstrate to their funders and to the wider public 
that they are addressing this agenda.  
We can see these effects in contemporary funding requirements, which are setting 
research agendas.  For example, in terms of funding, there is an ‘agenda setting’ (e.g. the 
European Research Council’s agenda, or the strategic priorities of the major funding 
councils) through which the basic sciences are increasingly being called upon to legitimate 
their interests, foci, and activities not in terms of the pursuit of knowledge, but of 
knowledge that will be useful in terms of improving health: they need to show how they 
help reveal correlations between biological processes and the development of disease or 
the sustaining of health, together with the direction of possible interventions. These 
relations are expressed in grandiose mission statements and visions, such as the statement 
of their vision on the UK’s Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council’s 
(BBSRC, undated) website: 
 
Our vision 
 
To lead world-class 21st century bioscience, promoting innovation and 
realising benefits for society within and beyond the UK. 
BBSRC has a unique and central place in supporting the UK’s world-leading position in 
bioscience. We are an investor in research and training, with the aim of furthering scientific 
knowledge, to promote economic growth, wealth and job creation and to improve quality of 
life in the UK and beyond.  
In the coming decades bioscience will be central to providing solutions to major challenges, 
such as: 
 Feeding 9Bn people sustainably by 2050 
 Developing renewable ‘low carbon’ sources of energy, transport fuels and 
chemicals to reduce dependence on dwindling oil reserves 
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 Staying healthier for longer as lifespan increase and society ages 
Our vision is structured around world-class bioscience, key strategic research 
priorities and enabling themes - methods we will use to achieve our aims.  
 
The BBSRC is the largest UK public funder of ‘non-medical research’, with an annual 
budget of around £445M, and we can see from their vision and strategy that some of the 
work they will fund has to demonstrate benefits and impact in terms of improving quality 
of life as well as being able to provide solutions that will help people ‘stay healthier for 
longer’.   
Now if the dominant discourse over what counts as health and quality of life is 
medical, then, increasingly, bioscience is going to become intertwined with medically 
defined needs and problems. For example, the BBSRC publish news about scientific 
breakthroughs.  One of the categories here is “Health News”, and includes reports on how 
basic research has contributed to discoveries or interventions into specific diseases and 
their treatments such as bipolar disorders or Alzheimer’s.  The efficacy of bioscientific 
exploits in these kinds of funding programs is thus increasingly being explicitly harnessed 
to market values, health, wealth, job creation and economic growth.   
We can also see this intermingling in the organization of basic bioscience, medicine 
and innovation into new forms of ‘Big Science’ (Galison 1994) and the proliferation of 
‘interdisciplinary’ scientific institutions described above – what Clarke et al (2003) are 
describing as “Biomedical Technoservice Complex, Inc.” For example, The Wellcome 
Trust’s Sanger Institute whose mission makes explicit the relation to medically defined 
problems:  
At the Sanger Institute we aim to make a real contribution to global health, a 
responsibility that derives from our position as a world leader in genomic research. 
For example, we are carrying out large scale research programmes dedicated to 
investigating the biology and genomics of malaria, which kills over one million 
children in Africa each year and causes debilitating illness in over half a billion people 
worldwide.  We also invest in research that elucidates the genetic basis of cancer 
and metabolic and cardiovascular disease, which are a significant part of the global 
health burden. (Wellcome Trust, undated) 
Or the 1000 Genome Program: 
An international research consortium has announced the 1000 Genomes Project, an 
ambitious effort to sequence the genomes of at least 1000 people to create the most 
detailed and medically useful catalogue to date of human genetic variation (my 
emphasis).   
 
Similarly, the National Science Foundation (NSF) in the US with an annual budget of about 
$6.9 billion in 2010, has a mission “to advance the national health, prosperity, and 
welfare” (NFS undated). 
Somewhat controversially, Rose (2005) asserts that medicine is not just being 
molecularized and technologized, but also capitalised in ways that demean it and erode its 
authority and power. There is, for instance, an increasing tie with Treasury-defined 
objectives that make explicit how the sciences are being enrolled in health improvements 
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that will have specific economic/societal gains; and, in the US, concern over the potential 
"domination of the nation's scholars by Federal employment, project allocations, and the 
power of money” (Shapin 2008:81).   
Although he is making an important point, I think Rose is too sweeping in making his 
claim, for what is happening is not just a simple capitalization of medicine, or science. 
Rather, the relation between medicine and capital is nothing new. As Foucault’s analysis of 
biohistory discussed in Chapter 2 helps us see, medicine’s position in relation to capitalism 
has long been in terms of governing and shaping the social.  Indeed, the position of 
medicine as ‘in between’ capital and health is well represented in a lovely engraving from 
the website Pandora’s Box (undated), which explores relations between medicine and the 
humanities, arts and sciences.  The engraving draws on ancient iconography, with 
Esculapius (medicine) as a figure standing in between Mercury (Merchants) and the Graces 
(Medicine, Hygiene and Panacea).  The Caption reads as follows: 
 
Esculapius dealt with Patients - Merchants make deals with Clients  
Esculapius is linked with a Constellation of Idealistic Medical Ideas  
Mercury or Hermes is linked with Haemaphroditism and Mercantile Mercenary 
views.  
Here, medicine is represented as in between the merchants on the one hand and the three 
graces on the other.  As such, historically medicine is the link: the conduit between the 
two sides, capital and idealistic notions of health as a metaphysical good.  I am suggesting 
that this relationship persists today. 
This is not to insist that in the backstage of ‘small science’, boundary work  
between applied and basic science is not going on in the clinic.  As I have shown above, 
these fronts can hide more than they reveal. But there are also accountability practices 
here through which branding science as being ‘of use medically’ putatively adds value. 
Indeed, in the earlier analysis of the medical gaze, we have already seen how the 
association between the clinic and science also adds value.   
 
Medicine as adding value to the Biosciences 
 
In this chapter, I have been pressing how the proliferation of life science research may 
increasingly depend upon its medicalization. Specifically, how the legitimation and 
significance of research in genetics is being articulated in relation to health needs defined 
by medical discourse as for the good of society, including wealth and health. Indeed, after 
Verran (2011), this can be understood as an ‘ontic politics’, in which the utilitarian and the 
metaphysical, the ethical and the instrumental, value and values, become jointed together 
in the manufacturing and securing of techno-scientific futures.   
This particular alliance of science and medicine, and what I am calling the 
medicalization of the basic sciences, and their transmogrification into ‘Life’ sciences, can 
be seen as an effect of the parallel and intertwined agendas of making science more 
ethical and relevant, encapsulated in ELSI programs throughout the Western world, whose 
aim is to not just to get science into society but also to get society into science (Strathern 
2004). 
Löwy (1996), probing the “seemingly natural process of the genesis and 
development of medical facts” (p. 19), stresses how the generation of medical facts 
legitimates the need for the pursuit of particular aspects of science.  There are serious 
issues here. On the one hand, as Löwy goes on to suggest, medicine, as the site that to 
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some extent determines the need for science and technology to enhance society in terms 
of health and wealth, does so at the expense of other possible ways of seeing a problem.  
On the other hand, in genetic medicine there is even more to the relation between 
medicine and science than the possible detection of, and intervention in, disease 
processes, including genetic abnormalities.  
This brings us to the issue of flow and direction, and to how the definition and 
significance of effects become medicalized as diagnostic categories that need to be 
addressed by science in its association with medicine. The categories themselves are 
medical: cancer, malaria, diabetes, inflammatory disease, the myriad genetic disorders or 
syndromes; even ageing itself is increasingly being categorised in terms of disease.  
These medical categories are being mobilized and enrolled to legitimate new forms 
of interdisciplinary ‘science’. But they also represent assemblages, stabilized as solid 
medical diagnostic categories. Questions therefore arise as to how these assemblages, 
such as genetic diagnostic categories, come into being.  I address this aspect by examining 
how the relation between science and medicine is accomplished within genetic medicine 
in the following three chapters.   
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have begun to suggest how an alignment with medicine acts as social and 
cultural capital (Bourdieu 1984) for bioscience, and vice versa. This is to say that an 
association with science does not just add value to medicine, as argued by Foucault and 
others and discussed in Chapter 2. More and more, medicine is going beyond adding value 
to science to imbue it, additionally and explicitly, with its values. The upshot is science 
having to address medical problems in order to give itself moral as well as economic 
purpose.    
It is in this identification and definition of which problems need to be addressed, that 
the entangling of medicine and science is at its most potent. Here the renaming of the 
‘biosciences’ as ‘life sciences’ is significant: connecting bioscience to ‘life’ and ‘lives’ makes 
explicit its association with objectives that address the need to improve quality of life and 
health. The interjection of medically defined objectives associates life science research 
with health, welfare and capital to joint both moral and economic agendas.  
We can see in the medical fronts I have described in this chapter an engineering that 
reinforces the interdependency of science and medicine. This is not just to engineer 
societies in terms of the good life, the good society, but also in terms of the ‘goods’ of 
capital. While I have pointed out that this is nothing new, the life sciences in their 
association with medicine are meant to address the market, and figure more and more in 
the stimulation of wealth creation.  
What I want to underline here, though, is how that which counts as science is itself 
being reshaped by a particularly insidious process of medicalization: a process that 
involves medicine’s location as aligned with policy and government and an association 
with the need to generate knowledge that will help promote not just a healthy society but 
also a wealthy one.  I am suggesting that, in the growing climate of functionalism, science 
is being associated with medicine in ways that do not just enhance medicine, but are 
actually medicalizing science – even to the point of eroding distinctions between basic and 
applied science. This is important since debates over the geneticization of medicine, as 
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well as talk of the erosion of medical dominance, appear to miss this aspect of the 
interaction of science and medicine.  
In the next chapter, as I get behind the fronts of science and medicine and go inside 
their intersection in dysmorphology, we can begin to see that the co-constitutive and 
interdependent relations between medicine and science also lay claim to shaping the 
science of normal human development.     
 
 
 45 
Chapter 4 
 
The ‘Translation’ of Growth and Form 
 
 
The key to understanding form is development; the process through which a single-
cell egg gives rise to a complex, multi-billion-celled animal  (p.x) . . I have described 
the genetic toolkit for development and how its discovery was driven by the study of 
spectacular mutants that made the wrong number of body parts, or put a part in the 
wrong place, or lacked some major structure all together.  Most of the time, 
thankfully, nature gets it right and flies and babies are born with the right number of 
parts in all the right places. (Carroll, 2005, p. 82)  
 
Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter I introduced the notion that, in the contemporary landscape of 
politics, markets, and research funding, relations between medicine and bioscience are 
being intensified, offering some evidence for how bioscience is being increasingly 
medicalized. In this chapter I problematize this fissure further by challenging ideas that 
dichotomise science from medicine into separate domains. Particularly questionable is the 
presumption that science is the major site of discovery and that medicine merely hosts the 
‘application’ of science.   
Much current thinking treats medicine as a passive territory being colonized and 
transformed by innovations from science and technology. There is a central problem with 
this view. To separate science and medicine in this way is to understand the relations 
between them in terms of a diffusion model through which theoretical discoveries and 
innovations in ‘science’ are imagined as knowledge and innovation dripping down into 
practical activities such as ‘medicine’. Some of this thinking is embedded in the 
differentiation between the clinic and the laboratory as different kinds of organizations: 
the latter concerned with discovery and innovation and the former with delivery and 
intervention. Indeed, diffusion models are also embedded in the policy and artefacts 
organizing clinical and applied science on the one hand and basic science on the other.  
A more contemporary articulation of knowledge being radiated outwards is 
encapsulated in the idea of “translational research”. For some this has the rather simplistic 
idea that: “A translational scientist should be able to move an idea all the way from basic 
research to a clinical application and back to the lab to inform more basic science.” 
(Boussard 2011). Others like Latour (1987), as will be discussed, are much more radical and 
sophisticated in their conception of translation.  
This more radical view sees translation as a ubiquitous process that is endemic in all 
aspects of innovation and, consequently, eschews the notion of basic research as the 
single major source or origin for discovery, in which technological change is seen as a 
linear process (research > invention > development > innovation> diffusion):  
The linear view of technological change has recently been superseded by a non-
linear conceptual model featuring feedback loops emanating from each stage (Kline 
and Rosenberg 1986). In this alternative model, basic science can fit into the process 
of innovation at any stage. Moreover, the very idea of a source or an origin point of 
technology is misleading because innovation is an emergent, interactive activity. It 
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involves many actors who cooperate or oppose one another (Akrich, Callon and 
Latour 2002). Science and scientists … are no exception. (Callon, 2006, p.4, my 
emphasis)   
 
Distinctions and divisions such as that between applied and basic science, useful as they 
may have once been in terms of boundary work, are also being eroded in the new political 
agendas and the organization of science funding. As discussed in the previous chapter, 
biosciences are increasingly gaining their legitimating discourses from their alignment with 
medicine – the rationale being to expand the prosperity of nations, as well as to help 
improve their health.   
In line with Michel Callon’s comments, quoted above, I am going on to show how 
discourses of genetic medicine present ‘circuits’ in which we move from practices to 
inscriptions and from inscriptions to practices in the constitution of new medical entities. 
But I want to go beyond simply showing how these discourses perform medicine as co-
constitutive of medical entities, important as this matter is.  So in the rest of the chapter I 
pick up on my epigram and discuss how the ‘genetic toolkit’ for development in humans is 
partly evolving from what Carroll calls the clinical study of ‘spectacular mutants that made 
the wrong number of body parts, or put a part in the wrong place, or lacked some major 
structure all together.’  This is to argue, as I go on to do in the chapter which follows this 
one, that dysmorphology in genetic medicine emerges – particularly in those discourses. 
and its practices, which relate to the natural history of syndromes - as claiming to help 
shape the science of growth and form.  
The present chapter begins with a brief insight into the world of dysmorphology. This 
helps to illustrate how the relation between medicine and science is performed in 
dysmorphology. After a discussion of debates in the social sciences over the relations 
between the clinic and the laboratory, I then move between different discursive practices 
to show how the clinic in genetic medicine is very far from being reshaped by innovations 
coming from the laboratory. What emerges instead is a picture of the complex relation 
between science and medicine working through translation effects from invention and 
innovation back and forth between the clinic and the laboratory. 
 
 
The Theatre of Dysmorphology 
 
Imagine being in a large, bright, and airy auditorium – very modern and generous with its 
padded seats sweeping down to a large front area (see Fig 4.2). There is an elevated 
podium on the left, a huge screen behind, and another large screen to the right. The 
theatre is completely full, some sit with notes and papers while others have laptops sitting 
in front of them. An energetic and forceful woman is standing to the side, about halfway 
up the aisle, directing the ceremony. It is all beech wood, steel and glass.   
As the person at the podium talks, images are projected onto the large screen 
behind them as well as to the other screen to the side of them. These images show 
assemblages of photos of children and babies, details of parts of bodies, various diagrams, 
scans of brains, strange images of strings of small objects and so on and so forth. The 
images appear and disappear during the talk, giving a medical genetics’ case history.  This 
consists of a history of the pregnancy and birth of the child, a history of their growth and 
development since birth, details of any health problems, results of tests, and descriptions 
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of the child and their family’s body parts and behaviour. They usually also present a family 
history, represented on screen as a ‘family tree’, and what is sometimes referred to as a 
medical pedigree. On the other screen to the right, different lists of features are being 
projected while another person, a middle aged man, is sitting at his desk, tapping away at 
his laptop just below the podium (just off the picture and to the right in Fig. 4.2).  
I am in the lecture theatre in the Wellcome Trust Building at the Institute of Child 
Health, University College, London. The woman is Professor Fox and, as my study 
progresses, I learn to think of her as one of the mothers of dysmorphology in the UK.  The 
younger person at the podium reading from their notes is a neophyte geneticist. The man 
sitting at a computer in front and to the right of the podium is Professor Smart and I learn 
to think of him as the father of dysmorphology.   
At a later interview, when I meet Professor Smart face to face, I find out he was 
scrolling through the dysmorphology database of features, searching for a match with 
what the younger doctor at the podium is reporting. During this later interview, Professor 
Smart shows me this database. He tells me that to be a dysmorphologist: 
You have to have a multiple choice sort of mind, like all the facts are there but you 
don’t just regurgitate them, somebody gives you options and you know what it is.  
That’s what I think anyway . . And also you had to be good at visual recognition as 
well – which seems to be genetic.  (Dr Smart, interview, my emphasis) 
Good at visual recognition, indeed. For there are over three thousand syndromes 
described in this database, with each syndrome broken down into hundreds of features, 
traits, and expected clinical findings, such as test results.  But Professor Smart is also 
stressing how, in order to be a good dysmorphologist, you don’t just regurgitate, you know 
what it is.   
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.1 Atrium, Institute for Child Health, Wellcome Trust Building, University 
College, London. 
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Fig. 4.2 Lecture theatre, Institute for Child Health, Wellcome Trust Building, 
University College, London. 
 
 
The particular occasion I am attending is a meeting of the London Dysmorphology 
Club (cf. http://www.clingensoc.org/Dysmo/index.htm), whose home is this new, quite 
beautiful, building for the Institute of Child Health (see figs 4.1 and 4.2), based at Great 
Ormond Street Hospital for Sick Children, a world-leading centre for paediatric medicine 
and research.  This is the academic meeting of the UK network of expert dysmorphologists 
and trainee medical geneticists where the discipline is being established and passed on. 
The people in the audience are there to debate the presentations and, as I am finding out 
from Dr Smart’s interview, to learn how to do dysmorphology.  So the audience sits, listens 
and watches.  They are seeing how he does his search. Indeed, a good number of those 
present in the audience also have computers and are scrolling down inside the same 
database as Dr Smart. They mimic him, enacting what he enacts, and they listen and watch 
the presenters as they relate the case history. 
The assemblages of things on the screen represent the child, the family, and the 
parts of them that are possbile signifiers. As well as photographs of children, their 
distinguishing features, and their biological relations, they include laboratory results, 
images of chromosomes, scans and x-rays. The performance of the clinical gaze thus brings 
the laboratory and the family into association. On these occasions there is nothing about 
the family or the child that marks them as social beings: they are figured almost entirely in 
terms of their signs, symptoms, history and, of course, the visual images.   
Sometimes the person at the podium is very pleased with himself or herself - they 
have a diagnosis. Often they have no diagnosis and Professor Fox engages the audience in 
‘guessing’ what the diagnosis might be. There is a lot of audience interaction and 
participation, debate and questioning. What is being decided, in ways that go to the heart 
of Callon’s view of translation, is what is abnormal and/or unusual, about the child and/or 
other family members. Equally, what is also being decided, often explicitly, is what is 
normal or usual.  
Also being questioned, in ways that further corroborate Callon’s view of translation, 
is whether the effects that are being assembled represent genetic problems. The 
neophytes are being exercised in these practices of differentiation and its associated 
technologies – search engines, databases and photographs of faces and other body parts, 
histories, chromosome printouts, and so on and so forth.  
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Deep play 
 
Clifford Geertz (1973), the noted cultural anthropologist, talks about the occasions when 
the ethnographer returns from the field and faces his scientific community in front of ‘the 
blackboard’, or rather the whiteboard as it would be called today. The London meeting is 
the whiteboard of the dysmorphology clinic writ large, the occasion in which members of 
this growing profession return from the field and perform its special gaze in front of each 
other.  
What is surprising about this academic meeting of the London Dysmorphology Club 
is the number of cases being presented as interesting but which are then left as unsettled. 
Their diagnosis appears uncertain. On these, Professor Fox opens the discussion to the 
audience; asking them to comment and debate, even guess what the diagnosis might be.   
At the lunch break I introduce myself to both Professor Smart and to Professor Fox 
and arrange to contact them for interviews. They are standing talking to someone 
introduced to me as a scientist. Later on in the London meeting, this scientist presents his 
research on experiments with mouse mutants.   
This is very typical of such meetings – the juxtaposition of the laboratory science and 
the presentation of the clinical cases. As I have noted earlier ‘boundary work’ helps keep 
these matters separate but in ways that give credence to the translation view over the 
diffusion model. 
As I go on to argue later, what is being put on display here is not just clinical 
certainty but also uncertainty.  While this meeting is a part of the front of dysmorphology, 
to enact a medical gaze through which bodies of congenital deformity can be known, the 
dysmorphologists also perform the association between the laboratory and the clinic as 
partial and incomplete.  
Crucially, in terms of understanding how medicine works as a science, what is being 
made central is a method of doubt. Certainty is reserved for the clinical moment, the 
diagnosis of a syndrome. Yet even here, as we have already seen, there is room for doubt. 
So much so that, like Easter, the clinical moment becomes a moveable feast. 
 
 
Laboratory technology 
 
The rise of laboratory science in the 19th and 20th centuries appeared to separate itself off 
from medicine and shift the locus of medical science away from the clinic. Supposedly 
medical science moved to the laboratory on the one hand and to epidemiology (and 
statistically based science) on the other.  Here the relationship between the clinic and 
science could be (re)presented in a similar way to the relation between the farm and the 
laboratory in Latour’s study of the pasteurization of France (1988); that is as ‘remote 
control’ (Cooper 1992), with the laboratory establishing itself as a ‘centre of calculation’ 
(Latour 1987). 
Within this view – contrary to the image we gained through the meeting of the 
London Dysmorphology club - the clinic is remote and not involved in the production of 
medical knowledge. Rather, the pressure is for clinical staff to apply knowledge, 
determined elsewhere, to efface complexity and heterogeneity (Berg 1992) and to make 
decisions and ‘dispose’ of patients (Latimer 1997) at an ever-increasing speed. Thus, the 
contemporary clinic tends to be reconstituted as a site of intervention in which science is 
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merely consumed within complete clinical episodes.  The point is not that grids and codes 
are abandoned within the clinic. Instead, the rather false idea is that illness and disease 
are harnessed and sedimented within these classificatory systems, the diagnoses of which 
are in turn ‘carried out’ in laboratory tests. There are several problems with this view. 
Representing the clinic as remote hides the place of the clinic in the development of 
laboratory science and technology, and vice versa. Keating and Cambrosio (2003), for 
example, have demonstrated that historical accounts of the ‘new genetics’ have been 
markedly, and inaccurately, skewed: significant advances are attributed to basic sciences 
and laboratory work, while major contributions arising from clinical research and practice 
are marginalized or ignored. They suggest that even sociologically sophisticated narratives, 
like Fujimura’s genealogy of oncogene research (Fujimura 1996), imply a linear model of 
development whereby basic research impacts upon clinical practice (cf. Gaudillière 1993). 
In contrast, Keating and Cambrosio conclude rhetorically: ‘Could we not say that in many 
respects clinical research and practice are constitutive of the new genetics and not some 
kind of passive receptacle awaiting impact?’ (2003 p. 352).  
Keating and Cambrosio extend their reflections to develop their model of 
‘biomedical platforms’, which they understand to be new forms of knowledge not 
grounded exclusively in either the biological nor the clinical. They argue that their model 
provides a means of capturing the emergence of a new way of making knowledge in the 
period after World War II that transcends the divide between the normal and the 
pathological, creating new ‘truly biomedical entities’ that exist simultaneously as normal 
biological phenomena and pathological signs. They define biomedical platforms as 
‘material and discursive arrangements that act as the bench upon which conventions 
concerning the biological or normal are connected with conventions concerning the 
medical or pathological’ (p. 332). This model stresses the intersection of the laboratory, 
the clinic, industry and mechanisms of regulation in networks of interdependence.  The 
discursive history of medical genetics is a case in point. 
 
 
The paths of genetic medicine 
 
Medical genetics is a relatively new discipline, probably in the region of 50 years old 
(Harper 2008), and was only formally recognised as a medical specialty in the US about 30 
years ago (Korf 2002).  Genetic medicine developed out of human genetics, particularly 
from the middle of the 20th century.   
Its early roots are in understandings from Mendelian genetics, and the identification 
of pathologies that are inherited, also called single gene disorders.  In 1966 Dr. Victor A. 
McKusick, sometimes referred to as the father of medical genetics, wrote his seminal 
textbook Mendelian Inheritance in Man; A Catalogue of Human Genes and Genetic 
Disordersiii.  In this book McKusick also predicted the mapping of the human genome.   
Within this classification system different diseases are listed alongside their gene 
symbol and their chromosomal location. Some diseases have many clinical differentials so 
there need to be subcategories.  Taking Alzheimer’s Disease as an example: there are 12 
different entries for Alzheimer‘s Disease in the OMIM database, some of which share the 
same chromosomal location and gene labels, and others which do not.   
Currently there are very interesting developments in this process through which 
clinic categories, such as Alzheimer’s disease, appear to be being refigured by new 
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understandings of the chromosomal and genetic relation between what were originally 
considered ‘separate’ diagnoses, prompting the possibility of a revision of clinical 
classification. The best example of this is the spectrum of mental health disorders from 
autism, schizophrenia, bipolar disorders through to Alzheimer’s Disease, which seem to 
share some elements at the genetic level.    
 I want to emphasize an important feature of the kind of clinical work that we are 
dealing with here: pathological effects described clinically are, in medical genetics, being 
mapped to genes and their location on chromosomes.  Knowledge production, and the 
relation between science and medicine, is performed in medical genetics very much in 
terms of a medical platform.  A part of this process includes refiguring clinical classification 
of mental and physical disorders, including the parameters of disorders and their 
etiologies.   
 This said, the history of the emergence of medical genetics also includes older roots - 
not in the classification of disease diagnoses, but in the association of human 
developmental science, and the identification of causes of congenital anomalies, often 
described as syndromes.  As we saw in the introduction these may include susceptibility to 
disease, but they are not equivalent to disease.   
   
 
A science of growth and form  
 
Most of the dysmorphologists I talked to had ‘come from’ paediatrics, and ‘got into 
genetics’ through that route. This disciplinary genealogy is evident in their inclusion of  a 
pregnancy history and a history of the child’s development in their presentation of cases at 
conferences or in papers. 
 Dysmorphologists also make a distinction between themselves and other kinds of 
medical geneticists, who have come through the route of disease-orientated genetics, 
such as cancer genetics. This latter kind of genetics is much more prone to look for the 
genes that are implicated in the production of the underlying conditions for the disease 
process, such as Alzheimer’s (as discussed above) in which many related genes have been 
discovered. In contrast, paediatric genetics is much more focussed on the relationship 
between growth, shape and form and the development of the human organism.  The 
interest in diseases is where these are associated with malformation. 
 Genetic medicine in dysmorphology is thus not simply concerned with diseases.  
Rather it has a direct relationship to what I want to delineate as the science of growth and 
form, after D’Arcy Wentworth Thompson (2000). These sciences include morphogenesis, 
embryology, and developmental biology, on the one hand, and psycho-physiological 
theories of normal child development on the other. In the natural history of genetic 
medicine concerned with congenital abnormalities, there is therefore an association 
between clinical paediatrics and biological theories of human growth and development, 
including more recently genetics.   
 There is a long history of people seeking explanations for specific kinds of differences 
in babies and children (Crawford 2004). In contemporary Euro-American societies, 
deformity in babies and children has become increasingly medicalized, so that we are used 
to thinking of differences in terms of ‘congenital abnormalities’ or ‘anomalies’, or ‘birth 
defects’. Medicalization has included twin processes: distinguishing when defects have 
serious, even life-threatening implications, and clinical processes through which effects are 
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identified and named as deformities, including creating ways of dividing the normal from 
the abnormal, and identifying the causes of deformity.   
Increasingly, surveillance of children’s failure to grow and thrive has been 
standardized: for example, in tecnologies for measuring and charting growth and form in 
foetuses, babies and infants, and plotting these results in relation to ranges and norms. 
There are a number of technologies that can help identity abnormalities in growth and 
form prenatally - for example, foetal growth percentile calculators - as well as detecting 
potential abnormalities in the form of the foetusiv.  These technologies can help detect 
variations.  For example, specificities over how a baby fails to grow properly in the womb, 
are related to how the baby is born with defects such as harelip and cleft palate, too many 
or not enough fingers or toes, too big or too small a head.  Other ‘common’ failures may 
include growing too large or being too small for foetal chronological age.   
Additionally, deviations from the norm may involve organs – brains may fail to grow 
in the right way or hearts fail to close up where they should. Birth defects do not always 
show immediately: they can make their appearance over time as the child is seen to fail to 
develop ‘normally’. Here defects can present over time, such as ‘abnormal’ behaviour, 
including what is now categorized as mental retardation, autism and attention deficit 
hyperactivity disorder.   
Medical explanations for birth defects include environmental factors during 
pregnancy – such as foetal exposure to chemicals , infections (such as rubella), radiation – 
or parental lifestyle factors, such as drug consumption (such as alcohol or lithium); as well 
as events during birth itself, such as lack of oxygen. Some birth defects are identified as 
having a chromosomal or genetic origin. This can be inherited, from one or both parents, 
or seen as a de novo event, where there has been an aberration at the chromosomal or 
genetic level but that this has not been inherited from either parent, although there may 
be other correlations, for example between Down syndrome and older mothers. Doctors 
in dysmorphology set out not just to identify the effects of defects, but to differentiate 
their causes. This is why they do a careful pregnancy and birth history – to exclude any 
environmental or lifestyle factors that might have effected the child during its 
development in the womb or during birth, or even after birth.     
 
 
The geneticization of congenital disorders 
 
Dysmorphology thus has its roots and routes in the description and explanation of 
deformities, and, as such, has been at the heart of the emergence of medical genetics as a 
specialism in the UK.  In the US, dysmorphology is a distinctive department set apart from 
medical genetics, while in the UK dysmorphology is located within medical genetics as an 
integral part of medical and clinical genetics, and as a key underpinning knowledge 
practice to the discipline.   
 Specifically, the histories of medical genetics in the UK associate it with, on the one 
hand, correlating complex human traits and pathologies with hereditary mechanisms 
(Kaplan 2000), and on the other, with landmark innovative technologies (Harper 
2004,2006), for example chromosome karyotypingv.  
It has been suggested that the history of medical genetics was in part curtailed 
because the Eugenics movement associated ‘social problems’ with hereditary – human 
genetics was promoted as a way to breed people in order to strengthen the race and 
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eliminate ‘the weak’ (Richards 2002). Dunn (1962) argues that it is only later, when human 
genetics was rearticulated as of medical importance and as a way to understand 
‘genetical’ problems in individuals as new kinds of medical entities, including the part 
genetics plays in normal human development and the production of health and pathology, 
that a renaissance and flourishing of human genetic science was possible: 
Progress in human genetics seemed to have been impeded less by lack of means 
than by lack of a clear scientific goal, and this at a time when the major problems of 
genetics were taking a clear form. The particulate nature of the transmission 
mechanism of heredity had focused attention on the means by which genetic 
elements reproduce and maintain their continuity with opportunity for change and 
evolution, and on the means by which genes control metabolism and development. 
But most observations on human heredity were not oriented in any clear way 
toward such problems. Matters of greater moment seemed to be the inheritance of 
"insanity," of "feeblemindedness" and other then vaguely defined mental ills, the 
effects of parental age or alcoholism or social status on the offspring, and similar 
studies pursued for immediate social ends. (p.2, my emphasis) 
Critically, then, the emergence of the technologies with which to visualise chromosomal, 
and later gene, sequences, have helped legitimate the differentiation of genetic as 
opposed to other kinds of aetiologies, for variation and difference in growth and form 
associated with complex human troubles.  While medicinalization of human vriation as 
deformity has helped, as I have discussed in Chapter 3, legitimate the need for the 
technoscience. 
Thus the study of complex human troubles, defined as congenital, already has a long 
history, together with a history of differentiating their origins, including environment, 
perinatal events, such as alcohol consumption during pregnancy, and so on and so forth.  
Here I should stress two things. The first is how the medical history of complex human 
troubles identified as congenital, and their association with heredity, reproduction and 
family, has legitimated the development of the technologies with which to visualise them.  
The second is that the development of technologies to ‘visualise’ the chromosomes and 
the genes has legitimated the rapid and proliferating interest in the description of 
congenital abnormalities – or ‘syndromes’.  This relation between medicine and science is 
increasingly sedimented in Euro-American health policy.  
To elaborate: recently the American College of Medical Genetics (2006), in a policy 
directive, advocated screening at birth for 29 different conditions, including many 
syndromes with a ‘genetic’ origin. Further sedimentation can be found in registers for 
congenital anomalies. Across regions and nations in Europe, as well as states in the US, 
information about congenital anomalies is collected on a vast scale to form a database for 
statistical analysis of deformity at the level of populations. In Europe these registers are 
gathered together by EUROCAT (http://www.eurocat-
network.eu/aboutus/whatiseurocat/whyregistercongenitalanomalies). These reporting 
mechanisms include reporting of anomalies that have chromosomal and genetic causes. 
Hidden in all this is how any specific syndrome has emerged; how it comes to be 
classified and defined, and continuously refined, prior to its naturalization in a test, or a 
policy, or as a diagnosis and reportable event. For example, the work of classifying 
chromosomal anomalies, such as Down Syndrome or Turner Syndrome, has been 
sedimented and naturalised in the technologies with which to visualise them at the 
molecular level.   
 54 
This process can be seen in antenatal and newborn screening programs. For some 
time both in the UK, Europe and the US pregnant mothers are routinely offered screening 
for Down syndrome.  Down syndrome has been medicalized through the association of 
visible features with problems of growth and development, as well as with some diseases: 
 
Though the symptoms of Down syndrome are very dangerous, it is possible 
that the patients won’t experience all of them. Most of them are 
morphological abnormalities like asymmetrical, small skull, abnormal round 
head with a flat side at the back. Besides, a child with Down syndrome can 
have slanting eyes, short hands (sometimes broad) and fingers. The nose is 
usually flattened, the mouth is small with an enlarged tongue (which causes 
serious problems). The children with Down syndrome also have low muscle 
tone (which cause feeding problems) and loose joints. Besides the rate of 
weight increase at the DS newborns is slower than the normal newborns. 
Unfortunately DS affects also the mental abilities of the child. DS patients 
suffer from moderate mental retardation. Besides, these newborns face 
problems in developing some skills like feeding, toilet teaching etc. Besides 
there is a positive connection between Down syndrome and Alzheimer and 
Leukaemia. (Genetic Diseases, undated)  
 
Down Syndrome is now also sometimes called trisomy 21. This is because its diagnosis was 
‘settled’ in 1959 by tests that have allowed it to be seen as a chromosomal condition 
caused by the presence of all or part of an extra 21st chromosome.  
As it happens, Down syndrome was originally named after a British physician who 
described the syndrome in 1866.  What is interesting is that in the US the syndrome 
is now actually called trisomy 21 – this technoscientific labelling thus effacing the 
trace of its clinical origins as something ‘discovered’ by Dr Down. Indeed, the shift 
from an eponymous (Brighton & Brighton 1987) naming of syndromes to a name 
that designates the gene or the chromosome is becoming more frequent. This is 
itself significant in greatly masking the clinical part played in the development of 
genetic technology.  
I should add here that Down syndrome is one of the orginal dysmorphic syndromes 
with its own special ‘look’, both in terms of facial features and the shape and form of 
hands and feet (see fig. 4.3). 
 
Insert here 
Fig. 4.3 The Many Faces of Down syndrome: Richard Bailley 365 (2008) 
 
In this brief history we can see the intertwining and co-dependency of clinical knowledge 
creation and genetic science in the context of understandings about congenital 
abnormalities. Because congenital abnormality is being figured as a problem of growth and 
form, clinical work is deeply entangled in shifts in biosciences and vice a versa, including 
the development of biotechnologies such as karyotyping. These relations and associations, 
or ‘assemblages’ (Ong and Collier 2005), become invisible once they are stabilized as 
diagnostic categories and sedimented as screening technologies, such as those for Down 
and Turner syndromes.   
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Critically, recognised expert dysmorphologists are the key actors in the construction 
and dissemination of databases of abnormalities – and the construction of clinical entities 
that may or may not be screenable in the future. Some of these experts form the subjects 
of the current study. But what is being performed in dysmorphology is the messiness of 
categorical work (Bowker and Star 2000) in the making.  And, as will be seen, it is in this 
messiness that dysmorphology enacts clinical observation and classification of Sean B. 
Carroll’s “spectacular mutants” that occur ‘in nature’ as opposed to in the laboratory, as 
necessary to the science of the new genetics. 
 
 
Genetics and (De)formation: From Correlations to Causes 
 
Within the medical genetics concerned with anomalies in growth and form, a child’s 
development is explored at the molar level of the whole organism; namely, at the clinical 
level.  With changes in biological understanding, it follows that there are changes in clinical 
possibilities: that is, with a proliferation of genetic science and technology, the question of 
whether the clinical picture is a phenotype (the fleshy expression of a genotype) is 
increasingly opened up. This is referred to as the phenotype-genotype correlation:  
 
The distinction between phenotype and genotype is fundamental to the 
understanding of heredity and development of organisms. The genotype of an 
organism is the class to which that organism belongs as determined by the 
description of the actual physical material made up of DNA that was passed to the 
organism by its parents at the organism's conception. For sexually reproducing 
organisms [such as humans] that physical material consists of the DNA contributed 
to the fertilized egg by the sperm and egg of its two parents. The phenotype of an 
organism is the class to which that organism belongs as determined by the 
description of the physical and behavioral characteristics of the organism, for 
example its size and shape, its metabolic activities and its pattern of movement.  It is 
essential to distinguish the descriptors of the organism, its genotype and phenotype, 
from the material objects that are being described. The genotype is the descriptor of 
the genome, which is the set of physical DNA molecules inherited from the 
organism's parents. The phenotype is the descriptor of the phenome, the manifest 
physical properties of the organism, its physiology, morphology and behavior. The 
concepts of phenotype and genotype also demand the distinction between types 
and tokens. As the words “genotype” and “phenotype” suggest, these are types, sets 
of which any given organism and its genome are members, sets defined by their 
physical description. Any individual organism and its genome are members of those 
sets, tokens of those types. (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2004)  
It is interesting to note that features of a phenotype do not necessarily correlate to a 
genotype: these features can express different genotypes. As can be seen from the above 
quotation, the individual organism and its genome can become members of a ‘class’ or 
‘set’, or be held up as representing a ‘token of a type’. Here, then, we are not talking about 
direct causal relations, or the discovery of truth or laws, but about correlations, based on 
associations that have to be evidenced rather than proven:   
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The association between the presence of a certain mutation or mutations (genotype) 
and the resulting physical trait, abnormality, or pattern of abnormalities 
(phenotype). With respect to genetic testing, the frequency with which a certain 
phenotype is observed in the presence of a specific genotype determines the 
positive predictive value of the test.  
(http://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/glossary=genotypephenotypecorrelation) 
 
The predictive value of any particular molecular test is gained not in demonstrating causal 
relations, but through correlations between what is observed (phenotype) and the 
presence of a particular genotype  – in other words there has to be observation of a 
phenotype ahead of a) its sedimentation in a classification system and b) its correlation 
with a specific genotype represented by a test.  Therefore, the advent of the new genetics 
opens up a new site: the relation and non-relation between the molecular (the genotype) 
and the molar (the phenotype).   
 This relationship between the observation, description, and validation of a 
phenotype, and its correlation to a specific genotype, is the space occupied by the 
dysmorphology clinic in genetic medicine. The relationship between clinical genetic 
medicine and the science of human growth and development is of some standing, and its 
incorporation of new genetic knowledge in terms of both the classification of congenital 
abnormalities (as well as in the recognition, diagnosis, and ‘treatment’ of congenital 
abnormalities) is ongoing. In the main, this can be understood as a process through which 
there has to be an arrival at a position in which correlations can be tested in the 
establishing of genetic etiologies.  
 
 
 
Classification in dysmorphology 
 
A key site in which this work is being undertaken is dysmorphology, and the formation of a 
particular kind of discourse and particular kind of gaze. In the ways that dysmorphology 
classification is presented, knowledge about the origins of a syndrome comes after its 
original description. 
 In terms of the medical model, this represents the reductive process of medical 
categorizing: the move is from correlations to causes.  This includes a shift from the clinical 
observation and description of syndromes to the laboratory and the experimental mode 
through which to discover the underlying defects causing the syndrome:    
The biochemical and physiological defects underlying human dysmorphic syndromes 
can now be approached using techniques of molecular biology. The genetic 
component of the causation of the dysmorphology can be studied in isolation from 
the environmental component by using large, rare families that exhibit the same 
phenotype as more complex multifactorial disorders, but inherit the mutation in a 
monogenic fashion. Such an analysis starts with the determination of linkage to a 
gene probe, followed by the use of newer techniques of molecular biology to 
enable cloning and sequencing of the mutated gene. Analysis of the gene product 
by amino acid sequence homology to other known proteins, and tissue specific 
expression, may place the defect within the cascade of events associated with 
development and differentiation. Once cloned, the gene can also be manipulated in 
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transgenic laboratory animals and the effect of its mutation studied directly. The use 
of techniques of molecular biology to study the genetic aspects of dysmorphic 
syndromes will allow insight to be gained both into normal foetal development and 
into the causes of congenital malformations. (Ivens et al. 1988: 473, emphasis 
added) 
As already indicated, most of the experts I encountered in the study were also involved in 
collaborative research with laboratory based scientists trying to identify the genetic basis 
of syndromes. These laboratories (both cytogenic and molecular genetic laboratories) 
were situated alongside the clinics. They provided not just clinical investigative services, 
but also acted as homes for collaborative work between clinical and laboratory based 
scientists. For example, one medical genetics department and its associated molecular 
genetics laboratory had been intimately involved together in cloning the myotonic 
dystrophy and Huntington gene for which diagnostic tests and family follow up is now 
routine. In addition, at many of the meetings I attended, laboratory based research using 
animal models or clones would be presented alongside the presentation of dysmorphology 
case studies. In the lobby of national and international human or medical genetics 
conferences, posters would be mixed together displaying clinical case studies and 
laboratory research, sometimes the two being juxtaposed within the same poster.   
What is being enacted here then is how contemporary discovery in clinically 
orientated genetic science contravenes any notion that new genetic knowledge follows a 
diffusion model – from bench to bedside – but relies rather on the intermingling of clinical 
and laboratory work in the co-constitution of genetic knowledge. Indeed, as I have 
suggested, classification of syndromes for example as genetic, or not, is performed in 
dysmorphology as very much still in the making (Latimer 2006). This is corroborated by 
Featherstone and Atkinson (2011) who also show, in their recent study of Rhett Syndrome 
as a syndrome in the making, activities in one domain (the clinic) influence perception in 
the other (the laboratory).   
This refutes the usual way in which the flow of innovation is represented. Indeed, 
even where there are conscious attempts at correlating descriptions of a phenotype (in 
the clinic) and visualization of the corresponding genotype (in the laboratory), there can 
be a gap between the two. This gap in the correlation between phenotype and genotype is 
a feature of how genetics and the classification of syndromes proceeds, one that is 
captured by Morris (2006) in the opening of her chapter on the dysmorphology, natural 
history and genetics of William’s syndrome (see Fig. 4.4).   
She suggests that “The study of a syndrome typically proceeds in a stepwise fashion 
reflecting distinct knowledge increments”; including a linear and progressive process from 
clinical discovery of a unique pattern through to definition of a condition, cataloguing of 
the natural history, delineation of the causes of the syndrome, including teratogens, 
mutant genes, and chromosome abnormalities, and finally genotype-phenotype 
correlation. This latter phase, or “knowledge increment”, is described by Morris as when:  
 The population of clinically affected individuals is examined. With an 
objective test for diagnosis, researchers can detect both extremes (mild 
and severe) of the distribution, resulting in a redefinition of the 
syndrome.  
 The range of the phenotype is better evaluated.  
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 Researchers investigate the variability in phenotype relative to the 
particular genetic mutation, the genetic background, varying 
environmental conditions and the actions of modifying genes.  
 Genetic heterogeneity may be demonstrated for the phenotype, if a 
mutation in a different gene is found to result in the same clinical 
syndrome. (Morris 2006, p.3) 
 
Morris is asserting that the laboratory work can help refine the clinical description of a 
syndrome, including reevaluating the range (mild to severe), and even help redefine 
classification where different mutations result in the same clinic picture. This is very much 
a picture of translation rather than diffusion in the relation between the laboratory and 
the clinic in the description and refining of syndromes.  Critically, however, it also indicates 
a gap – what I want to call a possible non-relation between the visualization of the 
genotype and the clinical picture of a phenotype. Also missing from this account is how, 
for many clinical descriptions, there is as yet no way of visualizaing the genotype. I return 
to describe how clinicans account for this process in Chapter 5. 
 
Insert here 
 
Fig. 4.4 The face of William’s Syndrome 
 
 
 
Discussion 
 
In this chapter I have shown that what is being performed by the association of the clinic 
with the laboratory, as well as with technoscientific representations of genes and 
chromosomes, is the possibility of new knowledge and understanding about disease. We 
have seen, in discourses about the history of medical genetics and the natural histories of 
syndromes, the figuring of what Keating and Cambrosio describe as medical platforms in 
the creation of new medical entities.   
This is important because the recurrent motif in the expanding research literature on 
the relation between science and medicine – in the context of the new genetics 
concerning the so-called geneticization of contemporary medicine - is a scepticism 
concerning reductionist explanations of medical knowledge (cf. Kerr 2004a: 24-28). It has 
been stressed that there is a need to avoid the assumption that medical knowledge and 
practice can be accounted for either in terms of increasing molecularization (e.g. de 
Chadarevian and Harmke 1998), or in the rise of technology (e.g. Wailoo 1997).  
Kerr’s exploration of cystic fibrosis is a key case in point (Kerr 2000). She 
demonstrates the flexibility of genes and disease entities in the complex intersections 
between genetic and clinical research. While genetic reductionism is a feature of much of 
the scientific and medical texts she examines, she argues for social-science analyses that 
‘contextualize genetic reductionism’ (p. 870), stressing the ‘variability and contingency’ 
that characterizes the accomplishment of genetic categorizations.  
The consequent dialogue between Kerr and Hedgecoe (Hedgecoe 2003, 2004; Kerr 
2004b) serves to underscore the fact that, while social scientists may wish to treat 
‘geneticization’ as a topic for inquiry (as reflected in the rhetoric and practices of scientists 
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and clinicians), it should not be invoked as an unexamined explanation for current practice 
(see Hedgecoe 2002, Hedgecoe and Tutton 2002, Gibbon 2002). Cox and Starzomski 
(2004), discussing the construction of autosomal dominant polycystic kidney disease, also 
argue that the complexities of everyday practice escape simple characterizations as 
‘geneticization’. There are, of course, wider cultural analyses in which the notion of 
geneticization has been invoked to account for generic consequences of the new genetics 
(e.g. Finkler 2000) and to contest strong versions of a geneticized ‘medicalization’ thesis 
(Cussins 1996, Lock and Kaufert 1998, Martin 1998).  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have examined the various discourses over dysmorphology’s contribution 
to genetic science. These fit neatly with Foucault’s analysis of medicine as an 
enlightenment project and the emphasis on the naturalist’s gaze, discussed in Chapter 2, 
in which ‘observation should lead to experiment, provided that experiment should 
question only in the vocabulary and within the language proposed to it by things observed’ 
(Foucault 2003a, 131).  
However, I am suggesting that there is a greater significance here. This extra 
significance concerns, first, the gap between the phenotype and the genotype as well as 
the partialness of the relationality between the molar and the molecular.  And, second, 
concerns how dysmorphology performs the relation between the normal and the 
pathological in understandings of human growth and development as emergent.   
In the next chapter I go on to suggest how these (partial) relationalities are 
accomplished in dysmorphology. My argument is that these pressage the clinic in genetics 
as a new frontier of knowledge. A space in which medicine, albeit incipiently, might be 
thought to be beginning to reassert its dominance in society.   
 
Chapter 5  
 
Shaping the Science of Growth and Form 
 
The constant division between the normal and the abnormal, to which every 
individual is subjected, brings us back to our own time, by applying the binary 
branding and exile of the leper to quite different objects; the existence of a 
whole set of techniques and institutions for measuring, supervising and 
correcting the abnormal brings into play the disciplinary mechanisms to which 
the fear of the plague gave rise. All the mechanisms of power which, even 
today, are disposed around the abnormal individual, to brand him and to alter 
him, are composed of those two forms from which they distantly derive. 
(Foucault 1995, Discipline and Punish, p. 199).  
 
In the last chapter I began to examine how clinical geneticists lay claim to the science of 
growth and form, exploring how the genealogy of dysmorphology is also a history of the 
medicalization of deformity in children; one that is critical to the emergence of genetic 
medicine in the late 20th and early 21st century. This included looking at how 
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developments in molecular biology intertwine with clinical medicine’s history and interest 
in how the genetic is implicated in the production of syndromes.  
In this chapter I explore further how the clinical identification and description of 
pathologies takes place. My aim is to begin to explore in detail how the shape of forms for 
congenitally abnormal entities connects to how the genetic is being investigated as playing 
a part in normal human development.   
 Donnai (2008), a leading British dysmorphologist, states in a lecture to neophyte 
geneticists that: “David Smith from the USA first used the term “dysmorphology” in the 
1960s to describe the study of human congenital malformations and patterns of birth 
defects”.  She goes on to add that dysmorphology is important for both families and for 
our understanding of human development.  In this statement she is making the claim that 
by studying the abnormal and the pathological, we can understand much more about the 
normal.  Or to put it another way: by studying “morphological defects” we can learn more 
about normal human development.  
 In the following, I elaborate how this process of relating the abnormal to the normal 
may be working through an analysis of an extract from my interview with Professor Smart. 
Ahead of this, however, I note some similarities and differences between the academic 
meetings of dysmorphology and earlier displays of medical dominance.   
 
 
Staging the display 
 
Occasions such as London Dysmorphology Club described in the previous chapter conjure 
up visions of ‘grand rounds’, the ritual events in which medical case histories were 
presented as a vital part of medical education and science. Grand rounds took place in 
auditoriums located either in the teaching hospital or in the medical school – often 
designed for that purpose, with steep sides and a circular central floor. Usually the patient 
that formed the focus of the case was present, and their history and treatment presented, 
and then debated by members of the audience at great length.  
The grand round constituted the ‘deep play’ (Geertz 1973) at the heart of clinical 
medicine and was where medicine was visualised and reaffirmed as grand. In the grand 
round what was [tense change] at stake was much more than the enactment of an 
empirically grounded discipline of discovery and innovation. What was being put on 
display was a competitive and hierarchical world in which doctors more or less produced 
and reproduced medical perception, judgement, and discretion.  
Grand rounds, like the ones I used to attend at University College and St Mary’s 
Hospitals in London, were just such sites for the spectacle of medical dominance to be re-
enacted. Teaching ward rounds at the bedside were also such occasions although not on 
such a large scale. However, they could still be spectacles of the medical gaze, hierarchy 
and competition, and the method of doubt, with sometimes up to 30 attendents, including 
visiting doctors from all over the world.  Increasingly, however, with audit cultures, 
political correctness, and technologies of democratization (such as pathways, evidence 
based medicine, and patient choice) it would appear that medicine is in retreat, becoming 
almost recessive, with only intermittent displays of dominance (c.f. Latimer 2005). For 
example, a doctor in the New York Times (Altman, 2006) suggested that while some 
leading medical schools now stream and podcast what they call grand rounds for public 
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consumption (e.g. the Mayo clinic @ http://www.mayoclinic.org/grand-rounds/), grand 
rounds as a space for Socratic dialogue has been lost.  
In conjuring up these contrasting images, I want to press three things. The first is 
how the meeting of London Dysmorphology Club is one of medicine’s ‘fronts’  (Goffman 
1968). Its mimicry of the grand round of old offers an occasion in which dysmorphology is 
magnified, enacted, circulated and passed on. The fact that the spectacle of medical 
dominance is displayed only intermittently today makes such theatre no less potent. 
Secondly, the presenters are often neophytes rather than established clinicians. The career 
young are being exercised and disciplined through their participation, not merely through 
witnessing as members of the audience.  
Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, the meeting also acts as an occasion that 
contemporises the power of the medical gaze through the specificities of its technologies 
and practices. However, in place of the fleshy bodies that constituted the focus of the 
grand round, it is assemblages and syndromes displayed on twin screens that magnify the 
modus operandi of dysmorphology. In this virtual world, the patient is made present only 
occasionally and remotely through visual recognition and oral histories.  
 
 
Genetic Medicine and the Science of Growth and Form 
 
As reported in my description of London Dysmorphology Club in Chapter 4, Professor 
Smart is the man who was sitting at his laptop in sending images and database to the 
screen on the left of the podium. Later he tells me a story that elaborates how medicine 
brings the clinic, the laboratory, and the family into association. Critically, Professor 
Smart’s story emphasizes the clinic’s place in generating knowledge about growth and 
form in humans, in a way that captures how he, and other experts I interviewed, present 
the relation between the clinic and the laboratory in processes of discovery and 
innovation.   
The interview is taking place in the café of the same building in which the London 
Dysmorphology Club was held.  As it happens I never get behind this front to the backstage 
of his office – or gain access to his clinic or laboratories (also housed in this building) - 
possibly because with his laptop he brings much of his backstage with him wherever he 
goes.  
As he talks to me, Professor Smart is showing me pictures and articles and all sorts of 
data on his laptop.  During the whole interview, the mouse of his computer is competing 
for space with the coffee cups and my tape recorder on the café table. This has a certain 
irony since one of my questions leads to the topic of laboratory mice coming to dominate 
his narrative on the natural history of Fraser syndrome: 
JL: Just one more technical thing before you take me through the (dysmorphology) 
database, which is mouse modelling, and how does that help clinical work or, what’s 
your view if you like? 
Professor Smart: Mice don’t really have much clinically, but they do help in research, 
to give clues as to where a gene might be.  One of the things that we’ve done very 
recently, on the research side, that is a good example of how useful mice are.  I’ve 
always been interested in mice, so I’ve actually got a database that is equivalent to 
the human database, which is a database of mouse mutants, of abnormal mice.  I’ll 
show you that in a minute.  Let’s show you how mice are useful.  This is a slightly 
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gory picture, okay – this is a syndrome called Fraser’s syndrome.  [he shows me 
some slides, pictures of a blind mouse as well as pictures of children with blinded 
eyes – see figure 4.5] 
 
Professor Smart begins this part of the interview with a distinction between the fact that 
mice don’t have much to offer clinically and the significance of their place in genetic 
research, in that they are good at helping you find the genes.  In Latour’s terms (1987) 
Professor Smart is mobilizing mice as ‘spokespersons’ not for clinical anomalies, but for 
their genetic basis.  So here we have the doubling that the clinic performs: as a site of 
knowledge production about the genes and their functions, and as a site in which diseases 
are classified, diagnosed and intervened in.   
Professor Smart goes on to say that he has a database of mouse mutants and their 
abnormalities, and that he can show me how mice are useful.  He then shows me some 
pictures of the blinded eyes of mice and human mutants – note the overlap and the 
distinction between mice and humans. As he continues, he shifts between his talk and the 
different images or slides on his laptop: 
Professor Smart: It is named after a guy called George Fraser, who was an old-time 
geneticist, in Oxford.  Fraser syndrome – slightly gory – [returns to the slides of the 
images of mice and people with Fraser syndrome] -  the eyelids don’t actually form, 
so cryptothalamus – hidden eyes – so they don’t actually have any eye openings, and 
underneath there, even if you open them up surgically, the eyeball is not normal, so 
they are blind basically.  And the other thing they have is …syndactyly – their fingers 
are joined together.  Here is George’s original paper [he brings up a pdf of the 
original paper on his screen], so this is way back in 1962.  (emphasis added) 
Here Professor Smart is implicitly making another distinction – George Fraser was an ‘old-
time geneticist’; as if to corroborate this designation, he shows me the original paper that 
was published ‘way back’ in 1962.  He enacts Fraser syndrome as being discovered through 
observation of nature, in ‘the field’ of the family, and identification of clinical signs and 
unusual features, which the special clinical gaze associates with one another (eyes, joined 
up fingers) published in an early paper by Dr Fraser.   
In doing this Professor Smart begins to historicize, and give a sense of discovery and 
progress – a sense that he is describing the ‘natural’ history of an evolving clinical 
medicine, but one that is also engaged in discovery over the genetic.  He then goes on to 
tell me a ‘funny story’: 
Professor Smart: This is a funny story – this lady here [shows me a slide of a woman 
in her forties], she’s got cryptothalamus and she is obviously aged about 45, and her 
mum, who was aged about 70 wrote to me, just out of the blue because she didn’t 
know I was working on Fraser Syndrome. And she said ‘I’ve always wondered what 
was wrong with my daughter and somebody has said that she’s got Charge 
Syndromevi’.  So I said, ‘Well I don’t know, but send us some pictures’.  So she sent 
some – and I said ‘Oh well I think we do know what she’s got, perhaps you’d like to 
come to the clinic and we can talk to you’.  Talked to her and said it was something 
called Fraser’s syndrome, and she said ‘Oh that’s funny because somebody called Dr 
Fraser came to see us about forty years ago’! And it turns out this is the original case 
from the paper [by Dr Fraser], although nobody had told her what he was going to 
do, but anyway. 
JL: So did he not go back to them? 
 63 
Professor Smart: I don’t know.  But she didn’t know that this was Fraser syndrome 
and this was the original case.  So anyway it is recessive, and it is quite difficult, this 
lady has obviously survived, but a lot of them die early on because they get absent 
kidneys and they get blocked larynxes – so ... it is quite difficult to get cases, DNA, 
genetic studies, so there aren’t many cases around. 
Professor Smart in this section goes on to describe how, through serendipity, he gets to re-
examine the original case of Fraser Syndrome.  He enacts the “gestalt”, or instant 
recognition, of the gaze in dysmorphology – he had asked the mother to send some 
pictures and then he knew what she and the daughter had. But then he expresses 
something different – how the mother and her daughter become interesting to hviiim 
because the mother had survived, while in fact the syndrome is quite difficult – people 
often die early.  He mentions the genetics – it is recessive - but because of these early 
deaths doing genetic studies on the DNA of affected families is problematic.   
Yet, as Professor Smart goes on to illuminate, the point of his story is not the 
curiosity of his meeting the mother, or of her mere survival: 
Professor Smart: I was hanging on for about fifteen years, because there’s a group of 
mice called the Bleb mutant mice, which look like Fraser Syndrome [shows me a slide 
of a mouse] – and you can’t see – but they haven’t got open eyelids either, and 
they’ve got syndactyly, and they are called Bleb mutant mice because – this is a 
mouse embryo – early on in development, they get these blebs or blisters and these 
are like sort of blood blisters really, and you see that one sitting over the eyeball, and 
that one sitting over the lower limb part, so it is thought that they interfere 
mechanically with the development of the eyeball.  
JL: And that’s a naturally occurring mouse – so to speak? 
Professor Smart: It is –  
JL: As opposed to an engineered one? 
Professor Smart: Yes, that’s one [slide of a mouse with bleb eyes] that has been 
collected a long time ago because it looked interesting.  In fact – this is . . I got taught 
about mice in the 1960s by a guy called Grünebergviii, who was a middle-European 
man, who spent his whole life looking at mice, and he thought it was pretty weird, 
and I should have listened to him a little harder.  So this is from his book from about 
the 1950s [shows me a slide of a cross section of a mouse’s eyeball], showing a cross 
section of an eyeball and these mice with their blebs – that’s the eyelid that didn’t 
form, and that’s the blister and that’s the eyeball.  So they’ve known about them for 
a long time.  But the thing is that in the mouse there are different genes that cause 
the same picture, so there are at least five genes, which means it’s heterogeneous, 
and that tells us it is going to be very difficult to map it in the humans, because you 
get a load of families, but you are not just looking at the one locus, the one gene, 
you might be looking at four genes, which means in terms of genetic mapping it 
makes it extremely difficult, if not impossible.  But if you’ve got these clues from the 
mouse, it helps.  So the thing is these mice have been [useful] If we breed the mice, 
they can all be mapped pretty easily to specific mouse chromosomes, so we didn’t 
know what the gene was in the mouse but we knew what chromosome it was on.  
(emphasis added) 
 
In this passage he invokes the length of time it took to move the genetics of Fraser 
syndrome along: ‘I was hanging on for about fifteen years’.  And here he switches from the 
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family with Fraser syndrome to his attachment to mice, and the history of another 
discovery: a particular kind of mouse that also has eye problems identical to people with 
Fraser syndrome.   
In the same passage, he then proceeds to give a history of how mapping the genes in 
the mice gave clues.  He is implying that while it is hard to do gene mapping studies in 
humans, if mice are bred (with the mutation) they can be mapped pretty easily – not to 
the genes – since ‘there are at least five genes’ - but to the chromosomes.  
 
Insert here 
Fig. 5.1 Fraser Syndrome – showing blebs in mouse mutants and in children (Smyth 
and Scambler 2005) 
 
The significance of this point begins to emerge when Professor Smart goes on with 
his natural history of discovering the genetics of Fraser syndrome: 
And what we can do is ... here we are [shows me a slide] - this is something called 
the Oxford Grid.  It turns out that although mice have got twenty chromosomes, 
twenty pairs of chromosomes and humans have got twenty-three, and they look 
different down the microscope, chunks of mouse chromosome are conserved – so if 
you look at the genes on one particular mouse chromosome it will all be in the same 
chunk in the humans.  So this is [a] recent paper here – so that is the human 
chromosome – seven – and there is a ... mouse [chromosome]... so for example this 
bit of human seven, all the genes there are the same as the ones on the bit of mouse 
five – and a little bit of mouse six.  So it means that if – let’s say a gene has been 
mapped with a bit of mouse six syndrome, it is a good first guess that it might be on 
this bit of chromosome seven – but if you don’t know that, you have to do what is 
called a [ ] gene-linkage approach, which is when you have to use markers – three 
hundred markers for every chromosome and if you haven’t got very many families 
then you probably can’t do that.  So it is useful to have a clue like this [the mouse 
mutants].  So because we knew which mouse chromosomes these genes were on, 
then we could have a guess as to where the human’s were.  
 
In this passage of his story Professor Smart explains the relation between how the 
laboratory mapping of chromosomes in mice works to give clues as to where to look in 
humans.  Here we enter the world of the molecular.  We are in a new landscape to that of 
blebs, joined-up fingers and problem kidneys.  We are in a landscape of chromosomes, 
genome sequencing and genetic maps, one that is able to compare mice and humans.  
What happens on chromosome 5 and 6 in the mouse, because of the technology known as 
the Oxford gridix, a technology that compares maps of human genomes with those of mice, 
Professor Smart can suggest that Fraser syndrome might be something that happens on 
chromosome seven in humans.  Of course chromosome 7 in humans is made up of 
hundreds of genes.  But, as he puts it, it gives us a clue.   
 
As he continues, he switches extensions in his discourse – back from mice, and the Oxford 
grid, to families, and on to “knock-out” or genetically engineered mice: 
 
Professor Smart: Then we got some inbred families which are also useful for 
mapping and got those – a Pakistani family up in Leeds and Bradford – they are very 
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helpful for those mapping studies, because they – if they do have a problem like this 
[Fraser Syndrome] then you can have it affecting multiple members in the family.  So 
then we mapped it and we found the gene basically. This is a mouse – now this is a 
knockout mousex – somebody else knocked out this mouse and produced exactly the 
same picture with these blebs.  So that was useful with the mice because it told us 
that there was more than one locus involved and it helped us to find the gene 
because we knew which bit of the chromosome to look at.  Now of course, we’ve got 
a mouse model to try and understand what else is going on.  Because it is a rather 
novel protein, so it is one of those things, where nobody had found that protein 
before in humans – it hadn’t been found because of Fraser Syndrome – but obviously 
when it is working normally it was doing something important in the mouse skin as 
well.  It is also odd because these mice and humans have absent kidneys as well 
sometimes, and that is not caused by the ... so it is doing something important in 
kidney development. 
JL: So something else is going on. 
Professor Smart: So yes, mice have helped there. 
JL: That’s really useful. 
Professor Smart: I’ve got a project too – as I say we’ve got this mouse database but 
we want to link up human, our database in the mouse with this, so that we can get 
clues more efficiently basically. 
JL: So it sort of helps you to know where to look – that’s partly how? 
Professor Smart: And then it helps you to find the mouse model for one human 
disease. 
 
In this final passage of his story, Professor Smart tells me about how they then ‘got some 
inbred Pakistani families’ and mapped their genes and discovered the gene for Fraser 
Syndrome. But then he switches his focus on bodies back to the mice - it was the ‘mouse 
model’, the knock-out mouse engineered to ‘model’ Fraser syndrome, which helped them 
locate the gene: it helped them know that there was more ‘than one locus’.   
The experimental laboratory-based science in the form of the engineered mouse, 
which becomes a ‘mouse model’, is thus helping in more than the clinical understanding of 
Fraser syndrome.  The natural history of Fraser syndrome, the switching between people – 
the mother and her daughter, the Pakistani families, the mice (the original mutant mice), 
and then the transgenic knockout mice that someone else made that had the same blebs - 
is, in Professor Smart’s account, critically not just key to discovering the genetics of a 
syndrome.  Rather, in moving from the family to the transgenic mouse, he suggests that 
they have created a mouse model of Fraser syndrome, with the specific genes on 
chromosome 7 and, therefore, making not just gene mapping, but experimental work 
possible.  This is articulated as important, not simply in terms of one human 
developmental disease, but in terms of the relationship between specific genes and 
human development.    
In this way, the clinic and the laboratory come into association in Professor Smart’s 
natural history of Fraser syndrome as a space of knowledge production of human 
development. In these shifts between the clinical and the naturalist gaze, observing and 
describing the human families and mouse mutants, to the experimental mode and the 
construction of laboratory conditions under which experiments can take place, Professor 
Smart enacts key relations between clinical dysmorphology, the family and the science of 
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growth and form and how these are helping to create not just Syndromes, but the ‘new 
genetics’.  Specifically, he is showing us how the work on the original family, and the 
original mouse mutants, and then the making of the mouse model, is helping them to 
know about the relation of specific genes, their location on chromosomes and aspects of 
human development – namely that of the eyes and the kidney.   
Additionally, and of equal importance, Professor Smart is not just showing me 
moments of translation, shifts back and forward between the laboratory and the clinic. He 
is illustrating how dysmorphology as a science moves from the abnormal and pathological 
(the fleshy and painful problematics of Fraser syndrome), to the normal - the place of 
genes in the development of human eyes and kidneys.   
Professor Smart was, as were all the expert clinical geneticists in my study, a 
practicing clinician, and he described many clinical cases to illustrate his practice in which 
he was acting as consultant to sick children and their families.  And there is no doubt that 
his double profile as scientist and clinician are a part of the reason he was at the top of his 
profession and a world leader in his field.  
But as we can see from his interview, as well as his role in the London 
Dysmorphology Club and his juxtaposition of a natural science of mouse mutants, the 
laboratory science and the natural history of an original clinical case, the database, the 
images of children and their siblings, their history and their test results, he is offering a 
discourse on this particular way to knowledge: a discourse not just of disease, but of the 
basic biology of human development.  
 
 
The pathological and the normal 
 
We are beginning to see in medical genetics, and in dysmorphology in particular, how 
medicine – in the context of the new genetics - is beginning to associate the pathological 
and the normal, in order to create new understandings about how the human organism 
does or does not develop.  
Locating congenital abnormalities as genetic aberrations begins to institute 
syndromes as a problem of normativity in Canguilhem’s (1991) sense: a problem with the 
organism’s vitality, as its capacity to create and sustain the norms that it needs in its basic 
fabric to generate normal growth and form, or what Canguilhem describes as ‘health’ 
(Greco 2009).  In this we can begin to see how individuals such as the mother and her 
daughter with Fraser syndrome are constituted in the discourse of medical genetics as 
both the sources and the objects/subjects of knowledge.  They are the sources of 
knowledge because their genetic makeup is enacted as containing knowledge that 
produces particular healthy life forms; or, as in the case of the mother and her daughter in 
Professor Smart’s story, do not. They become the objects of knowledge because, in 
revealing how their normativity does or does not work, Professor Smart and his 
collaborators can help discover which aspects of peoples' genetic makeup correlate with 
which aspects of the growth and form of the human organism.   
This is important because, as I have discussed in Chapter 2, medicine’s authority 
usually derives not from explicating normativity – as is frequently presumed - but from the 
performance of a gaze that helps make visible pathology and abnormality.  As Canguilhem 
argues, drawing on the history of physiology and pathology in France, the pathological is 
never reducible to the normal. Consequently, the identification of clinical, pathological 
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entities cannot be equated with the extension or extrapolation of the normal, either in 
terms of excess, or in terms of deficiency. For example, he argues that one should not 
confuse the qualitative categories of the normal with the quantitative expression of 
physiological values.  
From Canguilhem’s perspective, therefore, the pathological occupies a distinct 
domain of knowledge deriving from the clinic.  As Greco (2008) asserts in the context of 
medicine, the logical priority of ‘life’ leads Canguilhem to insist that the difference 
between health and illness does not correspond in any simple way to the difference 
between the normal and the pathological. Being healthy involves being normative, rather 
than being normal. A healthy organism is a normative organism, in the sense of one (more) 
able to live according to its own norms of life.  
But what we can learn to hear in the discourses and claims of dysmorphology is that 
by studying “morphological defects” and locating their origins in genetic mutations, 
dysmorphology is claiming to contribute to knowledge about the normative in human 
development.  In the alignment then of the new molecular biology, the clinic and the 
science of human development, medicine is extending itself as contributing to knowledge 
about the genetic as the source of what Foucault calls ‘life itself’: 
Nowadays, with the techniques at the disposal of medicine, the 
possibility for modifying the genetic cell structure not only 
affects the individual or his descendants but the entire human 
race. Every aspect of life now becomes the subject of medical 
intervention. We do not know yet whether man is capable of 
fabricating a living being which will make it possible to modify 
the entire history of life and the future of life. A new dimension 
of medical possibilities arises that I shall call bio-history. The 
doctor and the biologist are no longer working at the level of the 
individual and his descendants, but are beginning to work at the 
level of life itself and its fundamental events. This is a very 
important element in bio-history. (Foucault, 2004, p.11, my 
emphasis) 
Thus, on the one hand genetic medicine’s ‘spirit’ (Foucault, 2003b p.241) is performed as 
routed in a relation to a science that creates the possibility of making disease as a genetic 
problem visible.  On the other, these relations and associations are being performed as 
fundamental to establishing the relationship between fleshy troubles (such as 
cryptopthalmus and spondactyli) and genes, as a specific way to knowledge, not just about 
disease, but about how human organisms normally grow and develop as a key aspect of 
their vitality.   
 
 
Conclusions 
 
In this chapter I have built on what has been discussed in earlier chapters in order  to 
examine how various accounts of genetic medicine and dysmorphology perform in terms 
of medicine’s dominance. This is, in part, about becoming wary of taking conventional 
pictures of the relation between medicine and science as the truth about the relations 
between these domains of culture in the production of discoveries, as will be detailed 
further.  
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There are two important things to point out here. Firstly, the relation between 
science and medicine in these discourses and practices is being enacted as a site in which a 
specific kind of science is being accomplished and re-accomplished, one that shifts and 
moves back and forth between the laboratory and the clinic, the virtual and the fleshy, the 
enginnered and the natural. In their attachment to the laboratory and to laboratory 
technologies, dysmorphologists enact the children and the family in these discourses as 
both the starting point, and the site to which genetic science returns, time and again.  
Within the perspective outlined we see and hear of a translational world in which, as the 
earlier quote from Callon put it, “the very idea of a source or an origin point of technology 
is misleading because innovation is an emergent, interactive activity” that “…involves 
many actors who cooperate or oppose one another” (Callon, 2006, p.4).  
The way in which Professor Smart represents the relation between medicine and 
science not only fits with the translation view described by Callon, discussed in Chapter 4, 
but appears rather strongly to advocate it.  In this, the science being described and 
advocated is precisely one that shifts back and forth between the real world of bodies and 
families on the one hand, and on the other the laboratory as space in which to undertake 
experiment, and virtual technologies, such as gene mapping and the Oxford grid. Indeed, 
in asserting his claim in the development of the mouse model for Fraser syndrome, 
Professor Smart is also engaging in a new kind of medicine-science relation: one in which 
the transgenic mouse model itself becomes the new ‘patient’, and the laboratory becomes 
an extension of the clinic.  As the clinic’s extension, the laboraotory is figured one moment  
as the site of obervations and descriptions, the next as an engineering factory where 
technological innovation is produced, such as mouse models, and finally as helping to 
progress the classification of human disease.   
To return to my discussion of the place of the clinic in science, in the context of 
genetic knowledge, the clinical truth is being enacted in dysmorphology as both preceding 
and then also as legitimating, experimentation and technological innovation. And 
innovations must derive in the first instance from direct observation of people and their 
families, and in the second from observation of the transgenic mutant mouse model and 
his or her family. The engineered mutant mouse model becomes another ‘real’, whose 
organization, growth and form can be observed, and experimented with, alongside the 
‘visualization’ of its genetic map, in ways that are according to Professor Smart, difficult to 
do with human families.  
 Additionally, I want to emphasise (ahead of a more detailed exposition in later 
chapters on the clinic and the family) how the medical geneticists being cited are not 
simply describing, but are also doing ‘identity work’.  Medical genetics is being enacted by 
dysmorphology as central to the development of the new genetics.  Within these 
discourses and practices family and the children are rendered merely as clinical objects. In 
order to ‘pass’ in these fronts of science, the clinicians are active agents doing identity 
work for themselves; they present themselves as the people who are helping to push back 
the frontiers of the genomic unknowns in the context of the sciences of human growth 
and form.  In this front stage of medicine’s alignment of the laboratory with the clinic 
(along with technologies such as the Oxford grid and gene mapping techniques, as well as 
animal models), the clinical gaze is enacted as if families and children are constituted as 
cases to be ‘got’.  Unsurprisingly, their humanity and sociality is effaced.   
Nonetheless, as we will see when we turn to the clinic in the following two chapters, 
the effacement of humanity is itself partial and intermittent. What gets reinstituted in 
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medicine’s attachment to science is certainly the kind of clinical gaze that is itself a form of 
detachment, a detachment from the mess and flesh and pain of the field of clinical work.  
But it is just this doubling and shifting that I think is important: detachment in terms of the 
gaze masks an attachment to other allies, discourses, technologies and so forth. However, 
even in Professor Smart’s account, the mother wrote to him directly about her daughter.  
Relation that this letter writing and Professor Smart’s response is significant, it prompts 
investigation about how families attach to dysmorphologists and how dysmorphologists 
attach to families.  As we will see when we enter the clinic, the dysmorphologists also 
need to immerse themselves in more everyday versions of the real – the world of bodies, 
persons and families – if they are to ‘pass’ with the family and so enable members of the 
family to attach to them.    
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Chapter 6 
 
Creating Clinical Pictures 
 
I think we learn to be worldly from grappling with, rather than generalizing from, the 
ordinary.  I am a creature of the mud, not the sky. (Haraway 2008, p.3) 
 
 
Introduction  
 
In the previous chapters we have seen how dysmorphologists present their work at 
academic and educational meetings, in published works, and in interviews.  We have seen 
them in what I am calling, after Goffman (1968), the front stage - where they are at the 
blackboard, rather than in the field - presenting a highly refined picture of their clinical work.  
Back in the clinic, the picture is very different: here we see the organization of clinical work.  
Pointedly, this clinical work immerses clinicians such as Professor Smart in their ‘field’ of 
study: the bodies, homes, and persons of the family.  As we will see, the family here is not 
just made up of virtual representations of family members; it is also made up of interactions 
with the sentient and fleshy family.    
Consequently, as I show over the next few chapters, clinical work entails ‘switches’ in 
extension as the clinicians move between engaging the family, and consulting the clinical 
pictures that they are constructing.  Some of this extension work is distributed – between 
nurses and doctors, in addition to family members.  Critically, however, in order to muster 
the appropriate identities to ‘pass’ (Goffman 1968, Garfinkel 1967) in this field, and facilitate 
attachment by families, dysmorphologists must display more than the technological gaze: 
they must become social and human.   
 
 
Arranging the Clinic 
 
In the service under study, genetic work is distributed between consultants of clinical 
genetics, genetic specialist nurses (GSNs), other genetic associates (such as genetic 
counselors), trainees in clinical genetics (specialist registrars or SpRs), other clinicians 
(General Practitioners and other clinical specialists) and, importantly, the family.  
At the time of the study there was also a dedicated cytogenetic laboratory in the 
department, and a molecular genetics laboratory in the hospital that worked closely with the 
department.  Both these laboratories provided patient investigative services as well as 
homes for clinican’s and sceintists to work on biomedical research projects into genetic 
disorders.  Like the clinic, then, the laboratory is a a site of crossing, between mundane 
routine diagnostic work and heroic scientific discovery and innovation.  Where tests were 
not available locally, clinicians could make requests for tests to other centers with expertise 
in the field, or seek support through the UK Genetic Testing Network, although the 
geneticists I spoke to stressed just how prohibitively expensive this was. 
 In the current service, clinical genetic process is also distributed across different 
occasions: the home visit, the clinical consultation, and regular team meetings. After 
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referral, but prior to most clinic appointments, the genetic specialist nurse or genetic 
counsellor makes first contact with the individual referred, called ‘the proband’, and their 
family.  The proband in genetics is the initial subject of a genetic investigation that then 
radiates out to the family.  The interesting aspect of this term is that the word is also 
connected to the term ‘probitus’ – meaning a hypothesis or argument. In this sense a 
proband also forms the basis of a case, in both senses of the word: as well as the subject 
becoming a medical case, it is also the starting point for the construction of an argument on 
which a diagnosis is grounded.    
Many families receive a home visit prior to their clinic appointment, the purpose of 
which is to ‘take a history’, create a family tree, and collect relevant materials (e.g. 
photographs).  In addition to the different ‘histories’, the nurse obtains permission to trace 
and acquire medical records for relevant family members, including test results and autopsy 
reports, which will be used in the creation of the child’s ‘medical pedigree’.  A report of this 
visit, including the family tree, is placed in the medical records held by the clinical genetic 
service.  It is then discussed at the clinical team meeting, often prior to the family’s visit to 
the clinic.   
Some weeks or months after this initial work, the child and other family members 
come to the clinic for a consultation.  Timing here relates to how interesting or urgent the 
team assess the case to be.  Usually, both the consultant and the GSN who has conducted 
the home visit are present at the initial clinical consultation.  Here, the consultant discusses 
the route of referral and the family tree assembled by the nurse, and looks at test results 
and scans.  They also do their own history and conduct a clinical examination.  They do this 
by asking the parents or the proband themselves a series of questions in a pretty routine 
format – about the pregnancy, the child’s development and their health, as well as about 
other members of the family and their health and development.  Either simultaneously or in 
between taking this history, the doctor will ask the child to undress or be undressed, and 
examine the child.  
A typical dysmorphology examination “starts from the top” (Consultant 
dysmorphologist, field notes, clinical consultation with Sheila).  Generally, the clinical 
geneticist carefully inspects the head, the face, the tongue, hands, trunk and back, joints, 
feet.   Measurements of head circumference, height and weight are taken. They are looking 
at the shape, size and position of features.  The doctor may look closely at specific aspects 
that arise as the examination unfolds – such as neurological reflexes or genitalia or in the 
eyes.   They may also take photographs of those features that appear distinctive and look at 
photographs of other family members.   
Potential diagnoses, tests, and other materials that may be required to aid a diagnosis 
are sometimes discussed.  More rarely, the causes of the condition, its progression, and the 
risk of recurrence are also discussed where these have been more established.  Many of the 
consultants that I interviewed also told me that they did a lot of what some of them called 
‘homework’ in-between each formal element of the diagnostic process.  This included 
searching databases, discussing descriptions of cases with colleagues across the world via 
email, and seeking out and reading up on articles with similar descriptions.   
All these facets of clinical work are used to build a ‘clinical picture’ of the child and 
their family.  This clinical picture is regularly reviewed at weekly team meetings.  The team 
meetings observed during fieldwork usually consisted of all members of the clinical team, 
namely the special registrars and one or two genetic specialist nurses, working under the 
direction of the genetic consultant.  In these meetings members review and prioritize new 
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referrals, construct a diagnosis for both new and ongoing cases, gather materials to aid 
diagnosis, and organize future clinics.  They often do this while looking at slides of the 
photographs of children and their relations assembled during the clinical process. 
 
 
 
Clinical Technologies 
 
As well as all the usual clinical technologies and processes, such as clinical history, 
biochemistry and CT scans, there are two distinctive clinic based technologies used in 
dysmorphology diagnosis: photographs and family trees.  These are described in turn in the 
next few sections.  
The clinical team uses two types of photograph: those taken during the clinical 
consultation, and family photographs collected by the GSN at the initial home visit or 
brought to the clinic by the family.  Photographs taken in the clinic are used to make a 
record of specific and ‘unusual’ features, such as unusual hands and feet or a ‘distinctive’ 
face.  Throughout the book so far I have been illustrating the text with these two types of 
photographs.   
At team meetings the photographs, reproduced as slides, are projected onto a screen 
and discussed.  Family photographs are used to trace specific features, either in the proband 
themselves or across other family members.  The most relevant of these photographs are 
filed in the medical records.   
As we have seen in Chapter 3, it is these photographs (rather than the patients 
themselves) which are subsequently circulated at clinical meetings of experts at regional, 
national and international levels for teaching, research and diagnostic purposesxi as well as in 
published academic papers.  I offer an in depth analysis of the photographs and their use in 
Chapters 6 and 7.   
The second technology, the family tree, is composed initially by the GSN during the 
home visit. Turning the family tree into a medical pedigree is a mundane practice that, 
through processes of inclusion and exclusion, begins to construct patterns and relations 
between bodies and persons, and ideas of inheritance.  Representational conventions with 
which to construct these pedigrees in genetic medicine are examined in various other 
contexts (e.g. Nukaga and Cambrosio 1997; Gibbon 2002).  
How the process of making medical pedigrees constructs family and kinship has been 
described elsewhere (Atkinson et al. 2001). Others have noted how the family tree draws 
on wider cultural constructions of bloodlines, breeding, and inheritance in constructing 
biological relatedness (Bouquet 1994).  
It it is important to see that the medical pedigree does not merely report or ‘picture’ 
family relations, but that it is one of the key mechanisms whereby such relations – and 
indeed families themselves – are actively produced.  It is also where biological, as opposed 
to social, closeness is being reinstated, with the effect of medicalizing reproduction and 
legitimating clinical access to the family.   
Pressing these matters in the rest of this chapter, as well as the chapters that follow, 
will help show how clinical genetics gets ‘inside’ the family and turns them into allies.  
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Reproducing the biological family 
 
To give some idea of how the creation of the family tree as the technology that reproduces 
biological family is related to the initial home visit, I have included the following extract from 
the opening of the specialist nurse’s visit to the home of George and his family: 
[Arrive with Susan  (the specialist nurse) at a large, detached post-war house with 
large iron gates and a short drive that leads up to a large porch. Greeted by the 
parents, both in their mid to late 30’s. Don’t see their 2 children, hear them playing 
upstairs. Taken through to a large sitting room by the mother while the father goes 
to make tea - he brings through a tray later in the meeting. Susan sits on the sofa, 
George’s mother sits close to her side, the father when he joins the meeting stands a 
little apart, leaning against a piece of furniture near the fireplace]. 
Susan  (specialist nurse): We had a letter from Dr Bond [paediatrician]. This [the visit] 
is to ask you a little bit more information and what you expect to get out of it, 
explain about Dr White [the consultant geneticist to whom George has been 
referred], who she is, when her clinic is and when the best day is and just go through 
things a little bit with George [son]. I’ll take a family tree [she opens out her file and 
takes a sheet and starts to record the family history]  
Susan arrives and enters the house and sits on the sofa.  The greeting and the making of 
the tea signal the sociality of the occasion.  As a specialist nurse, she explains to George’s 
mother why she is there, and opens up her file, announcing the business of the visit, which 
is to give information about the clinic, to take a history, and ‘take’ a family tree.   
However, the first thing to note is how clinical genetics penetrates the home and the 
private space of the family.  Clinicians’ account for this visit in terms of helping the families 
to feel at ease with their visit to the clinic.  But this visit also helps ground the clinical work 
in the material and semiotic space of the contemporary family home.   
 
 
Surveillance in the home 
 
When they report back to the team, it emerges that the nurses who do these visits are also 
making an assessment of the family: they notice things and make a reading of the family 
from how the state of the home, particularly in terms of order and disorder, and how 
parents and other members relate to each other - how they look or conduct themselves.  
This kind of surveillance work is quite normal in child and reproductive health care, for 
example when midwives and health visitors make home visits during and after pregnancy 
(e.g. Bloor and Mackintosh 1990).  
Many comments made by the nurses at team meetings indicate that this is a part of 
what they are doing, such as ‘there was an old fridge in the front garden’, or ‘Mum is 
obviously delayed’, or ‘they are clearly not coping’.   
In the following part of the Susan’s visit she is taking the family history as the basis 
for making a family tree:   
George’s Mother: My husband is adopted. 
Susan: That will be a short side! Does he know anything about his family 
George’s Mother: just that they’re Polish. 
Susan; [begins to take a family tree, husbands and mother’s names and dates of 
birth then] How many children do you have? 
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George’s Mother: George and Jacob. 
Susan: The dates of birth for both? 
George’s Mother: George 1987 and Jacob 2001. 
Susan: Any other pregnancies? 
George’s Mother: No. 
Susan: Any health problems? 
George’s Mother: No. 
Susan: Pregnancies fine? 
George’s Mother: Yes 
The session begins with George’s mother proffering the information that the father is 
adopted and Susan checks if he knows anything about his family, the mother says only that 
they are Polish.  Susan makes a joke – that will be a short side.  Susan then begins the 
question and answer session – closed questions about the father, the mother, and their 
children.  She also asks about the pregnancy and whether the mother has any health 
problems.  In this way she draws George’s mother into the correlation, between health, 
family, pregnancy, reproduction.  
Susan goes on to extend this questioning out from the nuclear family to previous 
generations (George’s mother’s parent and grandparents) and across generations, to her 
siblings and their children, or the ‘extended’ family: 
Susan: Your brothers and sisters? 
George’s Mother: A__ 40 years old, E__ 39. 
Susan: Any children? 
George’s Mother: A__ has 3 children, L__, M__ and J__; E__ has a baby boy. 
Susan: Are they all fit and well as far as you know? 
George’s Mother: Yes, J__ has had some speech therapy but he’s fine now 
Susan: Did your mother have any miscarriages? 
George’s Mother: No. 
Susan: Your parents are fit and well and fine? 
George’s Mother: Yes, although father has cancer. 
Susan: How old is he now? 
George’s Mother: 76. 
Susan: Is he local? 
George’s Mother: They live locally in ____. 
Susan: How are they coping? 
George’s Mother: I get up as much as I can but work [she is a doctor] gets in the way. 
Susan: Are you full time? 
George’s Mother: Yes. 
Susan: So your mother’s fine but exhausted, and her siblings? 
George’s Mother: Her sister died in 2000 in her 70’s, a brother and two sisters. 
Susan: Any problems with their children or their development? 
George’s Mother: C__ [mother’s brother’s son] is a bit odd, we think its more of the 
upbringing rather than anything else, he’s a bit slow, but from family talk it sounded 
as though he was a bit under-stimulated as a child. So environment. 
Susan: How old is he? 
George’s Mother: Late 30’s. 
Susan: Does he work? 
George’s Mother: Yes but he lives at home, he has no independent life. 
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Susan:  Was he a bit slow at school? 
George’s Mother: It’s a bit difficult because we moved away. Uncle P__ had 3 
children, they are all fine, but uncle T__, he didn’t achieve what the girls did. 
Susan:  Grandparents? 
George’s Mother: They are fine, grandfather was diabetic, he died when he was 72, 
grandmother was strong as an ox, she was 75 when she died but no chronic health 
problems. 
Susan:  How old is your mother now? 
In this phase of the questioning Susan moves between eliciting factual questions about 
health and age and longevity, and more qualitative questions about whether George’s 
mother’s parents are coping or not, and whether there where any problems with health or 
development in the children across her parent’s and grandparent’s generations.  George’s 
mother proffers observations and assessments here: that her uncle’s son was a bit odd, a 
bit slow, but attributes this to ‘upbringing’ and sums up that, from family talk, he was 
‘understimulated’: she summarises by attributing the problems with this child to 
environment – i.e. as nothing inherent.   
George’s mother then goes on to offer some unsolicited information, as if the 
question and answer session has got her to reconsider her family’s birth and reproductive 
history, to remember something that is not simply a part of well-rehearsed family talk: 
George’s Mother: 66. The only thing is my grandmother did have a stillborn little 
boy, it was ‘termish’ [nearly went to full term] and he was buried, so at that time it 
must have been full term. Gran had just him and the 4 that lived. My mother was a 
W____ [surname] [she goes into details of the family history], mother was from ‘a 
well to do family’,  ‘landed’, ‘she traded down’. You know, family secrets, there was a 
half brother, he’s dead but his children are fine. The son had 3, the daughter 2, 
they’re fine, though my sister, says L__ ,  there is something not quite right, she’s 
very shy and uncommunicative and as we get older, my sister thought she had a 
weird syndrome, she thought one of those X things, she’s little. 
Susan:  Is she noticeably short? 
George’s Mother: No. 
Susan:  Any other features? 
George’s Mother: Not really, not that I can put a finger on. 
Susan:  How old is her mum? 
George’s Mother: About 40. 
Susan:  L__ had no children? 
George’s Mother: Yes. 
Susan:  Did she do OK at school? 
George’s Mother: Yes, but I think it was hidden because she was overactive, L__ is 
ferociously bright but with all the problems that go with that, she never really 
settled. 
Susan:  What about your father’s parents? 
George’s mother offers a description and account of her grandmother’s stillborn child that 
was ‘termish’ and then gives a little social history of how her mother had ‘traded down’ in 
her marriage.  She then mentions there was a half brother [to her mother], a family secret, 
but that his children are fine, except for one grandchild, whom George’s mother’s sister 
thought might have one of those ‘weird syndromes’: she’s ferociously bright, shy, 
uncommunicative and short.  Thus the taking of the family tree provokes the mother to 
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juxtapose the social history of the family, including its secrets and darker markings, with its 
reproductive and health history.   
Susan asks George’s mother to provide information about her blood relations and her 
relations by marriage across four generations: grandparents, parents, herself and her siblings 
and their children. George’s mother willingly describes and accounts for each in terms of 
their health and anything ‘unusual’.   
Parents readily engage with tracing the family history, and assessing not just the health 
but also the behavior and development of family members, including their own, as well as 
revealing family secrets and characterizations – like being the ‘black sheep’ or the existence 
of mysterious half brothers and sisters.   George’s mother proffers her own and her sister’s 
assessment of other relations as maybe having a ‘weird syndrome’.  This is not just because 
George’s mother is a doctor: many families engage in this kind of assessment and evaluation 
of their relations (see also Featherstone et al 2006). 
What we can see from this exchange is that Susan is not just eliciting a medical 
pedigree by ‘taking a clinical history’.  Rather the note taking and chart making is inciting 
discussion and description of family members by family members. The importance of 
legitimating this kind of discussion – in terms of how they look and why their social and 
personal histories matter - is now discussed. 
 
 
Exercising the parents 
 
This first part of the home visit is all about focusing on biological kin, which has the effect of 
bringing family members into relatedness in very specific ways, what anthropologists 
sometimes refer to as ‘kinning’ (Howell 2006).  In so doing the nurse co-creates with the 
family its shape and form, represented by a hand written family tree.  George’s mother, like 
many parents, participates in connecting ideas of relatedness (biological and by marriage), 
reproduction, and ‘deformations’ in terms of strange children or mysterious illnesses and 
deaths.  She points to those areas of family that are difficult to illuminate – because of 
deaths and secrets.   
After the extracts above Susan goes on to explore George’s father’s health and 
development, the pregnancy and birth of George, and then they turn to George’s history – 
how he has developed, how he looks and what the parents noticed about him and when.  
There is a problem here for Nurse Susan in doing a full medical pedigree because George’s 
father is adopted and there is no medical or developmental history of his biological parents 
or siblings – this may be why he stands at the fireplace for the first part of the session, 
because he feels excluded as someone not related by biological ties.  
The shape and form of George’s family is thus asymmetrical: a further deformation 
and one leg of the tree will be absent, like an amputation or what Goffman refers to as an 
‘abomination’ of the body (1963, p. 4).  But note how the abomination here is in the shape 
and form of the family, not any one person.   
Observation of these interactions, and from subsequent comments at team meetings, 
suggests that the nurse is making an informal assessment of the family in various terms, such 
as their ‘commitment’ to getting a diagnosis (see also White et al 2011), individual and 
family ‘capacity’ (intellectual, [dys]functional), as well as ‘family’ and ‘social’ dynamics, for 
example in terms of how they are ‘coping’. Here, when presenting the family at a team 
meeting, mothers and/or fathers can be described as ‘delayed’, or as not quite ‘coping’.  
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Here, I want to emphasise how the interactions over, as well as the materiality of 
constructing, a family tree begin to exercise parents in making correlations: between family 
histories, how people look, their health and how they cope, their behaviour, with 
reproduction and biological relatedness. Thus family relatedness, and specifically relations of 
reproduction, are being enacted in very particular ways through these encounters: as 
correlated with health and illhealth and the kinds of persons, intellectual, social and 
behavioural, that families make.  And family members, especially parents, are being engaged 
to participate in these enactments.   
Critically, it must be remembered that the implicit purpose of these encounters is to 
search for the origins of problems in the child, George.  And in this case there are all kinds of 
undercurrents and traces subtlety being surfaced, particularly where the history is slightly 
problematic (secrets, trading-down, adoptions and unknown others).  Thus, in the history of 
the mother’s family, but also in the absence of a history of the father’s family, there is a 
search for anything unusual in the family that might be at the root of George’s problems: if 
there is nothing in the mother’s family, then maybe it is the adopted father and his unknown 
family, that are ‘to blame’?  At this stage there is no clinical examination of the child.   
As well as noting how referral of a person for a genetic consultation opens up the 
genetic clinic’s access to the family and to the home, it is important to emphasize how family 
is participant in this opening up.  As already mentioned, one of the things being gauged at 
the home visit is the family’s commitment and capacity to participate in the long and 
arduous process of genetic diagnosis (see also White et al 2012).  The family tree engages 
family in the construction of the family’s formation, and associates issues of health, illness, 
and deformity to the form of the family.  I shall return to these relationships in depth in later 
chapters on the family.  
 
 
Compiling the family tree 
 
A family tree thus begins to be compiled from the initial home visit, and grows from there 
into what becomes a medical pedigree.  Each stage in this transformation becomes a part of 
the case notes.   By the time it becomes a medical pedigree each member of the kindred is 
represented by a symbol to indicate their gender and latent or manifest disease status if 
known, along with details of their name, age, pregnancy history, health status and any other 
potentially relevant information.  The medical pedigree serves as a much sanitized visual 
representation of family relationships that includes medical conditions, and may also 
eventually as it is built over time, contain any genetic diagnosis or positive tests results, 
including carrier status (see Figure 6.1).   
Specifically, the family tree takes on a life of its own: its fabricated nature is effaced 
and it is, like other clinical materials, placed in the proband’s medical records as a 
representation of the family (cf. Gibbon 2002).  So the construction of a family tree allows 
the clinical team to map similarities in diseases, as well as in features, across family members 
who are biologically related, or related by marriage.  However, the visual representation of 
the family tree does not contain any of the ‘extra’ contextualising descriptions of family by 
the nurse or by family members of themselves and their relations that help ground the 
clinical picture.  These aspects may or may not be retained in the memories of the team, but 
they are erased in the documentation. 
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We can see from this analysis that the clinic in dysmorphology does not only concern 
itself with the individual – with the molar, the organism as a singular entity – but with the 
family, and with the family as an extended bodily form made up of connected parts, a figure 
that becomes sedimented in the form of the family tree.   
 
Insert here 
Fig.6.1 The Growth of Family Tree into a Medical pedigree: from the handwritten 
notes through to the formalized medical pedigree. (reproduced with kind permission of 
Angus Clarke) 
 
 
Through a process of inscription, the family tree, together with the photographs, begin 
to connect and mark some features and ‘bodily troubles’ as possibly familial and/or 
inherited.  Others features drop out of sight.  What is traced and simultaneously ‘erased’ 
(Derrida 1978) is the interactive work through which families create their own descriptions 
and the nurse takes impressions of families as social as well as biological phenomena.  These 
aspects, like the soil, mulch, water, light, which enable trees to grow, leave their traces in 
the clinical interpretation of a family’s troubles, but they gradually get translated, sanitized 
and their origins erased from any record of the case.   
 
 
Doing Dysmorphology 
 
Clinical genetics thus draws upon several clinic-based technologies in the work of 
categorizing patients.  Photographs and family trees are among the material resources for 
clinical genetic knowledge practices, and help us to understand how patients are 
categorized. And, as has been seen in previous chapters, dysmorphology also draws at 
moments upon various techniques of chromosome and molecular analysis.  
Although most dysmorphic syndromes are thought to involve submicroscopic 
genetic mutations, and changes in DNA sequence, for many syndromes there are not yet 
any tests. Even when a relevant test exists, it does not necessarily determine the 
diagnostic categorization. Instead, what gets enacted by dysmorphology practice is that it 
is the gaze of the clinic that can read both the fleshy family as well as virtual 
representations of bodies and faces of a child and their family for their signs.   
Further, while dysmorphology discourse and practice enact the gaze of the clinician 
as able to read the bodies and faces of a child and their family, the gaze emerges not just 
as monolithic, inculcated in medical schools and acculturated on occasions such as 
Dysmorphology Club.  Rather, for their gaze to ‘pass’ (Goffman 1968, Garfinkel 1967) their 
different audiences, clinicians have to be motile.  They do not only have to be passed by 
fellow scientists and clinicians in the academy, such as we have seen at Dysmorphology 
Club.  To gain access to the family, and enable immersion in the field, the clinician also has 
to pass with the family, as a fellow human.   
We can hear some of this complexity in the description of practice by Professor Fox, 
a world-leading expert and Mother of UK Dysmorphology,: 
 
I love the science, but it is the clinic that matters…I do my own history and 
examination.  As I take a history I read the family – what do they want?  What have 
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they noticed? And I watch the child.   I do the examination sitting the child on my lap 
– “ooh its hot in here, daddy do you want to take your coat off?” I look at the faces.  
Hold up bangles – give the child one, then the other – they know I am nice. But I am 
looking at palm creases, motor function, little fingers, toes, eye movements – hold 
the bangle up and look at eye movements.  I am looking for anomalies, differences, 
patterns. The family tree helps me get a feel for the family – and for patterns across 
the family. I’m very visual.  I take my own photos - photos are a part of the clinical 
notes – but a special face marks them as a problem. (Professor Fox, interview) 
 
Professor Fox is the person who I described in Chapter 2 as working alongside Professor 
Smart at the London Dysmorphology Club meeting, schooling neophytes in the art of seeing 
syndromes. In this interview of almost two hours, she spoke to me with her eyes closed; 
smiling, grimacing, frowning, as she remembered each family she had worked closely with.  
She exuded carefulness, exactness, curiosity, as well as real attachment to the families and 
her stories of them.   
Professor Fox describes herself as interacting with the family where she can examine 
the child’s response, their ‘behaviour’, and the form of their body (e.g. palm creases), as at 
the same time she has to ‘pass’ (Goffman 1968’ Garfinkel 1967) with the child and the family 
as human: sitting the child on her lap, persuading the child to be helped off with their 
clothes, holding up bangles.  She figures herself as clever, humorous, and devious, stressing 
the undercover watchfulness and observation – ‘ . . they know I am nice. But I am looking at 
palm creases . . hold up the bangle and look at eye movements.’   
We can hear in her discourse how dysmorphology focuses on shape and form, and the 
appearance as well as the function of bodies and their parts: ‘I look at the faces’. While we 
have seen how nurses at the home visit help construct a family tree by taking a history, 
Professor Fox, like many of the clinicians interviewed and observed, emphasizes how ‘I do 
my own history’: but, as she ‘takes the history’ she ‘reads the family’. This involves picking 
up on what the family themselves have noticed so that the family becomes the extension of 
her gaze; they are her eyes and ears for what they can see and she cannot (as of yet).   
Professor Fox describes herself as doing this work of observing in the context of a 
process: she is making a reading and ‘getting a feel’ through intense processes of 
crosschecking and contextualization. Yet she is doing all this in a way that still makes her 
acceptable to the parents and the child.  All the observations of geneticists at work in the 
clinic conveyed these same kinds of careful practices and processes, revealing a kind of 
attachment to the fleshy family, not just the virtual family represented by photographs, 
charts, or test results.   
 
 
Immersion in the family 
 
The attachment to the fleshy family is much more then than just ‘sentimental work’ 
(Featherstone et al, 2006).  Rather, like Hercule Poirot, or traditional ethnographers for that 
matter, the clinicians are insisting on a particular kind of immersed, or ‘situated’ (Clarke, 
2005) knowledge practice: one which is much more closely aligned to humanist 
representations of clinical practice (see also Greco 2009).  
 80 
Clinicians extend this insistence to representations of the family.  For example, in the 
following extract, the doctor insists on making her own readings, looking for herself, not just 
at reports produced by others: 
And people from outside they don't understand why I should want to look at the 
scan. Not just - they don't understand why the report's not sufficient. But it doesn’t 
give you, you don’t see the pattern and the pattern is. Well it's like doing 
dysmorphology without seeing the child and without a picture. It's the same thing. 
It's exactly the same thing. And it doesn’t mean other people are wrong. I mean, 
they often think I want to see it because I want to prove them wrong. It's got nothing 
to do with that. But I've got my own picture and this is the way I understand the 
world if you like. In a sense. That's the thing about dysmorphology as well, this is the 
way you understand what you are doing and I understand the world by looking, by 
seeing. (Dr Fellows, 2nd generation dysmorphologist). 
In this extract Dr Fellows, like many of her colleagues, stresses the need to look at the real 
thing – whether it be a scan or the child and their family themselves - in order to be able to 
see.  But ‘looking’ is situated; it includes, as I have shown earlier, dysmorphologists doing 
their own questioning over the exact history of the proband’s case – both in terms of 
pregnancy and the birth, as well as in terms of the history of the child since birth.   
Thus, looking and seeing are not quite the same things: seeing is what happens after 
looking, it is enacted by dysmorphologists as the effect of gaze as an act of interpretation or 
even by some as innate, a ‘gift’ – Professor Smart in Chapter 3 said it was genetic!  But, as 
we have heard in Professor Fox’s and Dr Fellows’s discourse, looking involves immersion in 
the real world. This in turn means both attaching to family and passing as a fellow human.   
Like Drs Fox and Fellows in the extracts above, dysmorphologists emphasize that a 
critical aspect of their work is seeing the face as unusual because it is this, together with 
pattern recognition that can indicate the presence of a syndrome.  Some syndromes have 
a typical face, but there may be ‘variability of expression’, so that the syndrome may be 
clearly or mildly expressed (see also Selicorni et al 2007).  This term ‘expressed’ is a 
common feature of the geneticists’ world – it refers to how the phenotype is an expression 
of the genotype.  The face then, in this discursive domain, becomes a ‘text’ written 
strongly or mildly by the syndrome.   
 
 
The art of recognition 
 
Where the syndrome is clearly ‘expressed’, there may be what dysmorphologists call a 
‘gestalt moment’ of instant recognition, such as that described by Professor Smart in his 
account of the woman and her daughter with Fraser syndrome in Chapter 4: the moment 
he saw her in the clinic he says that he knew what he was looking at.   
This is not always the case, and the face of the child may need to be set explicitly in a 
broader context:   
The combination of specific and typical dysmorphisms can sometimes give an overall 
impression of a facial appearance at a glance (‘gestalt’) which can be the key clue in 
getting immediately to a diagnosis (for example, Down syndrome). If a diagnosis is 
not made straight away, it is then important to focus on each single facial trait and to 
compare them with other family members’ ones (siblings and parents), in order to 
 81 
determine whether the features noted are familial or not, and therefore be much 
more related to a syndromic pattern (Winter 1996). 
In this extract we are given some idea then of what is meant by reading the family, and 
why, as Professor Fox emphasises in her interview with me, they need to look at the faces 
of the family.  Unless the diagnosis is ‘immediate’ –  ‘at a glance’ - then it is important to 
focus on each single facial trait, and compare faces across family members to see if 
features are familial or not.   
What is being enacted here – either way – is an idea of a special gaze.  Sometimes 
this is enacted as instantaneous, at other times as requiring explicit contextualization and 
crosschecking.  Of course as we have already noted, the first time a clinician sees a child 
their gaze may have already been situated – at the team meeting in discussion of the 
referral, and by the nurse in her report of the home visit.  Either way, the clinicians are 
enacting a gaze that can ‘see by looking’. 
it is seeing a syndromic pattern in the features of family faces that dysmorphologists 
say they can read by looking.  This is a vital aspect of their expertise, sometimes it is 
instantaneous, but more often than not they enact it as part of a long process grounded in 
the family, requiring many cross-checks, especially involving looking across the family.   
They describe this as ‘pattern recognition’. For example, another dysmorphologist, 
Dr Albert, told me a story in his interview about a very sick newborn infant who was 
referred to him.  On his first visit to the baby in intensive care he could not see anything 
particularly dysmorphic in the face of the baby, but then on the next visit to the baby he 
met the mother and he could see the syndrome in the face of the mother. He reported 
that the likeness between the mother and child helped him identify what was wrong with 
the baby.    
Dysmorphologists also say how they follow up ‘feelings’ or hunches from looking at 
the face of a child, first by looking at the family but also by trying to find ‘handles’: 
 . . if I think the face is unusual, you’ve obviously got to look at the parents to see if 
there is a likeness or whatever.  If you can’t make a gestalt diagnosis, don’t recognise 
the face, and the chromosomes are normal, then these days you wonder about 
doing more specific or detailed chromosome tests.  There is rather a vague concept 
that that child looks a bit chromosomal – sort of thing. Which is kind of just a feeling 
that there is something about the faces of some children with bits missing from their 
chromosomes, that you just have to look, if you know what I mean…We don’t 
[always] do them - chromosomes – we do them on the ones that look chromosomal 
basically.  So we might use that approach.  Otherwise we are going - if we haven’t 
got any gestalt – and the chromosome test doesn’t work, then we’re stuck.  The 
other thing we might do is, we might, if the child has a small head for example, we 
might have a brain scan, a CT or MRI scan, and we might consider that – that might 
give us a specific handle; or then - if it is a child - order a skeletal survey, that might 
give us more of a handle on what the bones look like.  So there are other handles if 
you don’t get clinical [recognition], further tests. (Interview with Dr Godfrey, a 
second generation dysmorphologist, who said he had ‘come through’ Professor 
Smart) 
Critically, this discipline is about being able to see something in children and/or family 
members as dysmorphic, or malformed, but also to see that that these malformations are 
produced because of something wrong at the levels of chromosomes and genes.   
This for dysmorphologists is ‘looking a bit chromosomal’.  Some experts argue that 
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this malformation has to be visible in the face of the child and/or their kin, while others 
take the view that it can include any feature across the bodies of children and their kin, 
including as Dr Fellows suggested, their behaviour.  Ordinarily, however, the doctors 
stressed that an individual or their kin has to look dysmorphic, and that clinicians have to 
be able to see this look.   
 
 
Embodying the gaze 
 
All the experts observed or interviewed emphasized that they belonged to the school in 
which this gaze had to be embodied by the clinician: it could not be programmed into a 
computer.   Indeed, some stressed that there are computer programs being developed and 
standardized measures of facial features being incorporated into the assessment of 
dysmorphia, although they thought these would be useful, at most, merely as cross-checks 
on their own perception.   
This resistance amongst the British dysmorphologists that I followed was in the face 
of pressure to make the gaze ‘more objective’.  For example, Loos et al (2003) reported on 
a research project on development of computer recognition tools for dysmorphic faces.  
The tools were tested against clinicians, with the clinicians being reported as not being as 
good as the computer tool at recognizing dysmorphia.  Computerised images are also used 
to create simulation programs through which the photos of children can be matched with 
the image of a syndrome (Clarke, undated).  
There is some controversy, even dispute, between dysrmophologists regarding this 
issue. The computer simulation of faces relies upon stabilized classification of dysmorphic 
syndromes as present in an individual, whose face can be measured and held against the 
face of a ‘representative subject’. In contrast, the experts I interviewed said that they had 
been trained in a different tradition, by the mother and father of dysmorphology Professor 
Fox and Professor Smart, and that because children change over time and because of the 
problem of racial and other kinds of variability, standardized measurements and programs 
where not very useful.   
In addition, when we enter the clinic and examine how dysmorphologists do their 
work, we can see that they are not just looking at a face, they are looking across faces, 
bodies, and other representations of family members, including their medical, social and 
pregnancy histories. Dysmorphologists are building a clinical picture, not just of a child, but 
of the child and their relations. 
As is discussed in greater detail in the rest of this chapter, there is considerable 
motility as to how the recognition of dysmorphia is enacted on the ground. At one 
moment the dysmorphology gaze is enacted as if it is embodied in an individual - the 
sovereign subject of a clinical gaze. In the next, the work of establishing the presence or 
absence of dysmorphia is enacted as belonging to a collective enterprise.  
 
 
Seeing dysmorphia 
 
 
Fitting someone’s features into a classification of dysmorphia is enacted as not in 
any way self-evident; it has to be established.  As Latour (1987) puts it, the classification 
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has to be ‘made to hold’.  This is where we see the clinic most clearly enacted as a centre 
of discretion, made up of sovereign subjects who can agree or disagree with each other’s 
‘opinions’.   
We have heard already that photographs of children and family members are key 
materials. Specifically, at clinical team meetings photographs are passed around, and each 
member looks for distinctive physical signs and indicators on the body of the child and 
their kin. In the following extract, the team is examining photographs of Sam: 
Lottie (GSN): A follow-up. [Adds that she and the SpR had seen Sam previously at the 
clinic.]  
Dr Bythe (SpR): Not particularly dysmorphic. 
Dr White (CG): Coarse looking though. 
The team offer their observations of how Sam looks to them.  Although Dr Bythe describes 
Sam as ‘not particularly dysmorphic’, the consultant notes that he is ‘coarse looking’ and 
this subtle distinction helps keep Sam within the realm of dysmorphology.  It is important 
to remember here that dysmorphia is categorized as a feature of how someone looks that 
is not necessarily abnormal, but has a distinctive quality to it, which in this case 
is‘coarseness’.  
A common question raised while looking at the photographs is whether a patient 
looks dysmorphic enough.  Consider the following discussion about Charles:  
Lottie (GSN): Yes, he’s the new one to be seen, query Sotos [She brings out two 
family photographs from her file. The first is of a young man in his late teens 
standing in a bathroom doorway with a towel wrapped around his waist - it looks as 
though he has just got out of the bath.  In the second photograph he is sitting with 
his twin sister in either a restaurant or a bar, they are both smiling into the camera.  
The photographs are passed around and examined by all the members of the team.]  
He’s got learning difficulties. 
Sarah (GSN): [Looking at photos] They’re [his features] not striking.  There were no 
complications during his birth.  
Dr Little:  [He places the photographs back in the envelope and reads from the notes, 
commenting that his birth-weight was low even for a twin. The consultant then takes 
the photographs out of the envelope again, scrutinizes them and passes them to the 
specialist registrar]  I’m hopeless at talking about what I see, he has got a high 
forehead - but [gesturing to Charles’s eyes] they’re not down-slanting.  
Sarah:  Apart from his forehead he doesn’t look dysmorphic enough. 
Dr Little: But the forehead is quite striking. 
Lottie: His CT (brain) scan was normal. 
[They go on to speculate about other possible genetic origins to Charles’s problems]. 
As the various members of the team scrutinize the photographs, they are considering 
whether Charles does or does not fit a diagnostic category, Sotos Syndrome.  In Figure 6.2 I 
have included some a photo of a child diagnosed with Sotos syndrome taken from an 
article in the Journal of Medical Genetics (Robertson and Bankier, 1999).   
 
Insert here 
Fig. 6.2 Typical Features of Sotos Syndrome 
 
As we can see from the extract, Charles is not self-evidently a representative subject of 
Sotos in the clinic.  Rather, slides of Charles are juxtaposed with those of his twin Sister to 
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see if Charles’s face has the look of Sotos rather than share a similar look with his sister, 
who does not have the same problems as Charles.   
The initial gaze of the clinical team is further contextualised by the nurse, Lottie, 
who, presumably drawing on her history of the family from her home visit, points out that 
Charles has learning difficulties.  The second nurse, Sarah, sums up Charles’s look, stating 
that his features are ‘not striking’, but maintains ambiguity over Charles’s diagnosis by 
reminding the team that his learning difficulties were not caused by complications at birth 
(e.g. anoxia).   
Dr Little also hesitates, suggesting that Charles’ birth-weight was too low for him to 
have Sotos syndrome. As he puts the photographs of Charles and his sister away, Dr Little 
seems to be about to dispose of Charles, relegating him, as it were, to the realm of 
normality.  However, in drawing the photographs back out of the envelope, he draws 
Charles back into the clinic.   
 
 
Making it genetic 
 
Dr Little legitimates his action by stating that it is his inability to articulate what he sees 
that is the problem, rather than the absence of something to see.  Even though the second 
nurse suggests that Charles ‘doesn’t look dysmorphic enough’, Dr Little persists by stating 
that the forehead is ‘quite striking’.  Here he is enacting a sovereign gaze: he is the subject 
that can see ‘the real’, he just lacks the words to express what this might be.   
Sarah appears to reinforce Lottie’s pressure to move Charles out of the clinic by 
saying his CT scan was normal.  However, the ambiguity and undecidability over whether 
Charles is dysmorphic enough, together with his learning difficulties, is enough to keep 
Charles in the clinic, and the team continuing the search for genetic explanations for 
Charles’s troubles.  
This is the gaze, the gaze that is claiming to see dysmorphia, although it is a kind of 
seeing that is explicitly contextualised through the processes of the clinic; such as by 
recalling the history, and by examining photos of the sister.   
Thus a look may be made to gain in significance through being juxtaposed with other 
observations. For example, in another case, Louise, it is her ‘small jaw’ that becomes 
significant in the context of other observations: a cleft palate and a heart defect. Similarly, 
Charles’s ‘striking’ forehead when juxtaposed with his learning difficulties is suggestive of a 
pathology, even though the nurses do not consider that he looks sufficiently dysmorphic.  
The signs across different systems (long limbs, low brow, down-slanting eyes, pointy 
chin, hearing difficulties) can be made visible as abnormalities because there are the 
beginnings of a system (however incomplete) with which to trace and link them.  
Therefore, the significance of any distinctive feature is constituted by the presence of 
other signs across different systems.  Or not. The identification of the presence (or 
absence) of the pathological is being enacted as a matter of clinical discretion. What is 
always held in play is that discretion enacts the possibility of deferral.   
That is, even when one feature is defined as dysmorphic, this description is still 
indeterminate.  Fixing a patient within a categorization depends upon the skill/craft of the 
clinical team to see other effects in a patient’s history that are either associated with a 
known syndrome or that seem ‘syndromic’, that is, suggestive of a syndrome.  For 
example, in the extract below, the team describes a referral, a young woman, Fiona, with a 
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‘pointy chin’: 
Dr Smith: 16 [years old]. 
Sarah: What is it? 
Dr Smith: Slightly unusual face, pointy chin. Didn’t identify a syndrome. 
Learning difficulties, not major though. She’s had facial surgery. 
Even though her features do not fit neatly into any established category, so that she is not 
‘a major’, Fiona’s physical features, in conjunction with the evidence that she has learning 
difficulties, are enough to keep her within the clinic.  
Seeing a patient as dysmorphic, and therefore potentially syndromic, is therefore a 
matter of juxtaposing a patient’s ‘unusual’ visible features with their other problems such 
as ‘learning difficulties’.  The features partly take on their significance as dysmorphic 
because they are unusual in themselves, and partly through their association with other 
problems.  
  At this stage, there is also the requirement, as I have already shown in the discussion 
about Charles, to differentiate between genetic and other possible origins of dysmorphia 
and learning difficulties, such as anoxia at birth or foetal alcohol syndrome. The origin of 
features still has to be accomplished and be made visible.  Here, it is important to 
differentiate between demonstrating that the patient’s features are familial or indicative 
of a syndrome, and as having a genetic base that is or is not inherited.  For clinicians, such 
as those talking in the extract above, this requires them to see the bodies of babies and 
children in terms of how they have developed from their conception to the moment they 
encounter them in the clinic.   
The critical question that dysmorphologist’s practices begin to raise, is whether the 
abnormalities in the growth and form of a child represent a failure of reproduction or an 
aberration at the genetic level. As will be seen, this is not just important in terms of 
counselling the family over future reproductive plans or in terms of an individual’s 
prognosis, as important as these things are to the clinic.  Rather, it is also enacted as 
important in terms of building knowledge about the genotype and its expression.  
 
 
Making it familial 
 
Making it familial relies on the established old clinical skill of seeing patterns of inheritance 
across generations.  To do this, the clinical team draw together three strands of clinical 
(not laboratory-based) evidence, the family tree, accounts of the proband’s medical 
history and clinical examination, and family photographs described above. Seeing features 
and other effects, such as learning difficulties across ‘the family’, helps strengthen the 
evidence that the patient’s features are genetic. However, not all inherited features or 
traits are the effects of an underlying syndrome and part of the clinical work is to 
distinguish between what is familial, and what is (possibly) syndromic. 
Where photographic evidence is available, the physical features of family members 
are examined, discussed and compared.  In the following extract, the team discusses Anna, 
a new referral, and her family: 
Sarah (nurse): [Sally brings out a small laminated professional school photograph of 
Anna as a young girl from her file.  In the photograph with her are her three younger 
siblings in a row, arranged in age order - eldest to youngest. She passes this to 
Consultant 1, who studies it closely.]  They all need to be seen in clinic [she reels off 
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a list of developmental and behavioural problems that the children have]. Three 
have learning difficulties, one attends a special school.  
Dr Little (Consultant): [After studying the photograph for some time] Two have ‘big 
heads’ [He points this out to the researcher].  
Sarah: They had CT scans, which failed to show anything up.  
[They all agree that they need to start by looking at Anna.] 
Family photographs and family histories allow the team to look for features across family 
members. In discussing the case of Anna, the team traces features such as ‘big heads’ and 
learning difficulties across family members.  They do this through aligning observations 
drawn from inspection of the photographs with specific details from the histories of family 
members. 
In the clinic, the search for familial resemblances is pursued explicitly in the 
construction of a family tree, begun as described earlier at the home assessment.  The 
following extract in which Lee is discussed illustrates how the family tree can be used: 
Dr Smith (consultant):  [He looks at photographs of Lee] I’d wondered about Smith-
Magennis. But there’s nothing very striking to look at...he’s a bit square-ish in the 
face. 
Dr Lowe (Specialist Registrar): Why has it come to light? 
Dr Smith: [Examines Lee’s family tree] The mother’s sister’s son has learning 
difficulties, maybe I should see him? 
Dr Smith states he can see nothing very striking when looking at Lee’s photographs. 
However, after examining the family tree, he juxtaposes information from this source (that 
the mother’s sister’s son has learning difficulties) with the fact that Lee’s face is ‘a bit 
square-ish’.   
This alignment of evidence of a particular facial ‘look’ with a familial trace of a 
related problem is enough to strengthen the case for keeping Lee within the genetics 
clinic, even though his features do not look ‘very striking’.  Dr Smith draws on the family 
tree to imply that he can see something in the family that might mean that Lee’s problems 
are inherited. Thus, the idea that features suggestive of a genetic syndrome may be 
expressed across family members is also incorporated into the family tree. 
 
 
Conclusions: The dysmorphological gaze 
 
In this chapter I have examined the organization of clinical work and explored how the 
gaze of dysmorphology is performed in the clinic. What is enacted by the specific 
processes and practices that we have seen is how dysmorphology is a site in which the 
‘book of nature’ is being read, and ‘what is’ is being revealed as modes of differentiating 
the pathological.  This helps in the reassociation of the clinic in genetic medicine with the 
scientific epistemological-ontological relation.   
Following Strathern (2009), we can see much of this work as a ‘wonderful rendition 
of the ontology of perspectivalism’. This is ‘the Euro-American scientific view that holds 
that the physical world is continuous, and co-terminous with the universe, the same for 
everyone, the only shortfall being in knowledge of it, such that diverse experiences are 
taken as a matter of diverse perspectives on it’ (Ibid.). 
This said, I have shown how deciding upon the appropriate description and 
classification of individual cases does not entail a straightforward application of a 
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predefined set of clinical parameters.  To the contrary, clinical work – and especially the 
recognition of a syndrome - emerges as rooted in an immersion in the fleshy and material 
world of the family. In this world of the clinic, doctors and nurses attach to the family  – 
from the home visit, to consultations in the clinic, and discussion at team meetings. 
Doctors know they must first ‘pass’ with the family and then, in turn, the family becomes 
participant in the work of constructing a clinical picture of both the child and itself. 
When it comes to making sense of the materials assembled through these various 
aspects of clinical work, I have illustrated how the team juxtaposes and aligns evidence, 
including patient’s features, and draws together details, not just from looking at a patient, 
but also from constructing a patient’s history, examining photographs of the patient and 
their family, by making a family tree, and by considering the histories of the individuals 
within the family as well as offering observations of family members. We have also seen 
how team members examine and debate the clinical details, including photographs of 
individuals and representations of family trees, and try to establish whether or not what 
they are seeing is dysmorphia, and whether it is familial.  A number of clinic-based 
technologies are implicated in this work.   
The clinical world I portray here is a different world from the clinic performed in the 
‘fronts’ of academic meetings and papers described earlier in Chapter 4. Contrastingly, this 
is a clinic that does not abstract the doctor or the patient and their families as ‘social 
beings’ (Foucault 2003b). Instead what we see is how the clinic is socially immersed and 
entangled in what Haraway (2008) calls the ordinary and the material.  Rather than 
medicine being transformed into technomedicine, or reduced to a singular perspective, 
molecular or otherwise, something goes on in the clinic, when it comes to the diagnosis of 
dysmorphology at least, which allows multiple perspectives and possibilities to be enacted 
and to rub up against one another. 
This includes both positive and non-positive knowledge. In the clinic doctors engage 
quite openly in different modes of thought – including subjective assessment - and openly 
express uncertainty, doubt, and contradiction.  Rather than maintain a one-dimensional 
rationale that attempts to reduce, stabilize and singularize disease processes to one 
reality, the clinic emerges as a site where multiple methods (not just scientific ones) are 
enacted (see also Greco 2009, on Mol, 2002). 
Critically, what we also see is deferral to clinical perception and judgement, 
grounded in the material world of the body and the family.  Additionally, perception and 
judgement are collectively produced, not simply embodied by a singular figure. At one 
moment, the gaze of dysmorphology is enacted as embodied in one physician, just as a 
syndrome may be seen as embodied by an individual child. In the next, the gaze is 
distributed across occasions and people, just as the syndrome is distributed across the 
bodies of the family.   
In the face of all this it seems, then, that many commentators completely 
underestimate the nature of the clinic in genetic medicine (seemed a bit clunky).   
Laboratory and other technologies, such as blood tests, scans or x-rays, certainly give 
perspectives into the living body, but they require ‘reading’ to make their relevance 
explicit: the laboratory may help activate moments where these calculations happen, but 
it is in the clinic that we see moments of decision and indecision take place.  
As outlined in Chapter 2, what is being performed here revives the clinic as a centre 
of discretion. Although the contemporary object of the clinical gaze may, increasingly, 
focus on the relationships between the observed body and the dispersed images of 
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pathology, we have seen how establishing this relation is enacted as relying upon 
processes of collective reasoning and adjudication rather than the simple application of 
prescriptive schemata (see also Atkinson 1995).  
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Chapter 7 
Rebirthing the Clinic 
 
“I loved the cross-harmonies between nature and data.  You taught me this. The way 
signals from a pulsar in deepest space follow classical number sequences, which in 
turn can describe the fluctuations of a given stock or currency.  You showed me this.  
How market cycles can be interchangeable with the time cycles of grasshopper 
breeding, wheat harvesting.  You made this form of analysis horribly and sadistically 
precise.  But you forgot something along the way.” 
“What?” 
“The importance of the lopsided, the thing that’s skewed a little.  You were looking 
for balance, beautiful balance, equal parts, equal sides. I know this. I know you know.  
But you should have been tracking the yen in its tics and quirks.  The little quirk. The 
misshape. (Don deLillo, 2003, Cosmopolis, pp 200).  
 
 
Introduction 
 
In this chapter I suggest that in dysmorphology we are witnessing the ‘rebirth’ of the clinic 
as a site for the production of knowledge about genetics.  The dysmorphology clinic 
emerges in my analysis as a site in which some of the work of clinical classification is still 
observable.  My observations propose that much of this classificatory work is ‘messy’, 
prior to its sedimentation in the ‘pure space’ of classificatory systems (Bowker and Star 
2000), or indeed, even in the calculative space of bioinformatics.    
It is important to examine what this ‘mess’ of classificatory work signifies.  It has 
been suggested that the work of molecular biology would progressively erode the function 
of clinical judgment and perception in this process of diagnosis and classification. 
However, as we have already begun to see, the relationship between the laboratory and 
the clinic appears to be much more mutually co-consituting than is generally recognized. 
Like the links between the genotype and the phenotype, the relationship in 
dysmorphology is far from unilinear or settled.  This raises questions about what is 
accomplished in the way dysmorphology performs the relationship between the clinic and 
laboratory.   
Analysis is particularly important at this point because many studies on genetic 
medicine focus on the impact of a genetic diagnosis, but do not particularly attend to how, 
and at what moments,  a genetic diagnosis is accomplished. Nor indeed, and just as 
importantly, do these studies note when it is not accomplished.  
In the current case of dysmorphology – against any notion that diagnostics in 
genetics is a straightforward matter - classification emerges as far from settled. 
Furthermore, as we have seen in the previous chapter, the performance of clinical 
expertise in dysmorphology is accompanied by moments of explicit uncertainty, ambiguity, 
and deferral over the identification of the pathological and the attribution of a clinical 
diagnosis (cf. Bharadwaj 2002, Hedgecoe 2003, Sarangi and Clarke 2002).  Indeed, in Don 
deLillo’s terms (cited above), we have already seen how the clinic in dysmorphology 
attends to the lopsided, to that which is skewed a little; and how it pays attention to the 
tics and quirks of bodies, minds, and genes.   
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We can see this attention and care in how families and children are rarely reduced to 
data.  We can also see it in how, in this clinical domain, members do not simply discharge 
the patient who fails to fit into a specific category.  On the contrary, clinicians go to great 
lengths to legitimate ‘keeping patients on’.  To do this, as we will see in the rest of this 
chapter, they have to construct a case for the genetic basis of a patient’s features or 
problems, even if that basis cannot yet be ‘proven’ or made visible at a molecular or 
cytogenetic level.  Indeed, I am arguing that it is the very complexity of the genetic domain 
that affords medicine a site in which more medical discretion, not less, is necessary. This is 
exactly because this is a science of the complex and heterogeneous; a medicine whose 
very focus is on the lopsided, quirky, and incomplete.   
I should be clear here: I am not identifying the uncertainty and deferral, which are 
characteristics of clinical process in dysmorphology, as a case study of the failure of 
science and technology on the ground. On the contrary, I see the analysis as offering an 
alternative way to understand the significance of explicit ambivalence, uncertainty, and 
deferral over genetic diagnosis. As I am about to show, the clinic is not only equipped to 
handle uncertainty, but it emerges as a space that actually thrives on the imprecise. 
 
 
Keeping people on 
 
Diagnostic decisions do not hold because they are true, they are true because they ‘hold’ 
(Latour 1989). To hold, they must stand up to normal protocols in the specific science, and 
they must withstand the critical judgment of the experts in the field.  However, the 
observations of the dysmorphology clinic presented in the previous chapter suggest that 
deferral is equally important to making a diagnostic decision.   
To give an example of this work of deferral, the clinical team in the following extract is 
sitting together at one of their weekly meetings in the department of medical genetics.  They 
are discussing a young boy, Simon, a ‘follow-up’: 
Carly (Genetic Specialist Nurse): A follow-up. He’s a dysmorphic chap we’ve looked 
at together, he’s not Smith-Magennis...He’s obese with ADHD [attention deficit 
hyperactivity disorder] and difficult behaviour, no significant dysmorphic features, I 
thought about seeing him in a year. 
Dr Smith: How old? 
Carly: Eight. 
Dr Spradley: [Looking at photographs] He’s big. 
Dr Smith: I remember his photos, leave it more than one, maybe two years. I 
wouldn’t discharge him.  He’s got a lot of problems, it’s worth keeping people on. 
 
The key aspect of this extract that I want to emphasize is the idea of ‘keeping people on’. In 
the absence of a diagnosis, the clinicians are still working to categorize Simon: he is 
dysmorphic and has many associated problems.  The paradox is noteworthy: at the same 
time as he is ‘a dysmorphic chap’, he has ‘no significant dysmorphic features’.   
This paradox relates back to the claim made by dysmorphologists that they are able to 
see dysmorphia, even where the specifics of a persons features do not fit with the signs of a 
particular syndrome, as I discussed earlier.  Simon has been seen befor, he is a ‘follow-up’. 
Although the Consultant cannot identify a specific dysmorphic feature, or immediately 
categorize his problems within a specific syndrome, he still wants to keep Simon on in the 
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clinic and see him in a year’s time. He thus identifies him as ‘dysmorphic’, despite the lack of 
specific diagnostic characteristics.  
Legitimation for this this type of manoeuvre may vary.  Earlier, in the case of Charles, 
we saw how he was kept on because Dr Little said he could see something, even though he 
could not yet verbalize it.   On other occasions deferral is justified because the patient is a 
baby, and they may need to ‘grow into the face of a syndrome’. This is because some signs 
emerge only as the child gets older.  In this, the clinic is enacting one of the basic theoretical 
tropes of developmental biology.  
The puzzle in the present case is that Simon is already eight years old and he still does 
not fit any recognized syndrome; and yet he is being ‘kept on’. In this case, it is the clinicians’ 
recognition that the diagnostic categories are in flux that is being performed. Therefore, 
Simon is being kept on because the knowledge, rather than the child, may change.  
Despite there being already over 3000 named syndromes in the database, 
dysmorphological categorization is still in its early childhood.  Clinical diagnostic 
categorizations, and the classification of syndromes are still, like babies and children, 
‘becomings’ (Lee 1998): they are entities in the making.  
 
Confirming the genetic  
 
I now turn to exploring the various ways in which deferral and decision are accomplished. 
This is important, because it is through unpicking these kinds of moves and accounts that 
we can discover what the dysmorphology clinic is accomplishing, both in relation to its 
performance of clinical medicine, and in its relation to science.   
Keeping a patient on in the clinic in the absence of a firm diagnosis can be achieved 
by establishing that they are dysmorphic. Diagnostic tests, even when they are available, 
do not necessarily provide answers that can be treated as unequivocal. First, definitive 
tests are only available for a limited range of syndromes, so they cannot be used to 
adjudicate in many cases; and even when such tests do exist, and are used, they are not 
always treated as definitive. Instead they may be treated as confirmative, as in the case of 
chromosome analysis.  
In the extract that follows, for example, the consultant is in the clinic with Mandy, a 
woman in her thirties who has had surgery on a hole in her heart, her cleft palate, and her 
vocal chords, and who lives in a care home.  Prior to Mandy’s arrival, Dr White describes 
her to the team as ‘a query 22Q deletion’, pointing out ‘she’s got the face’ and ‘the full 
house’ of di George Syndrome.   
After a taking her own history and doing a physical examination, the consultant gives 
Mandy her diagnosis, Velo-Cardio-Facial Syndromexii (the alternative name for Di George), 
and that she wants to do some tests. She explains why: 
Dr White: I don’t know if anyone has mentioned any names yet Mandy. The function 
of the back of your throat is associated with Velo-Cardio-Facial Syndrome. This 
condition is associated with this feature and also very often people with this have 
heart problems, which you’ve had. A hole in the heart is typical. People with this 
condition often have problems at school and also have a tendency to get a little bit 
depressed . . It is caused by just a little bit of genetic material being missing. So the 
test is to confirm that you have this small genetic change [The nurse, Lottie, goes to 
get pictures of the chromosomes to show Mandy]. The test is just to confirm when 
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we have the diagnosis, there won’t be any new surprises. [Lottie comes back with 
the folder full of glossy diagramatic pictures of chromosomes, and Dr White uses it 
to show Mandy a picture of chromosomes and where they reside in the cell] 
Basically there is a little piece missing! We all have changes but sometimes we know 
about it and sometimes we don’t. Is there anything you want to ask? Is it making you 
anxious? 
Dr White explains that the symptoms that Mandy displays (hole in the heart, problems 
with her throat, difficulties at school) fit with a diagnosis of Velo-Cardio-Facial Syndrome. 
She tells Mandy that it is caused by ‘just little bit of genetic material being missing’, and 
that the test she wants to do is to confirm that Mandy has this small genetic change.  She 
says that everyone has changes but they don’t notice them.  In her account she stresses 
that the test is confirmatory and that there ‘won’t be any surprises’.  In this instance, then, 
Dr White enacts the test as confirmative of the clinical picture and her diagnosis, but not 
as helping her to make the diagnosis. 
 
 
Keeping the genetic open  
 
At other times, the clinical team may confirm the clinical picture by drawing on evidence 
to cast doubt on either the relevance or the reliability of a test result. For example, the 
relevance may be undermined by the strength of a clinical picture. In this instance, rather 
than rejecting the diagnosis and disposing of the patient, the diagnosis may remain 
provisional.   
Indeed, the clinical team can be seen to move between their readings of the physical 
features and interpretations of tests in ways that may well privilege ‘the clinical picture’ 
rather than the laboratory based test result. In the following extract, Dr White is doing a 
consultation with Peter, a 22 year old man.  Peter is a rarity in the clinic because he is an 
adult.   Peter was originally referred to the genetic clinic with a query over whether he has 
Marfan syndromexiii, and in the previous consultation Dr White took some blood tests. 
Dr White: Right. The first time we saw you there was a question you could have 
Marfan Syndrome, but it doesn’t look like it. We did some blood tests and looked at 
your chromosomes and that [they have?] has come back normal. 
Peter: Marvellous. 
Dr White: And we were looking for Fragile X, sometimes boys can be very tall with 
that condition, this was normal, so all the tests we have done are normal. 
Peter: Marvellous 
In the opening exchange Dr White is giving the results of the tests and of her original 
diagnostic analysis: Peter does not have Marfan syndrome or Fragile X, the chromosome 
tests came back as normal which confirms the clinical picture – ‘it doesn’t look like it 
[Marfan syndrome]’.  Peter doesn’t look like [a] Marfan.   
Peter says that it is ‘marvellous’ that the genetic test results are normal.  But then 
the interaction goes on: 
Dr White: The one concern you had last time was the test you had on your heart, are 
you still worried? 
Peter: No, we’re getting through that, they want another scan for the heart. 
Dr White: That’s useful to know, if you weren’t [already booked for a heart scan] I 
might have sent you for another onexiv. 
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Dr White moves on to Peter’s clinical problems with his heart and says that if he wasn’t 
having another scan she would have ordered one her self, thus suggesting that she is not 
giving him up.  Even though the genetic tests were normal Dr White moves the interaction 
on in a way that opens the case back up: 
Peter : Yes, because I had a blackout. 
Dr White: Tell me about the blackout. 
Peter : I don’t know much, I was feeding the cat and that’s me fell flat [goes on to say 
that he thinks he was out for about 10 minutes] 
Dr White: Did they measure your blood pressure 
Peter: Yes, fine, he’s put me down for a brain scan because my balance is gone. 
Dr White: I’m just looking at the notes [looks through a large stack of hospital 
records]. 
Peter: The Infirmary [the referring hospital] was supposed to send a letter for me to 
have my knee done. They can’t find it anywhere. 
Dr White: Let me jot down what is going on  
Peter: [He lists the various problems and investigations out loud and Dr White writes 
them down in her notes]: Cardiology – ECG; Eyes - OK; MRI of the spine – [Dr White 
reads out the report and states out loud that ‘2 discs are bulging’]; Referred for 
physio; Neurological - MRI on brain. [Dr White then looks through the notes for 
information about his need for a knee operation] 
Dr White: We’re wondering why you have all these problems. Most of your problems 
are with your back – we need to look at the MRI (scan). I think we’ve done all we can 
from a genetic point of view. As you say you are very young for disc problems, 
though you are very tall. I think we’ll see you in a year’s time to see if the 
investigations show that there’s a particular pattern. We should wait until we have 
the MRI and repeat heart scan [ . . ] Did we see pictures of when you were younger 
[to Susan, the genetics specialist nurse]? 
Susan: Probably. 
Dr White: I think we should wait for your results. 
Peter leaves, and Dr White tells the nurse and the registrar that ‘she’s thinking of 
Sotos’. 
In this phase of the interaction, Dr White gets Peter to report on his recent problems.  In 
this there is a shift from her reporting to him, to him telling her.  She then makes a list of 
these problems and the outstanding investigations that he mentions.  Then she switches 
back to her position as expert, to recover them as possibly of significance to the genetics 
clinic: ‘we are wondering why you have all these problems’.  She then tells him she wants 
to see him in a year’s time with all his new scans, even though ‘we have done all we can 
from the genetic point of view’.   
When he leaves the clinic, however, she says to the others that she thinks it is Sotos.  
Since she does not convey this information to Simon, we can presume that this possibility 
is being entertained more in terms of a deferral than a decision. 
Sotos syndrome is also called cerebral gigantism and is a rare genetic disorder 
caused by mutation in a gene on chromosome 5, it is characterized by excessive physical 
growth during the first few years of life. Thus chromosomal tests would not show it up – 
the mutation is too small.  And it is a mutation, rather than a bit missing or a bit extra.  Dr 
White wants to check pictures of Peter when he was a child – the implication is that this is 
because children with Sotos syndrome tend to be large at birth and are often taller, 
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heavier, and have larger heads (macrocrania) than is normal for their age (see the picture 
of Sotos on page **, in Chapter 6).  This is more difficult to ‘see’ in a fully-grown adult.  
There is no definitive genetic test for Sotos, which is why she comments that, ‘we have 
done all we can from the genetic point of view’.  But Dr White keeps Peter’s case open 
through getting him to bring all his clinical problems back into play, together with the fact 
he is tall, and alongside the need to wait for the results of the other clinical investigations.  
Through these moves in which she enrols Peter in the definition of clinical problems, she 
constructs a formal process of deferral through which she is able to keep him on in the 
clinic.   
 
 
Setting aside test results 
 
Sometimes clinicians also cast doubt on a test result.  Casting doubt on a test can occur in 
a number of ways.  For example, at another team meeting, a consultant and a specialist 
nurse discuss the case of a family who may have a genetic syndrome known as Fragile X.   
It emerged from their discussion that the results from the laboratory test were 
unclear because they (the laboratory) ‘couldn’t do a Southern blot’. However, the 
distinguishing features of Fragile X could be traced in the family, for example, the specialist 
nurse reports from her home visit and the family history that the mother ‘appears to have 
some learning difficulties’ and that ‘there are affected nieces and nephews’.   
In this case, although the genetic test results were unclear, other materials were 
brought in to support a diagnosis of Fragile X.  Specifically, information in the family tree 
and observations from the home visit indicate that the family may have the genetic 
syndrome, which reinforces the provisional diagnosis. In this way, a negative test result 
does not rule out a provisional clinical diagnosis where other evidence can be brought into 
consideration, such as family history.  Thus the team assemble the evidence in ways which 
suggest that what is being is an aberrant genetic sequence, even if the particular sequence 
has not yet been mapped, and cannot yet be ‘seen’ using molecular or cytogenic testing.   
Similarly, in the case of Alan, the laboratory test is negative but the clinical picture is 
strongly indicative: 
Dr Smith: Myotonic dystrophy (caused by one of two types of inherited genetic 
mutations). Grip problems, cataracts, frontal balding. 
Penny (GSN):  The full house almost but the bloods were negative.   
Here the Consultant aligns the clinical evidence (grip problems, cataracts and frontal 
balding) to support the diagnosis of myotonic dystrophy.  Alan almost has the ‘full house’, 
even though the ‘bloods were negative’:  the implication of this is that molecular analysis 
was unable to detect one of the two genetic changes associated with the syndrome. 
However, the team believe it is there - they can ‘see’ the evidence of a syndrome in the 
patient. 
A negative laboratory test result can sometimes lead to discharge, but is not enough 
in itself: it has to be associated with other evidence.  For example, in the case of Lindsay: 
Penny (GSN): [She describes a child who has mild dysmorphic features] But he looks 
OK on these. [She hands round two family photographs to the rest of the team.] 
Dr Gates (CG): There’s nothing, Fragile X and chromosomes have been done, the 
results are OK.  
Dr Young (SpR): [Looking at photographs] Ooh! [indicating she finds the baby 
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attractive] 
Dr Gates: He’s not very dysmorphic. 
Penny: [She agrees and adds] The child’s father had retinitis pigmentosa 6 years ago. 
I checked with the mother if the child had any problems, but she’s got enough on her 
plate. 
The clinical team does not see the child’s features as being dysmorphic and these 
observations confirm the negative test result, which like the photographs are also ‘OK’.  
This information is also interpreted in the context of the family; the nurse suggests that it 
may not be appropriate to pursue a diagnosis because the child’s mother has ‘enough on 
her plate’. In response, the team moves away from a genetic diagnosis and Lindsay is 
discharged from the clinic.   
The analysis to date indicates that where a patient does not fit neatly into a clinical 
category, this does not mean that they are to be fully discharged from the clinic.  On the 
contrary, the clinical picture can be assembled in ways that legitimate deferral, so that a 
patient is ‘kept on’. I have also illustrated how the molecular evidence itself is not 
necessarily relied upon: where there is negative molecular evidence, but the clinical 
picture of a possible genetic disorder to be strong, a diagnosis is not excluded, but will 
remain provisional.   
 
Stabilising diagnosis 
 
It has emerged that, in the field of dysmorphology, it is often difficult to give a definitive 
genetic diagnosis.  As I have shown, where laboratory tests of any kind are used, they are 
not privileged in any way as definitive forms of evidence.  Rather, we have seen how the 
clinical team moves between different forms of evidence in their assessment of any 
particular case.   
Critically, the significance of any particular aspect of the evidence of dysmorphism 
has to be established through aligning it within a wider array of clinical data.  It appears 
that the judgment and skill of the clinical team in making a case for the clinical picture is 
privileged over any single technology.   
These complexities are amplified by something about genetic categorization itself.  
While a tentative, working diagnosis is usually dependent upon the recognition of a 
pattern of abnormalities, a large number of syndromes share many abnormalities.  In 
addition, there may also be a wide variability in how an abnormality is expressed across 
different individuals with the same syndrome.  The shared nature of many abnormalities, 
such as learning disability, together with the huge variation in the clinical picture, creates 
both opportunities and constraints on the clinical team.  This complexity can increase the 
need for judgment and perception. For example: 
 
Dr Jones (CG): I’ve done some research on these three [he points to a pile of files for 
3 children with dysmorphic features] there are 40 possibles [diagnostic categories] 
for this one, 50 for the other and 38 for that [He has fed their patterns of 
abnormalities into a dysmorphology database]. 
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This indicates that the possibilities are vast.  Indeed, overlap between syndromes as well 
as variation across phenotypes only intensifies the need for clinical judgement.  For 
example, in the following extract the clinical team once again discuss the young boy, Lee: 
Dr Smith (CG): [He gets out two photographs from the file, examines them and 
passes them to the SpR.] 
Carly (GSN): In the photograph I couldn’t take from the family [at the home visit] he 
looks different. 
Dr Smith: Thin upper lip. 
Carly: We’ve seen part of the family before, the father had RP [Retinitis Pigmentosa]  
Dr Palling (SpR): Are you thinking more Smith-Magennis than Prader-Willi? 
Dr Smith: More Smith-Magennis 
Dr Palling: No, but not very Smith-Magennis either. 
Dr Smith: These phenotypes are getting more elastic. 
Thus, Lee remains on the perimeter of two different syndromes, because, as the 
consultant notes, to fix the configuration of abnormalities within one syndrome is difficult, 
these classifications are subject to change: ‘these phenotypes are getting more elastic’.   
This ambiguity creates the opportunity for Lee to be held within the genetic ground. 
Further opportunity for deferral is created by overlap and variation; where the clinical 
picture does not fit one syndrome, another can be tried.  For example, Kyle has been 
considered for a number of diagnoses since referral to the team:  
Dr White (CG): Someone who I think has Costello’s. Originally he was query 
Noonan’s, he does have some Noonan’s features, Costello’s is similar. [Adds that he 
had shown the photographs to two colleagues but they were non-committal].  
Penny (GSN): The child has major feeding problems. 
Dr White: I’ll tout them [the photos] round again.  
No diagnosis had been confirmed for Kyle, although Noonan’s had been suspected.  
However, Costello’s is ‘similar’ to Noonan’s and the child may also fit this classification.  
Furthermore, the discovery of ‘major feeding problems’ renews the team’s interest and 
this may be the additional information the team need to firm up a diagnosis, because 
major feeding problems can signify neuro-developmental behavioural problems.   
These moments of ambiguity and undecideability create a space of deferral that 
legitimates the need for more expertise and more technology through which to 
differentiate the genetic and so fix genetic diagnoses. The Consultant decides to keep Kyle 
on and ‘tout the photographs around again’ at meetings with other experts. 
 
The Clinical Laboratory? 
 
I now want to discuss how my analysis of the clinic in genetic medicine suggests that 
it is being reborn as a site for the production and disposal of knowledge, not for just its 
consumption. These findings should not surprise.  
As discussed in Chapter 2, Foucault (2003a) suggests that the clinic was born as the 
location of scientific medicine and the discovery of positive knowledge about the body and 
pathology.  In his analysis the clinic is the site of production, producing both medical 
scientific method and medical knowledge. 
However, my findings conflict sharply with much current thinking, in which the 
relationship between the clinic and science is increasingly being (re)presented in a similar 
way to the relation between the farm and the laboratory in Latour’s (1988) study of the 
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pasteurization of France - as ‘remote control’ (Cooper 1992). 
Within this view, the work of the clinic is no longer involved in the production of 
medical knowledge. Diagnosis has been made remote, and this perspective on the 
contemporary clinic has been expressed by Armstrong (2000), but is most stridently 
echoed by Rose: 
 
“Medicine” itself has also been transformed.  It has become technomedicine, highly 
dependent on sophisticated diagnostic and therapeutic equipment. It has been 
fractured by a complex division of labour among specialists.  Doctors have lost the 
monopoly of the diagnostic gaze and of the therapeutic calculation: the clinical 
judgment of the practicing physician is hemmed in and constrained by the demands 
of evidence-based medicine and the requirements for the use of standardized, 
corporately framed diagnostic and prescribing procedures.  (Rose 2007 p.10-11, my 
emphases) 
 
For Rose, medicine is not simply being transformed, but is actually presented as losing its 
power: it is ‘fractured’, ‘lost’, ‘hemmed in’, ‘constrained’, ‘colonized’, ‘reshaped’.   
Rose writes categorically – as though the effects he asserts are totalizing. In a two-
page summary of the state of medicine in the 21st century, he asserts that the ‘golden age’ 
of the medical gaze and discretion is long gone. As mentioned in Chapter 3, he suggests 
‘the treatment of health and illness’ has become ‘merely another field for calculations of 
corporate profitability’.  He sees capitalization, technologization, and the profound 
molecularization of ‘styles of biomedical thought, judgment and intervention’ as executing 
the takeover of medicine.  
What we have seen in dysmorphology is something far more complex: clearly not all 
doctors have ‘lost’ the monopoly of the diagnostic gaze and of the therapeutic calculation. 
Nor is there evidence in my study of the clinical judgment of practicing physicians being 
‘hemmed in’ and ‘constrained’ by the demands of evidence-based medicine and the 
requirements for the use of standardized, corporately framed diagnostic and prescribing 
procedures. In the place of contemporary forms of medical disposal and decision-making, 
in which the display of expertise entails speedy closure, In the genetic clinic I have found 
instead a slowing down of clinical process, and explicit moments of undecidability, 
uncertainty, and instability over genetic diagnostic categories.   
At the same time as there is a commitment to the possibility of certainty, of fixing 
diagnostic categories in grids and codes through the future development of technoscience, 
clinical practice within dysmorphology is performing something about the genetic clinic 
that is highly significant and related as much to its modes of deferral as to its forms of 
decision. This is to suggest, tentatively and provisionally, how undecidability, uncertainty 
and instability of genetic diagnosis are a prominent feature of dysmorphology.  
This deliberate sustaining of ambiguity and uncertainty within the clinic requires 
additional explanation, especially when it appears to run alongside a firm commitment to 
a future of diagnostic certainty.  In my view, it is precisely these moments of ambiguity and 
uncertainty that help to hold patients on the ‘genetic ground’ and establish the very space 
of deferral which is needed to secure that future. A future in which classification becomes 
sedimented in a techno-science that will continue to press back the boundaries of the 
genomic unknown, but a techno-science which also creates opportunities for more clinical 
judgment to secure its proper interpretation and salience.  
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Members in the clinic create a space of deferral in which the genetic itself is 
performed as very much still open, and its categories as revisable.  Thus, the 
dysmorphology clinic emerges as a site in which we can observe the complex, practical 
work of classification. Clinical uncertainty and the trope of deferral mean that the logic of 
the clinic appears to call for advances in technoscience that foreshadow its own demise. 
This is the way of the clinic. It performs an apparent commitment to future facts, which 
will be secured in the laboratory that is yet to come. 
Critically, this projection is itself always being deferred. This deferral creates the 
space in which the clinic and pathological entities are irreducible to molecular biology. I 
am showing this in complete contrast to commentators, such as Rose who presses how 
medicine is being reconfigured by a profound ‘molecularization’ of styles of biomedical 
thought, judgment, and intervention  (Rose 2007 p.11, my emphasis). 
For the moment the boot is on the other foot.  Rather than deferring to the 
laboratory, it is the laboratory that must travel to the clinic, in order to be noted, 
interpreted, or even discarded.  It is the laboratory that is behind and slow to catch up to 
the complexity of what is being seen in the clinic.  Not the other way around. 
 
 
Conclusion:  
 
In this chapter I have shown how dysmorphology clinical work does not merely fit patients 
into extant diagnostic categories. This finding is important because it has prompted me to 
reconsider how the dysmorphology clinic performs the relationship between science, 
technology, and clinical work, in a way that is itself of significance.  
Specifically, through a focus on how different forms of evidence are produced and 
brought into play in the dysmorphology clinic, I have shown how clinical work involves 
identifying and naming which patterns of physical features and other effects may have a 
genetic origin, and which do not.  Further, drawing on typical cases, I have explored how 
patients are held on the genetic ground even in the absence of a definitive diagnosis.  
Indeed, in the cases where it is available, it is possible that molecular or chromosomal 
evidence be discredited as inadequate. Thus, clinicians perform the techno-science of the 
laboratory as, at times, creating the need for more moments of interpretation, and more 
moments of clinical discretion, rather than less.    
At the same time as genetic clinical process is performed in ways that privilege 
clinical perception over other kinds of technology, moments of ambiguity and uncertainty 
over diagnosis create ‘a space of deferral’.  This space of deferral serves to legitimate a 
future in which even more techno-science - and consequently more clinical judgment - is 
called on to differentiate the genetic, and amend or determine genetic diagnoses.  
When performed as a new frontier of medical knowledge, the alignment of the gene 
and the clinic creates a space of interpretation that in turn produces the opportunity for a 
reinvigoration of clinical power. Thus, the conception of the ‘death of the clinic’ is 
premature. The clinic in dysmorphology is being reperformed as a site of knowledge 
production in the identification and classification of disease entities. Furthermore, as will 
be seen in the chapter that follows, it is precisely the non-relation between the genotype 
(the abstraction of informational codes) and the phenotype (the mess of distributed fleshy 
substance) that affords medicine its place as a site of crossing and translation in the 
production of the genetic as a new sphere of life. 
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Chapter 8 
 
Dysmorphology’s Portraits 
 
 
The form in which truth is originally shown is the surface in which relief is both 
manifested and abolished – the portrait. (Foucault 2003: 5) 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In this chapter I explore the kinds of bodies and medical entities that process and practice 
in dysmorphology perform. This continues the analysis of genetic medicine in the last 
chapter, where initial findings pointed to the clinic acting as a centre of discretion and 
rebutted the rather superficial prognosis that the clinic was being transformed into an 
outpost of the laboratory, in which clinical judgement is neither relevant nor necessary.  
In what follows I examine the specificity of how the clinic constructs the clinical 
pictures they make and ‘read’ as representations of the real.  I do this by considering these 
clinical pictures as a new form of portraiture. Shifting to thinking of the clinical pictures 
that dysmorphologists make as forms of portraiture is important because, as Jordonova 
suggests (2000, 2003), it emphasises that they are constructions: 
 . . portraits are always art – that is, they are not natural depictions of a state of 
affairs in the world but creations . . (Jordonova 2003:47) 
However, we must not not treat these portraits as mere simulacra.  Rather, by considering 
them portraits, we can consider clinical pictures as material, mobile, semiotic objects that 
are produced in a specific cultural and social time-space location.  Moreover, examining 
how these portraits are constructed allows us to examine the culturally and socially 
specific ideas that they make manifest and circulate.  
In what follows I illuminate how dysmorphology’s portraits are constructed, and 
consider what it is that they accomplish. Firstly, I show how the portraits put into a play a 
way of seeing bodies and their parts as the substantive and fleshy manifestations of genes.  
Secondly, I argue that my analysis of these portraits helps to make visible the way in which 
the clinic is a site of crossing and translation between the molecular (the genotype) and 
the molar (the phenotype), between the abstract and the substantial, and between 
informational codes and flesh.  What I suggest these methods of portraiture both reflect 
and constitute is the shift in genetic science from one gene as responsible for one disease, 
to the complexity of classifying a syndrome-phenotype as the expression of a genotype.  
Thus, the portrait in dysmorphology, such as the one of Kabuki presented earlier offers the 
figure of a syndrome-genotype relation, that is genetic and connected to reproduction, but 
does not have the characteristics of Mendelian forms of inheritance.  It is a way of 
representing syndromes as not reducing either to a single gene or to the figure of an 
individual and, instead, emerges in its partial connection between the assemblage and 
juxtaposition of materials deriving from different bodies. In this we can see how the clinic 
is doing the ‘new genetics’. 
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Texts and surfaces 
 
Ahead of this analysis, I need to say something more about those who see the clinic as 
abandoning the flesh. In her now notorious (and often misquoted) passage, Haraway 
(1990) states that it is time to write the ‘Death of the Clinic’. She pictures the ‘loss’ of 
medical dominance quite differently from the analysis offered by Rose in the previous 
chapter. As Haraway (1990: 194) puts it, ‘[t]he old dominations of white capitalist 
patriarchy seem nostalgically innocent now’ since, in normalizing heterogeneity (e.g., into 
man and woman, white and black), such dominations at least provided a space of 
subjectivity, a depth.  
Particularly compelling in Haraway’s more sophisticated rendering is her vision of the 
normless world of ‘texts and surfaces’ to which medical dominance, for all its normalizing 
effects, is giving way:  
'Advanced capitalism' and post-modernism release heterogeneity without a norm, 
and we are flattened, without subjectivity, which requires depth, even unfriendly 
and drowning depths. It is time to write the Death of the Clinic. The clinic's methods 
required bodies and works; we have texts and surfaces. Our dominations don't work 
by medicalization and normalization anymore; they work by networking, 
communications redesign, stress management. (Haraway 1990: 194).   
Haraway sees the clinic’s death in the emerging shift from biology as clinical practice 
(requiring bodies and work), to biology as inscription (information sound bites, 
technobabble, and the embedding and totalizing association of advanced capitalism and 
postmodernism).   
The theory that we are experiencing (and as Haraway implies, should be resisting) an 
epochal shift from flesh, substance, depth, and subjectivity, to the digitalizing of life and an 
information age is well rehearsed in the literature.  Rheinberger (2000) goes so far as to 
suggest an epochal shift in which the molecularization of biology (and therefore medicine) 
augurs the demise of the nature/culture divide, so that the natural and the social can no 
longer be seen as ontologically different:  
What is new about molecular biological writing is that we now gain access to the 
texture, and hence the calculation, instruction and legislation of the human 
individual’s organic existence, that is to a script that until now it has been the 
privilege of evolution to write, to rewrite and to alter. (p.28)  
From this perspective of life being reduced to informational codes, the programming of 
bodies emerges as plastic: the ‘real’ is no longer the flesh but is the script, or the code. In 
this way the gene appears as something technological, object-like, unnatural, inorganic - 
not fleshy at all.  
Intervention using the new genetic and reproductive technologies is represented as 
operating at the level of instruction, rather than at the level of the performance of 
metabolic processes (Rheinberger 1996). The language here shifts too: clinical 
interventions need to be ‘smart’ and ‘intelligent’, able to ‘switch’ genes on and off; 
contrastingly, old clinical technologies are figured as blunderbusses.   
This is the language of IT –  a language that penetrates how people in disciplines like 
cancer genetics talk to each other and to publics. It is racy and slick.  Even, dare one say it, 
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inhuman.  This language attaches medicine to the world of the digital machine. Here the 
basis of life bares no resemblance to Canguilhem’s (1989) normativity: there is nothing 
vital here (see also Greco 2009) and everything is mere abstraction and simulacrum.  It 
belongs to the new fronts of medicine, such as the Gene Knowledge Parks discussed in 
Chapter 3; far away from the messy work of the clinic, and the flesh and complexity of 
children and families. 
 
 
Fleshing up representation 
 
This foregoing representation of science as only molecular forgets that biology is itself 
clunky, partial, material and incomplete. As we are already learning from the analysis in 
the previous chapters, however, bioscience is far from being similar to a computer game – 
if it were scientists would not need to move between animal models, living organisms, the 
laboratory and the computer.  And we would not need systems biology and epigenetics to 
help us move past the fallacy that mapping the genome would solve all our problems. 
 Discourses about the molecularization of biology and medicine seem to be 
underpinned by two presumptions: firstly, that molecular biology has become dominant 
in ways that obliterate other kinds of bio-knowledge and understandings; and, secondly, 
that this dominance has dematerialized medicine and turned it away from flesh, bodies 
and work and towards informational codes, digits and maths.  It is as though persons and 
their bodily troubles can no longer be healed or enhanced as flesh, or even as cyborgs, 
but only engineered as virtual avatars.   
 These twin process do not only strip away the flesh, but are presumed to take the 
ground from under the feet of medicine.  The supposition in all this, as has already been 
discussed, is that medicine’s dominant place in society is under threat.  But surely it is 
more important and interesting to explore how the clinic continues to function and what 
place it has in the so-called information age? As Chatterji et al (1998) argue: 
 . . how the clinic is maintained as an idea and a practice in day-to-day functioning in 
different societal contexts . . within which we could see how the new ideologies of 
domination through information, require and use bodies.  (p 171) 
As we have been observing in the study of dysmorphology, not all the flesh is 
stripped away.  At least, not all of the time.  We have already witnessed how clinical 
process in genetic medicine continuously shifts, back and forth, between fleshy bodies and 
different forms of representation of these bodies, their parts, and how they are 
functioning, including chromosomal and molecular tests.  Specifically, many photographs 
and slides of babies and children, parts of their bodies, and photographs of other family 
members and parts of their bodies, are juxtaposed with other visual imagery, such as 
family trees, in the construction of a clinical picture.   
Alongside this visual imagery, doctors and others give their accounts and 
interpretations.  I have reported in Chapters 6 and 7 how these clinical pictures are being 
assembled by clinicians as ways of detecting the presence, or absence, of a syndrome. 
While simulacra are treated in medicine as a part of the real, as Grace (2003) argues, we 
have seen dysmorphologists enact their readings of the representations of photographs 
and scans as though they were representations of the real, not simulacrums. Indeed, as 
mentioned before, they tend to reject the simulacra of new computer technologies in 
preference of diagnosing syndromes from the faces of people, as if[though] they are like 
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any other natural objects: legible to a scientific and disciplined gaze.   
 
 
Medicine and portraiture 
 
The dysmorphology clinic constructs a very specific form of portraiture: assemblages in 
which various kinds of bodies and their parts are juxtaposed in multiple and 
heterogeneous images. Inasmuch as this form of portraiture differs from earlier forms of 
medical portraiture, which typically mimic other classical forms of portraiture in showing 
a singular figure rendered in great and vivid detail, these differences require attention 
because of what this clinical form of assemblage is bringing into presence.  
 As the following quotation from Thomas Sydenham indicates, medicine’s use of 
portraits is nothing new: 
 
He who writes the history of diseases must . . observe attentively the clear and 
natural phenomena of diseases, however uninteresting they may seem.  In this he 
must imitate the painters who when they paint a portrait are careful to mark the 
smallest signs and natural things that are to be found on the face of the person 
they are painting’xv (cited in Foucault 2003: 5).  
 
There is a long history of the use of images in clinical work in the science of modelling 
and visualising disease and, in calling attention to Sydenham, Foucault is suggesting that 
the portrait [‘is’ or ‘has been’?] a powerful technology for circulating knowledge.   
 Early representations of diseased bodies were either painted or engraved. Like the 
honorific portraits of individuals, or groups of individuals, which we see hanging in 
universities, corporation board rooms, stately homes, and galleries (Sekula 1986), 
traditional medical portraits usually portray a figure of an individual. As a well-accepted 
clinical method, through which diseases are constructed and a model fabricated, these 
portraits would illustrate medical textbooks along with illustrations of a particular 
affected part.  
Sometimes these portraits are classic depictions of a human figure in a specific pose, 
such as Charcot’s famous portrait of hysteria depicting Augustine in ecstasy (see Didi-
Huberman 2004).  Here the figure performs a particular relation between the appearance 
of the person and their essence: and the suggestion is that how the figure looks, and how 
they are as a person, is being determined. They are, perhaps, being ‘consumed’ by the 
pathology,  or possibly vice versa - the pathology is consuming them. Therefore, the 
portrait could also suggest that the pathology is an effect of their essence. 
Whichever way round, the figure of an individual is taken to stand for a disease and 
typify some of its signs and symptoms. The whole person personifies the disease, while 
representations of specific signs exemplify what makes up the disease - its constituent 
parts. Gilman (1988), however, presses us to attend to the implicit cultural and social 
significance of how clinical science has deployed portraits of ‘affected’ persons in the work 
of establishing pathologies. Here the specific use of photographs has had some 
importance because they have an epistemological significance as depictions of the real, 
rather than as simulations.   
 
 
 103 
Portraiture and photography  
 
Photography expanded upon these early representational practices by depicting types, 
characters, and pathologies. Photographic representations of organs and lesions, largely 
used to illustrate textbooks and atlases of pathology, have become standard practice, 
with trained medical illustrators/photographers forming a part of health care teams.   
 Importantly, it was the typical case or classic presentation of a pathological 
condition, which was captured even in the earliest years of photographic technology and 
have been increasingly ever since.  Photography was used to compile extensive 
typologies of characters and social types. These earlier photographs often depicted an 
individual figure in a pose: the figure typified the presentation of a disease or condition.   
 Photographs, which appear to capture and reproduce ‘the real’, and help to 
associate what is displayed with the truth – unmediated, for example, by an artist’s art. 
Because the epistemological status of photographs is hard to dispute (Cohen and Meskin 
2004), they help reinforce that an accurate portrayal of a given object is being depicted in 
the clinic.   
 The attempt within medicine, particularly physiognomy, to identify and classify 
pathologies of character and temperament through physical appearance also has a 
history here.  Appearance was thought to reveal the inner character of the person, and, 
as Kemp and Wallace (2000: 94) suggest ‘philosophy, science and medicine have been 
consistently mobilized over the ages to provide a framework of explanation of how inner 
is expressed in outer’.  Here I should also mention phrenology, in which the skull’s shape 
and form was mapped, based on the belief that areas on the skull, together with their 
size and shape, were indicative of different faculties and character traits.  Duster (2008) 
has likened DNA mapping of criminals, and the population searches for genetic markers 
of criminal types, to phrenology.   
Two well-known early examples of the way in which photographs were used in 
linking inner pathology to outer appearance are Lombroso and Galton (put dates in here I 
think to help situate your reader). Lombroso equated criminality and physiognomic types 
by codifying variation in human appearance into a classification of types, in which criminal 
traits were correlated with visible physical indices. Francis Galton combined the resources 
of photography with anthropometric techniques to classify human types, called 
‘composite portraits’ (http://galton.org/composite.htm).  Composite portraiture was a 
method of analysing the images of different persons identified as belonging to a particular 
category of person, such as sick or criminal or a leader, so that the ideal type could be 
ascertained.  This face could then be used as a way of recognising someone as belonging 
to a particular category or not.  For example, if their face did not match the ideal face 
typifying a leader, their selection for officer rank in the armed forces could be questioned. 
Although Lombroso and Galton were interested in the classification of types, and in 
the correspondence between appearance and character, they were also interested in the 
hereditary transmission of character from generation to generation. One of Lombroso’s 
methods, for example, was to transform the photographic family album and the family 
tree, into the visual display of physiological and phrenological semiology (Lombroso and 
Lombroso-Fererro 1972). Indeed, Galton was especially influential in the application of 
Darwinian ideas and the promotion of eugenic science (e.g. Galton 1904).  So the body-
world relation that comes into view is between appearance, character, pathology and 
hereditary. 
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The depiction of the insane was also a major site for the photographic recording of 
the relation between appearance and pathology. Asylum patients were photographed in 
abundance from the middle of the nineteenth century, notably by Hugh Welch Diamond in 
England, who was one of the founders of the Royal Photographic Society. In addition, and 
just as famously, an extensive photographic record supplemented Charcot’s displays of 
living patients at the Salpëtrière. In collaboration with photographers Bourneville, 
Regnard, and Londe, Charcot established a photographic unit at the hospital and the 
publication of New Iconography of the Salpetriere enshrined a voluminous record of the 
hysterics, cataleptics, and other inmatesxvi.  
The pathology and the body-person relation performed in these kinds of portraits 
seems totalizing. Despite this, the relation between appearance and essence is not a 
straightforward one, as we saw in the previous chapter. The art of the clinical gaze is 
precisely to be able to distinguish and differentiate between appearance and essence.  
Just as, for Talcott Parson, one of the cornerstones of medical dominance and medicine’s 
social contract is to be able to weed out and legitimate the genuinely sick from the non-
genuine, the key work in the case of dysmorphology is to differentiate the (possibly) 
syndromic from the rest.   
 
 
Reading across images 
 
Predominantly these kinds of portraits individuate: the pathology is performed as being 
located in some one, in a singular figure. In this way the pathology is being portrayed as 
inherent to the body (and mind) of this particular person. These are medicine’s usual 
portraits – their ‘representative subjects’.  And we have seen throughout the book 
examples of these in the different photographs I have included along the way, such as the 
faces of Sotos or Coffin-Lowry syndrome (pages * and * respectively). 
These portraits also settle all the parts – the signs, and the symptoms of the 
pathology - into a whole, complete, and reductive medical entity, for example, ‘hysteria’. 
So much so that the figure is taken not so much to represent themselves, but as 
representing the medical category to which they are being assigned: the figure of the 
person is being read as signifying the pathology. Foucault captures the radical nature of 
this shift: 
The first structure provided by classificatory medicine is the flat surface of perpetual 
simultaneity. Table and picture . . It is a space in which analogies define essences.  
The picture resembles things, but they also resemble one another. (Foucault 2003a:5) 
This is the meaning that a medical portrait captures. Meaning does not come from the 
representation of the person being portraited, but comes instead from its similarity and 
difference to other representations. There is not simply a likeness of the patient to 
portrait. There is even the possibility that a pathological condition can be represented, 
settled, and fixed in a moment of time (just as a photographic portrait fixes someone in a 
moment of time) in order to portray something of their essence. What is important, is that 
the picture resemble other pictures.  
The key point is that the pathology can be recognised as a pathology by reference 
not to the persons being portraited, but to the grid of other pathologies. Likeness is read 
across pathologies more than it is read from portrait to person.  
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This is why juxtaposition is so important, which I will make central in the following 
analysis. Dysmorphologists use juxtaposition as a part of making ‘assemblages’ (Deleuze 
and Parnet 1987), in which different images are juxtaposed or held apart. They do this to 
read across images in order to see their syndromes.  
Consequently, dysmorphologists use photographs in their work in the clinic in a quite 
different way to traditional medicine. We have seen in the previous chapters on 
dysmorphology how processes of diagnosis assemble different and multiple images of 
people and their parts, including their relations.  Some family photographs may have been 
supplied by the nurse from her home visit, and placed in the notes.  Some images derive 
from the examination of the child during consultations. [so?] 
These assemblages unsettle an idea of a disease process as located in a singular 
body, an individual.  What comes into view is the distributed and unsettled nature of a 
syndrome, which I will now discuss.  
 
 
Assemblage and juxtaposition 
 
As I described in Chapter 5 about the construction of a history, a typical dysmorphology 
examination “starts from the top”.  We also heard from Dr Fox how this may entail making 
themselves ‘human’, sitting a child on their lap for example, or making the examination 
into a game with bangles.   
Typically, the clinical geneticist carefully inspects the head, the face, the tongue, 
hands, trunk and back, joints, and feet. Measurements are also taken; clinicians are 
looking at the shape, size, and position of features. After this examination the clinician 
frequently takes photographs of any distinctive features, and may also ask parents for 
additional photographs of the child when they were younger, of siblings, and of other 
family members, where these have not already been supplied.   
As is evident in Chapters 5 and 6, diagnoses are developed over time and are 
discussed at length at clinical meetings: they are almost never offered immediately at a 
clinical consultation.  Diagnostic process includes both the assemblage of images together 
with other clinical materials, such as scans of organs and bones, blood and cytogenic tests, 
and medical family trees or pedigrees.  Different materials are thus juxtaposed so that 
they can be considered in relation to one another.   
Juxtapositions may include either images with images, or images and other materials 
including laboratory tests (or both?). Typically the purpose appears to be to illuminate 
incongruity and ambiguity as much as it is to elicit conformity.  For example, in Chapter 6 it 
became evident that juxtaposition may be made in ways that either confirm or falsify 
evidence, such as tests, or a previous diagnosis.  These processes of assemblage and 
juxtaposition can be seen across local clinical meetings, in clinical databases, and in poster 
and oral presentations at national and international conferences.  
At these moments of assemblage (whether in clinical meetings or at academic 
occasions), clinicians may designate certain forms and shapes as abnormal or unusual. 
Shapes of interest include the distribution of bodily features (faces, hearts, hands, feet, 
hair, genitals, brains, skin). Sometimes clinicians, as noted already, typify a child as an ‘FLK’ 
– a ‘funny looking kid’ – or as ‘looking a bit chromosomal’.  In these assemblages, clinicians 
are associating features together to see if there is a pattern – a pattern that corresponds 
to the defining features of a syndrome, one that is known or not yet fully known.  
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Sometimes, as in the cases of Fiona (p.**), and Anna (p.**) the child and their family may 
simply look syndromic.   
Establishing whether the features displayed can be taken to represent a syndrome is 
a complex process. The pattern-making associates different parts of bodies with each 
other across systems, such as specific shapes of eyes with abnormalities in brain shapes, 
and so on and so forth.  Many syndromes involve developmental problems: flesh develops 
in abnormal ways to produce abnormalities in the shapes of organs, such as the brain, and 
other fleshy parts.  It is these abnormal shapes that produce abnormalities in what the 
clinicians designate as the development of the child (physical, behavioural, intellectual).  
Differentiating the cause of abnormality includes establishing whether the ‘look’ of 
someone, or one part of them, is also ‘in the family’.  Here clinicians are looking to see if 
the sign of a syndrome or a distinguishing feature of an individual are manifest in other 
family members.  Dysmorphologists compare looks and features across family members 
and then hold them against databases of syndromes.  
Clinicians draw upon these clinical methods of assemblage to differentiate when 
what is abnormal or unusual about bodies, parts, persons, and even families, represents a 
phenotype.  This is because, for the most part - as already discussed, there is no genetic 
technology (molecular test) that can make anomalies visible at the molecular level (see 
also Reardon & Donnai 2007).  Through the enactment of rational detachment, geneticists 
make patterns out of the way a person and/or the members of their family look.  They are 
looking for signs that represent the defining features of a syndrome.  
I want to suggest that a relation between the particular features of a syndrome, the 
notion of a phenotype (as the expression of an atypical, aberrant genotype) is fabricated in 
the mode of juxtaposition rather than that merely of comparison.  To recap, a phenotype 
for geneticists is the way that a genotype is manifest(ed/ genotype manifests): it is the 
substantial or fleshy expression of a genotype, a specific arrangement of protein expressed 
as codes and number.  Therefore indicators such as low IQ, a big head, or the distribution 
of hair may be read less as an individual feature, and more as a sign, and evidence, of a 
syndrome in the family.  
If a particular feature is read as part of a pattern of features, and thus is judged to be 
evidence of a syndrome, the question arises as to whether it is genetic.  And then, of 
course, whether - if it is genetic - it is inherited.  If it is inherited, then there is the issue of 
‘morphological risk’ (Löwy 1996) and the question of whether or not the aberration can be 
passed on down the generations and through a family line.  
In summary, what implicated by how geneticists assemble their clinical pictures is 
that how people look and their bodies function (the phenotype) may not just be evidence 
of a syndrome. What is also being suggested by how these assemblages juxtapose 
particular signs is that the syndrome may be the effect of a specific aberrant (but as yet 
invisible) genotype, a syndrome-genotype relation. 
 
 
Investigating the syndrome-genotype relation  
 
It is this relation, the syndrome-genotype, which dysmorphology’s portraits evoke.  They 
do this at moments through the way in which assemblages juxtapose particular 
representations of bodies and their parts, even where there is no definitive evidence of 
such a relation (such as a cytogenetic or molecular test).  The aberrations that are being 
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suggested by these juxtapositions may be as tiny as a single gene defect, or ‘huge’ where, 
to use the locution of one expert, ‘a bit of chromosome has fallen off and landed in the 
wrong place’xvii.   
The following extract helps to illustrate how portraiting the possibility of a 
syndrome-genotype relation is being discussed at a local clinical meeting. In this meeting 
people from across the service and the different clinics come together to present their 
cases to each other, and look at ‘slides’ (the images collected from the different cases that 
each team is involved in).  Dr Little and Dr Smith (consultant geneticists), Dr Grey and Dr 
Milne (specialist registrars in genetics) are present. Like dysmorphology club, discussion 
and debate over interpretations and diagnoses are the norm at these meetings.  In the 
following extracts the team are discussing Poppy: 
Dr Grey sets up the projector.  They go through a number of new referrals as well as 
ongoing cases.  Dr Grey moves the slides on to show a picture of an 8 year old girl, 
Poppy, with short brown hair grinning into the camera. This is the case Dr Little is 
very excited about. 
Dr Smith: Would anyone like to make a diagnosis?   
Dr Little: This is Poppy, she is doing very well, she’s in a regular class, she has some 
help but is not coping. She came with her mum and dad who want to know what’s 
wrong.   Poppy was referred by a number of doctors and by a community health 
worker who suggested I should see her and mentioned that there was something 
odd about mum too.  
[Dr Little projects a slide of a head shot of Poppy, then a slide of her hands, palms 
down] 
Dr Grey: Short finger. 
Dr Little: A short finger, how about the nail?……[no comment from the others] it’s 
more deeply embedded than the others.  
[Slide of Poppy’s hands palm facing up] 
Dr Milne: Foetal finger pads… 
Dr Little: Short thumbs. 
[Slide of left foot] 
Dr Little: Short toes and broad. 
Dr Milne: Shapeless feet. 
Dr Little: Tiny, smaller than her younger sister…also the toenails are deeply 
embedded, the parents commented on how difficult it was to cut them.  
Up to this point the team have been looking at slides of Poppy.  These assemble images of 
her face, her profile, her hands and fingers, and her feet.  Although asked to make a 
diagnosis, no one proffers a suggestion.  Then the slide show moves on: 
[Slide of the child’s mother - head shot of woman in her 30’s with short curly hair 
and large eyes framed by large glasses – the doctors all exclaim when they see this 
slide]. 
Dr Little: She has large eyes, lateral aversion of the eyes [she demonstrates by pulling 
her own eyes to the side to illustrate an oriental look], her height is 1.49 
centimetres. I got hold of the mother’s baby notes, she was seen by lots of 
paediatricians because of her short stature and her pictures were shown at national 
dysmorphology meetings in the 70’s. So that’s mum.  
[Side profile of the mother – Dr Little comments on her prominent eyebrows that 
have high and large arches] 
 108 
Dr Smith: We’re talking about Kabuki aren’t we, but the nose isn’t. 
Dr Little: The girl (Poppy) does [have the nose] . . I’m encouraging mum to get some 
pictures of her(self) as a child.  
The moment that Dr Little puts up a slide of Poppy’s mother the rest of the team exclaim.  
As mentioned before, this is what the dysmorphologists I interviewed refer to as a gestalt 
moment: a moment of sudden recognition.  And it is the moment when Dr Smith offers a 
diagnosis: ‘We’re talking about Kabuki’.  Poppy has the nose but it is her Mum that has the 
eyes and brow.  So the defining features of Kabuki are seen in the juxtaposition of features 
distributed across the two bodies assumed to be biologically related. It is the juxtaposition 
of the slides of Poppy and her mother which evidences the syndrome.  The team go on to 
discuss the significance of the case: 
[Side profile of Poppy] 
Dr Milne: There aren’t many [cases of Kabuki] across generations, Owen (another 
geneticist) has an unconfirmed one. 
Dr Little: There is no actual report in the literature with a generational aspect [she 
adds that it would be a good case for someone to work up]. 
[Dr Smith briefly mentions a contact - her supervisor in the US who worked with the 
person who discovered or first wrote about Kabuki - to see if they are still doing work 
in this area. Dr Little doesn’t pick this up.] 
Dr Little: Mum’s got the full house really. 
Dr Milne: How about Manchester? 
Dr Little: I think they’ve given up [doing work on this syndrome.]  
[Slide of Mum’s profile and hands] 
Dr Little: See the frontal finger pads and the tiny fifth finger…can I take that to 
[London meeting of Dysmorphology Club]? 
Dr Smith: Yes. 
Dr Little: It’s really helpful to see an adult, many die of renal failure, that’s the worry. 
[She goes on to mention some of mum’s renal symptoms from the past for which 
she’s had no treatment or examinations] So that’s a worry, so we need to look at her 
kidneys. 
Dr Little: What’s her IQ like? 
Dr Little: Coping, just, in the 70’s I think. 
Dr Smith: They’re a good family…I can see if the Professor [Professor Kabuki] in Japan 
is still doing work in this area. 
Dr Little: They would be a good family to do, mum is so dramatic, I have no doubt in 
my mind.  
[Dr Grey moves the slides on to a head and shoulders shot of a pretty young girl with 
blonde hair smiling into the camera] 
To make their portrait, clinicians assemble slides of Poppy’s face, hands and feet, and then 
juxtapose these with slides of her mother’s face and hands.  They make their readings of 
these features: that the toes are short, or that the eyes are slanting down, and align these 
with other materials they have collected and present as significant (such as a history of 
kidney disease, records of height measurements).   
They put all this together with records of Poppy’s IQ and problems with her 
development (she’s not coping at school even with help). The parts they are interested in 
are constituted as distinctive in terms of their shape and form (eyes, heads, toes, hands, 
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fingers, nails, height), while Poppy’s conduct is assessed against norms of intelligence and 
development.  The implication is that her brain, like her hands, is malformed in some way.  
 
Insert here 
 
[insert] Fig. 8.1 Faces of Kabuki: Representative Subjects 
 
The doctors are excited because the slide of Popper’s mother’s face reveals a pattern 
across the representations, showing the defining features of Kabuki Syndrome. In the case 
of Kabuki Syndrome, which is rare, there is no so-called definitive or ‘objective’ evidence, 
i.e. no molecular test that confirms the clinical picture as the phenotypical expression of 
an aberrant genotype (c.f. Kara et al 2006).   
Therefore, I want to suggest that what is being implicitly performed here is not just 
the defining features of Kabuki, but rather, through the way in which the features are 
assembled and juxtaposed across the bodies of a mother and her child, it is being 
suggested that Kabuki is itself distributed across two biologically related bodies.  This 
juxtaposition implies something pathological in common at the genetic level.   
Constituting a relation between how Poppy and her mother look, the syndrome 
(Kabuki), and a genotype thus implies something more than the existence/presence of the 
syndrome itself.  The portrait constructed of Poppy and her mother suggests that there is 
something shared at the genetic level, and (partially and provisionally) a possible 
syndrome-genotype relation, which cannot yet be made visible by molecular tests.  
This is important, because most recorded cases of Kabuki are seen as sporadic, or de 
novo events.  Familial cases fitting autosomal dominant inheritance have rarely been 
documented.  I want to press, therefore, that the incompletion and provisionality of the 
portrait of Poppy and her biological relation is most important here: it gives opportunities 
for suggesting that which is not yet known and which cannot yet be fixed.   
 
 
Portraying the genotype-phenotype relation 
 
I am describing something very different here from the clinical process as portrayed in 
Mol’s (2002) ‘body multiple’, where the clinic creates a perspective that coordinates all the 
fragments and heterogeneous parts into a hybrid, but settled and integrated, form; a 
diagnosis such as atherosclerosis of the lower leg.  That form, as in Gillman’s analysis 
mentioned above, settles into a single body, which can be taken to represent a disease 
category.   
In contrast, in dysmorphology the heterogeneity and complexity does not always 
settle into the figure of an individual as being representative of a diagnosis.  I am saying 
this despite the use of visual images of representative subjects in journal articles and 
websites, such as the figures of Sotos and Coffin-Lowry syndromes shown in earlier 
chapters.  Contrastingly, the faces of Kabuki’s representative subjects, and the more usual 
way of representing the face of a syndrome, can be seen in Figure 8.1.  When the 
distributed nature of the phenotype across different bodies that are biologically related 
can be shown in the genetics clinic, then what is being revealed is that the genetic may be 
at work in producing the syndrome. 
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Dysmorphology’s portraits thus conform in some ways to the science of visualising 
disease mentioned earlier, and described so well by Gilman.  However, there are 
differences of real significance in method and subject matter.  The diverse visual and 
textual representations of different persons, their relations, and their parts are assembled 
and juxtaposed: the features of a syndrome-genotype are not locatable in one body, in 
one individual, but across different bodies (see Figure 8.2 for an example).  The syndrome 
(the phenotype) and its cause (an aberrant genotype) are distributed.   
The complexity and heterogeneity of the defining features of a syndrome need to be 
distributed for them to stand as a phenotype, and the visible expression of the syndrome-
genotype relation.  Critically, what is implicit in these juxtapositions and in 
dysmorphologists’ readings of them, is that there is something about the substance of the 
bodies of individuals that is not unique to them, but which is shared, or at least held in 
common to use Strathern’s (2005) term.  It is exceptionable that they are able to make the 
portraits show that it is not simply a disease that is shared, but rather that it is the 
common genetic substance, the genotype, that is pathological; and that the syndrome is 
the expression, or phenotype, of this common genotype, distributed across different 
bodies. 
 
Insert here  
Figure 8.2 
Making a Portrait of Kabuki’s Phenotype-Genotype Relation 
 
 
Therefore, the portrait in dysmorphology does not always reduce to the figure of an 
individual [as] a representative subject.  Instead, it is the figure of a syndrome-genotype 
relation that emerges in the partial connection between the juxtaposition of materials 
deriving from different biologically realted bodies. I should stress, though, that 
juxtaposition here is not being made in the ‘mode of comparison’ (Strathern 1997): it is a 
different mode of ordering, one that flattens the world into divisions for a moment.  
Further, and this is important, what is being performed in the clinic is how the portrait 
makes a (temporary) space that cannot (yet) settle all the divisions and connections 
between all the parts across different bodies.  And it is this distribution across different 
bodies that can be seen as the defining feature of dysmorphology’s key portraits.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The chapter has explained how the genetic clinic constructs clinical pictures as new forms 
of portraiture. Instead of showing individual figures in a pose that represents the features 
of a clinical diagnosis, dysmorphologists make assemblages of multiple and heterogeneous 
images of people’s faces and their body parts of bodies, composed together with other 
visual materials, such as medical pedigrees, scans, and tests results.   
The method of assemblage and juxtaposition creates connections between the 
portrait and what it is that they seem to suggest. In my study of dysmorphology, it is the 
figure of a syndrome that is depicted by such assemblages. Although many assemblages 
remain in anticipation of such an outcome - the very possibility of defining the features of 
a syndrome-genotype relation is suggested by those moments when assemblages are 
drawn from biologically related bodies. In addition, I have shown how the juxtaposition of 
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materials, such as the photographs of Poppy and her mother, can cast doubt on the 
significance of a test or report as well as be used as a method of confirmation or 
refutation.   
What this form of portraiture performs, at one level, is the very possibility that the 
appearance of people’s bodies and parts is the expression of a genotype. Clinicians’ 
assemblages are made first to represent a phenotype or a syndrome, distributed across 
the substance of different persons and their parts. However, the geneticists use how the 
fleshy bodies look – the phenotype – to tell them about another and different kind of body 
– a genotype.  How bodies across different persons ‘look’ is taken to mean something 
about the arrangement of genes. In this visualization and classification of the genetic, the 
clinic is ahead; laboratory-based science is lagging behind.  
The ways in which features across families are juxtaposed also performs relations.  
Specifically, in my examination of dysmorphology’s portraits, I have shown how the 
genetic clinic emerges as a space that gives form to the relation between genes (codes and 
information) and living, fleshy bodies.  While ‘morph’ denotes shape, as I have already 
discussed, morphology is not just a branch of biology that deals with living forms; it is also 
a branch of grammar that deals with the formation and inflexion of words.  
The two disciplines seem worlds apart, like the study of living forms and the ‘post-
genomic’ representations of genes as information, codes, and rules. Yet in a sense what 
dysmorphology’s portraits do is to bring these worlds – the flesh and the grammar - into a 
relation because they help both see and say a genotype-syndrome relation.   
The ways in which dysmorphology makes its portraits thus creates a space, a 
crossing, through which form is given to information (the aberrant genes), so that the gene 
is made visible. Here the gene is not only given presence, but is, for a moment, magnified.  
It is not simply, as Rabinow and Rose (2006) indicate in discussing the relation between 
the new genetics and strategies for the governing of life, that there is a very long chain of 
translation between the molecular and the molar – between information codes and the 
fleshy, vitality of the human organism.  Rather, that the molecular and the gene in models 
and in textual discourse mimic or simulate digital machines, and are performed as being of 
a different texture to fleshy bodies.  As such, the molecular gene brings with it a different, 
incompatible world to that which is occupied by fleshy, living bodies: these two worlds 
seem irreducible, they are in a non-relation (Foucault 1983).   
For all this, as this chapter has demonstrated, the transition from a world of flesh to 
a worlds of texts and surfaces is hardly as complete as Haraway fears. For the moment, the 
clinic is precisely a key site in which crossings between these two worlds can happen. This 
is partly because of what the clinic makes its composites of the organic and inorganic 
mean in terms of genes, but it is also because of how medicine performs representations 
as reality.   
Hence I also want to press the kind of scientific work being enacted here: 
assemblage and juxtaposition is a mode suited to a correlational science looking to take 
forward classification, rather than it is compatible to an experimental science seeking 
causes.  What I suggest these methods of portraiture both reflect and constitute is the 
shift in genetic science from one gene as responsible for one disease, to the complexity of 
classifying a syndrome-phenotype as the expression of a genotype.  Thus, the portrait is a 
way of representing syndromes that does not reduces them either to a single gene or to 
the figure of an individual and, instead, allows syndromes to emerge in the partial 
connection between the assemblage and juxtaposition of materials deriving from 
 112 
different, biologically related bodies. In this we can see how the clinic is doing the ‘new 
genetics’. I discuss the significance of these aspects of the study further in Chapter 12.   
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Chapter 9 
 
Genes, Bodies, Persons 
 
Perhaps the individual is so viable a god because he can actually understand 
the ceremonial significance of the way he is treated, and quite on his own can 
respond dramatically to what is proffered him. In contacts between such 
deities there is no need for middlemen; each of these gods is able to serve as 
his own priest. (Goffman, 2005, p.95) 
 
In the previous chapter I have shown how the method of assemblage and juxtaposition in 
dysmorphology – what I am calling their portraits - enacts the clinic as making syndromes 
visible as an effect of a phenotype-genotype relation.  This means that the clinic, through 
its immersion in the fleshy world of the family, can make visible what the laboratory 
cannot, as yet.  This is because the clinic is a site of crossing between two incompatible 
worlds, namely that of information and codes – the genotype - and that of the flesh and 
social interaction – the phenotype.  
We have seen how the dysmorphology clinic accomplishes this crossing of worlds 
through shifting between its front stage, where it enacts itself at the whiteboard as 
scientific, and its backstage, with its immersion in the fleshy, messy world of people, 
families, and their bodies. Questions arise, therefore, as to what persons become in the 
clinical processes that help rebirth the clinic.  Are they more or less molecularised in the 
form of the distributed effects of their DNA? And, if so, what happens to them as 
individual subjects? 
Debates on the new genetics, together with ongoing developments in biological 
theory, appear to rewrite the body, undermining not only the figure of the individual but 
challenging ideas of what it is to be human.  As I have begun to suggest in the previous 
chapter, recent writing suggests that the new genetics, particularly molecular biology, and 
its implications for how we think the body and persons, signals an era of the ‘posthuman’.  
This is due in part to the way the new genetics, or ‘postmodern biology’ (Melley 2002: 51), 
appears to trouble body-self relations.  
Specifically, commentators suggest that a ‘geneticization’ of the body could provoke 
a revolution in our ways of conceiving persons as individual, and lead to the destruction of 
the human: 
 
What is the posthuman? Think of it as a point of view characterised by the following 
assumptions…First, the posthuman view privileges informational pattern over 
material instantiation, so that embodiment in biological substrate is seen as an 
accident of history rather than an inevitability of life.  Second, the posthuman view 
considers consciousness, regarded as the seat of human identity in the Western 
tradition long before Descartes thought he was a mind thinking, as an 
epiphenomenon, as an evolutionary upstart trying to claim that it is the whole show 
when in actuality it is only a minor side show.  Third, the posthuman view thinks of 
the body as the original prosthesis we all learn to manipulate, so that extending or 
replacing the body with other prostheses becomes a continuation of a process that 
began before we were born.  (Hayles, 1999: 2-3) 
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Hayles is suggesting  that the shift to molecular biology heralds the destruction of the 
human because there is an undermining of the three pillars that underpin human 
exceptionalism: the uniqueness of the body-individual, the supremacy of consciousness 
and the human-other dualism.  
However, as I have indicated in Chapter 2, medicine has many more associations 
(and much more at stake in how it maintains its dominant position) than its attachment to 
either biology or science. Specifically, as I illustrate in the following two chapters, these 
associations are with the family. Ahead of this, however, I am suggesting that one of 
medicine’s crucial attachments is to the other humanist ideas that run alongside those of 
science, especially those of welfare and justice.  
In the rest of this chapter I hold the clinical practices in dysmorphology against the 
more general ideas underpinning debate on the geneticization of the body, in order to 
challenge presumptions that the figure of the individual is disappearing. I begin by 
examining research that suggests that the new genetics may be rewriting the relation 
between bodies and selves to deconstruct the figure of the individual.  I go on to show 
how medicine in the genetic clinic holds two apparently contradictory notions over bodies 
and persons in play, before exploring what this helps accomplish.   
 
 
Re-writing the individual? 
 
I am reflecting onFoucault’s examination of the way in which the clinic as a social 
institution is central to the apparatus of nation states that allows for the protection, as 
well as the enhancement, of people and their bodies (see also Hewitt 1983). There has 
been a great deal of critique of the clinic as a site in which the person as a social being is 
abstracted, that the clinic is often seen as a space that institutes the mind-body split. 
Similarly, many think of it as a space which helps organize the division between the 
medical body and the lived body in such as a way as to exclude personhood, and particular 
ways of thinking and knowing the body and its troubles.  
Less of a focus, however, has been the way the clinic, in performing these divisions, 
also performs a key duality inherent in the humanist tradition, which is linked to the 
compound figure of the individual of humanist thought. Within this latter perspective, the 
clinic has long been understood as a site constitutive of the dominant body-self relations 
that underpin modern biopolitics. Foucault (2003a, 2003b) and Deleuze (1997) among 
others have precisely connected the operations of clinical power to ideas of the 
integrated, discrete body-self.  Specifically, each has shown how modern politics works 
consciousness through the body, both the substantial body and the body as an idea.  They 
have also explored how the clinic has been pivotal to establishing this biopolitics of the 
body.  For example, the clinic has helped to constitute how we think of the body, and the 
ways in which we think the body circulates ideas of the normal, the individual, and 
individual-society relations.  
Any new ways of thinking about the body’s basic fabric and functions, such as 
growth and development, that erodes notions of persons as individual would, therefore, 
have profound implications for ways of ordering social relations. As Strathern (2006) 
stresses:  
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Bodily uniqueness is a sign, as much as it is a Euro-American symbol, of autonomy 
and respect for the person as an individual . . but genes are not unique at all – the 
combination might be unique but the genes are replicas (pp 20-21). 
 
Hence, while the destruction of the human figure represents for some a potentially 
liberating ontology of connectivity, there are profound implications for humanist traditions 
of welfare and justice.  Habermas (2003) questions the decoupling of a specifically human 
nature, not least because of its consequences for the functioning of the many social 
institutions that rely on notions of individual responsibility, conscience, will, and so forth.  
This analysis involves my returning to dysmorphology’s portraits to examine the 
kinds of bodies and persons that they perform.  Chapter 8 showed how the genetic clinic 
constructs clinical pictures of syndromes as new forms of portraiture: assemblages in 
which multiple and heterogeneous images of biologically related bodies and their parts are 
juxtaposed. As might be expected, these portraits, through particular modes of 
representing, reconfigure people and their parts as the visible, momentary expression of a 
genotype as the origin of a syndrome.  Yet this is not to say that all aspects of personhood 
are so encapsulated. Instead, as I am about to show in the current chapter, what stands 
out are shifts in ground that perform persons as at one moment unique and at another as 
made up of substance that is shared, or, as Strathern (2006) puts it, held in common with 
others.   
 
 
Deconstructing the Human? 
 
Many writers have been at pains to show how the revolution in biology offers new forms 
of classification and categorisation, which may or may not break down some of the old 
classificatory divisions (Rabinow 1992 and 1996). Here there are arguments that this 
revolution does not just lead us back to old forms of biological determinism, or the 
Cartesian mind-body split.  Rather, by offering individual genetic profiles that are also 
located in a collective gene pool (Flower and Heath 1993) geneticization of the body may 
characterize a ‘recombinant bio-politics’ (Dillon and Read 2001) that unpicks the 
fundamental principles of humanism and the polarity of individual-population that 
underpins the ordering of social relations.  
In contrast, for many years sociologists have been attempting to ‘bring back the 
body’ (Frank 1990), an agenda which has involved deconstructing ideas of persons that 
previously kept in play the mind/body split. Consequently, the incorporation of 
phenomenological traditions has introduced an alternative to the objectification of the 
body found in medicine, and helped to reinstate an idea of the body as ‘lived’ (Leder 
1990), both as the realm of the self (Young, 2007) and of individuals as ‘body-persons’ 
(Latimer 2009a). What has been instituted in this emergent tradition on embodiment is an 
idea of the body not just as a site of inscription and disciplinary effects (Brush 1998), 
including the institution of particular subjectivities (Biehl and Moran-Thomas, 2009) or 
even of the importance of embodiment in acculturation and social ordering (Bourdieu, 
1977; Mauss, 1973). In their place people emerge as bodies, both with as well as without 
organs (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987), as fleshy and yet as more than flesh (Fox, 2012). 
An emergent body of research is also exploring the cultural, political, and social 
significance of the way that bodies and persons are performed by the practices, artefacts, 
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and discourses of medicine at the interface with the new genetics and reproductive 
technologies (e.g. Atkinson et al 2006, Brodwin 2002, Carsten 2003, Clarke 1998. Clarke et 
al 2010, Martin 1991, Pálsson 2007, Thompson 2005).  Theorists have sought to identify 
the new identities flowing from the revolution in genetic medicine and technoscience – 
such as ‘carriers’, ‘prepatients’, ‘surrogate’ mothers and fathers, ‘somatic citizens’, and so 
on and so forth.   
Within this tradition, feminist STS and cultural studies scholars, as well as medical 
anthropologists, are exploring how changes in biomedical understandings of the body may 
not be just changing disease categories or constituting new identities, but may make 
explicit new ontologies, particularly of connectivity. This is not to suggest that human 
materiality, for example DNA, determines human nature.  Rather, it is to explore how 
discoveries in molecular biology incorporated into clinical science can undo the very body-
self relations that underpin so much of Western thought.  Let me elaborate. 
Emergent understandings from the biosciences have the possibility of changing 
perceptions of the body, and thereby of the existence of human beings.  Contemporary 
discoveries seem to suggest that bodies are not, as previously understood, bounded, 
contained, homogeneous, fixed and integrated entities.  Rather new thinking in molecular 
biology seems to trouble the self/not-self division that is the defining feature performed 
by the figure of the individual body.  This can be understood in several ways.   
Firstly, as Haraway (2007) points out, human bodies are not made up of uniquely 
human substance, but are themselves heterogeneous: 
I love the fact that human genomes can be found in only about 10% of the cells that 
occupy the mundane space I call my body; the other 90% of the cells are filled with 
genomes of bacteria, fungi, protists, and such, some of which play in a Symphony 
necessary to my being alive at all, and some of which are hitching a ride and doing 
the rest of me, of us, no harm . . To be one is always to be many. (Haraway 2007, pp 
3-4) 
The new genetics thus puts into play an idea that ‘[w]ithin ‘us’ is the most threatening 
other – the propagulesxviii, whose phenotype we temporarily are’ (Haraway 1991, p. 217).  
Secondly, breakthroughs made possible because of new genetic technoscience offer 
ways of rethinking body-persons as made up of substance from a much wider gene pool, 
and of the body as the temporary and partial expression of a genotype.  Within this 
perspective it is the DNA that is immortal, and the genes that are the ‘time travellers’, 
while the body or soma is just the transport vehicle, which like a ’hired car’, is the 
temporary and dispensable host for their reproduction (Olshansky and Carnes 2001).  
 
 
Living in the parts of others 
 
It seems from the preceding discussion that the new genetics has the potential to destroy 
the usual image of the individual that, as Strathern (1992a: 93-94) has illuminated, is the 
trope performed by Euro-American, modernist ideas of kinship 
A child was endowed with material from both parents, literally formed from parts of 
them.  Yet it was regarded as equivalent to neither mother or father nor to the 
relation between them: rather it was a hybrid product in another sense, a genetically 
unique individual with a life of its own.  It was only a part of their life, despite the 
fact that its genetic material was formed wholly of theirs.  (pp 93-94) 
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As Melley (2002) discussing Haraway points out, this is partly because of how postmodern 
biology ‘privileges “biotic components” over the “traditional organism” (p.50). Instead of 
the ‘“single unit of masterly control”, what appears is a new kind of biological organism 
that is a “pastiche of multiple centres and peripheries”’(p.50-51).   
Melley goes on to show how, within this perspective, the apparent unravelling of the 
body-self as unique and individuated is specifically being done by ‘nature’ and the 
materiality of bodies ‘talking back’ in surprising ways, so that postmodern biology is 
forcing (humanist) social philosophy to re-theorize, particularly over notions of the agentic 
subject and the possessive individual.  
Martin (2010), for example, in her work on microchimerism and ‘cell trafficking’ 
between mother and foetus suggests that, in the history of microchimerism, biomedical 
scientists have had to struggle with an anomaly that undoes the metaphor of the 
bounded, individual body-self that forms the basis of immunology theory:  
In microchimeric bodies, cells that are coded as ‘not-self’ are living and reproducing 
happily in body-nations that are not their ‘own’. In this way, ontologies are shifting in 
light of the unexpected, as are appropriate metaphors of what the biological (and 
indeed social) ‘self’ is (p.25). 
What happens in immunology is that this surprise finding about ‘fetal’ cells living in the 
‘motherland’ (the body of the mother), is that it challenges the underpinning ideas of 
bodies, persons, and the immune system based on the self/not-self division: immunology 
relies on an understanding of bodily substance (cells) of persons as being a territory that is 
uniquely their own.  
What Martin proposes is that emergent understandings have the potential to shift 
the model of the fetus as foreign, to a model that recasts the maternal-fetal relationship in 
ways that blur the borders of bodies so that individuals reemerge not as discrete and 
unique, but as “constitutively intermingled” (p.26).   Following Douglas’s (2003) emphasis 
on the mirroring of the fleshy and the social body, Martin explores how the migratory 
character of globalization mirrors this intermingling to trouble the bordering that 
underpins the politics of nation-states.  
Critically, if the heterogeneous nature of a human being’s substance is unmasked as 
not entirely their own (or even as all human), it become harder to resettle them into the 
figure of the unique individual (see also Latimer 2009). Specifically, is this an ‘ontic politics’ 
(Verran, 2011) in which understandings from the new genetics might help in the process of 
unpicking the ideas that bind the body to the figure of the possessive, autonomous 
individual and the dominant power relations that flow from this binding?   
If so, questions also arise as to what then happens to persons if the figure of the 
individual is first deconstructed, and then reconfigured as the constituents of a phenotype. 
We must ask whether this partial phenotype is merely the material expression of an 
informational pattern, a genotype, made up of elements of information coming from a 
gene pool that is common to many, even non-human, others. 
 
 
 
 
 
 118 
Bodies in Dysmorphology 
 
As already discussed, questions arise over what kinds of body-persons get produced and 
reproduced in the relationship between geneticization processes, the clinic, the body, and 
cultural conceptions of personhood. In Chapter 8 I have suggested that Dysmorphology’s 
portraits conform in some ways to the science of visualising disease, but that there are 
differences of real significance in method and subject matter.  The various visual and 
textual representations of different persons, their relations, and their parts, are assembled 
and juxtaposed: the features of a syndrome-genotype are not locatable in one body, in 
one individual, but across different bodies.  The syndrome and its cause (an aberrant 
phenotype) are distributed.    
In dysmorphology, heterogeneity and complexity does not always settle into the 
figure of an individual as ‘representative’ of a diagnosis.  Rather it reflects and consitutues 
the shift in genetic science from one gene as responsible for one disease (the OGOD 
syndrome of media hype mentioned in chapter 1), to the complexity of a syndrome-
phenotype relation that may represent a genotype.  Thus, the portrait in dysmorphology, 
such as the one of Kabuki presented in Chapter 8 offers the figure of a syndrome-genotype 
relation. This does not reduce either to a single gene or to the figure of an individual and, 
instead, emerges in its partial connection between the assemblage and juxtaposition of 
materials deriving from different bodies. The portrait in the clinic makes a (temporary) 
space that cannot (yet) settle all the division and connections between all the parts across 
different bodies.  And it is this distribution and deferral that is the defining feature of some 
of dysmorphology’s key portraits. The complexity and heterogeneity of the defining 
features of a syndrome need to be distributed for them to stand as a phenotype; and so 
act as the visible expression of the syndrome-genotype relation.  As I have said at the end 
of Chapter 8 – this the clinic doing the ‘new’ as opposed to the ‘old’ genetics. 
 
Bringing back family 
 
In conducting the above analysis, I have suggested that dysmorphology’s portraits help make 
information flesh, and flesh into information. So much so that the clinic itself becomes the 
crossing, the bridge, the interdisciplinary site through which the word gets made flesh.  I want 
now to return to [the] dysmorphologists’ discourse to unpack how persons are [being] 
represented.   
In the interview with Professor Smart he describes a case that was referred to him.  As he 
talks to me he is showing me photographs and images on his laptop and recalling his meeting 
with a family: 
Professor Smart - . . this was a really surprising case to us.  This little girl here (shows me a 
photograph on his laptop of a small girl), we got the referral letter from a dermatologist 
saying ‘Please see this girl because mum says she’s got little patches, tiny patches of 
hairiness on her, and we don’t know what it is’.  We didn’t know what we’d got to expect.  
So here she is, (shows me another photo of the girl on his laptop) she comes into clinic.  
She is a normal little girl and these are the little patches of hair (points to the patches of 
hair on the little girl in the photo), first I’m thinking ‘she’s a very fussy mother’, you can 
hardly see them, do you see what I mean?  Then this is where you’ve got to know a bit of 
dysmorphology.  She has got a big head, okay, a significantly big head even though she is 
normal, but right on the top of the range [size of head for age], hairy patches on the skin, 
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big head, whatever.  There is something called Gorlin Syndrome.  Now Gorlin Syndrome is 
caused by a dominant gene, and it is a funny syndrome.  If you’ve got the gene you don’t 
get hairy patches funnily enough, but you do get a big head and you get a tendency 
towards what are called basal cell carcinomas – which are actually skin cancers – and you 
get other things with a tendency to dural cysts as well.  So actually we asked if 
anybodyhad any tooth/jaw problems – Dad said ‘yes, I had a jaw cyst, when I was a child’ 
– and he had a big head as well. 
JL - This is the dad? (Photo of a man’s head now displayed on the laptop). 
Professor Smart - The Dad.  So then you’ve got to know a bit more dysmorphology – 
because what else can you look for in the Dad?  Well they [people with Gorlin Syndrome] 
have – if you x-ray their chest, they can have cysts in the ribs, and if you’ve x-rayed their 
skull they can have some cysts in the skull – but they also have these little pits on their 
hands – I can show you a picture, I thought I had, there you are [shifts to a picture of a 
man’s hands] – if you look at that palm, you can see these little tiny pits – that’s dad’s 
palm, so those diagnosis – so all that from a child that has come in with a little patch of 
hair, and what we thought might have been a fussy mother, we diagnosed – because Dad 
didn’t know that he had this.  So he has got a tendency to skin cancer, which is worth 
knowing about, and I guess it is worth knowing about for the child as well. So if somebody 
writes it up - hairy patches as a possible feature of Gorlin Syndrome, then of course 
everybody will start to look and then somebody will write another paper saying that we 
know what to look for now.  
 
In this extract Professor Smart helps us to see how dysmorphology constructs its clinical pictures 
through assembling and juxtaposing parts of persons drawn from across the family – the little 
girl’s hairy patches and big head, and the father’s big head, history (jaw cyst) and the  
scans of his bones.  The clinical picture is a portrait of Gorlin Syndrome – which is known to be 
an effect of a dominant gene and is an inherited condition.   
In this rendering then for a moment the little girl and her father become a phenotypical 
expression of what is going on at the genetic level.  In the portrait in dysmorphology, such as the 
one of Gorlin being represented by Professor Smart, the figure of a phenotype-genotype 
relation emerges in the partial connection between the assemblage and juxtaposition of 
materials deriving from different bodies. In the clinic the portrait makes a (temporary) space 
that cannot (yet) settle, all the division and connections between all the parts across different 
bodies.  And it is this that is, as I have already suggested in the previous Chapter, the defining 
feature of some of dysmorphology’s portraits.  The complexity and heterogeneity of the 
defining features of a syndrome need to be distributed across the bodies of people who are 
biologically related for them to stand as a phenotype, and the visible expression of a phenotype-
genotype relation.   
However, what is implicit in these juxtapositions and dysmorphologists’ readings of them 
is that there is something about the substance of individuals’ bodies that is not unique to them, 
but is ‘held in common’ (Strathern 2006).  Making the portraits show that it is not simply a 
disease that is distributed across different biologically related bodies, but the patterns of 
unusual or pathological features that are distributed is of significance.  This is because it 
suggests that the patterns are the effects, or expression, of a common genetic substance, the 
genotype.   
In accomplishing this, dysmorphology’s portraits help make information flesh, and turn 
flesh into information: so that the clinic becomes the crossing, the crossdisciplinary site through 
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which the informational codes (genes) get made flesh.  And at these moments we can see a 
geneticization of the body, and the destruction of the figure of the individual.  Hence, 
dysmorphology process seems, on occasion, to efface those body-self relations that are 
performed by the figure of the individual and that underpin modernity.   
However, gene medicine would be nothing if it were only concerned with people as 
dehumanized – as biologically determined effects, made up of informational fragments coming 
from a gene pool; as if the body-person were merely a temporary home for DNA that will be 
passed on (‘reshuffled’, as Olshansky and Carnes put it) to take shape in other forms down the 
line.  Dysmorphology’s portraits instead perform the idea that it is the syndrome-genotype that 
is made of distributed fragments, not persons.  In making this move, the clinic affords a space 
for bringing back persons (rather than bodies) in ways that rescue them from the destructive 
effects of the genetic, both in terms of the symbolic violence of a totalizing geneticization of the 
body, and in terms of the literal and fleshy effects of a genetic aberration.   
Specifically, as Professor Smart makes his portrait of a potential new discovery in the 
natural history of Gorlin Syndrome, he switches between portraying the little girl and her father 
as phenotypes (as mere distributed parts that signify a syndrome and that express a genotype), 
and personifying the little girl and her father as persons.  This switch is implicit in his account: 
‘…because Dad didn’t know that he had this. So he (Dad) has got a tendency to skin cancer, 
which is worth knowing about, and I guess it is worth knowing about for the child as well’.  
In his deft account of the dad and the little girl’s need for knowledge about their bodies 
being at risk of cancer, Professor Smart invokes the figure of these two people as persons with 
needs of a very particular kind – as in need of knowledge.  This is an example of what Strathern 
(2009) illuminates as a very contemporary Euro-American rendering of enlightenment 
personhood: namely that a context (the science) that gives people better knowledge and 
understanding of their bodies will then help them make choices and exert their autonomous 
decision-making.  
By refiguring them as persons who need knowledge about their bodies, Professor 
Smart gives the man and his daughter presence as Euro-American persons.  In doing so he 
refigures the daughter and the father as human in this very special sense: as people with 
bodies and as people who can know about their bodies in order to act differently.  That is, 
he refigures them in terms of the Cartesian legend: as capable of thought elevated over 
the body.  For a moment, then, the little girl and her father are not just figured as the 
effects of their aberrant genes, as informational codes distributed across the bodies of 
different persons.  These kinds of moves put into play a need to know that happens over 
and over again; for example, we can hear it in the discussion of Poppy and her mother 
analysed in the previous chapter.     
In addition, as he gives his account, Professor Smart also refigures himself as not just 
concerned with knowledge about genes and syndromes, but as working in the institution 
of medicine that is heroic and humanist. This is because his discourse makes present how 
his work helps with the saving of lives and the prevention of unnecessary suffering - in this 
case cancer.  In order to make this switch in ground, to move from the importance of the 
medical gaze to the welfare of persons, he is also aligning his gaze with a humanist ethics.  
Professor Smart is giving an account that, as at the same time as it justifies the clinical 
science, it also refigures patients as more than clinical objects: it reattaches him, and the 
clinic, to the girl and her dad as both persons and as the ultimate source of knowledge.   
I want to emphasise that this switch in alignment – from genes, and their expression, 
to the frailty of flesh, and to the potential for suffering – moves its speaker between two 
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contrasting moral imperatives that both can be addressed by knowledge.  This is 
medicine’s ‘godtrick’.  Not just to perform an epistemology-ontology relation able to read 
the book of nature, in this case the genotype-phenotype that produces a syndrome. but 
also to be in alignment with a moral universe that conjoins knowledge (information) to the 
relief of suffering and the support of a world of choice and autonomy. 
 
 
 
Recovering the human 
 
Through such switches in alignment the human seemingly gets recovered. Together, clinicians 
and parents bring into play many different ways of giving each other presence as human beings. 
For example, as I have already indicated in Chapter 6, clinicians do not just have to pass as 
experts with a special gaze; in their interactions with the family and with the children, they must 
also personify themselves as fellow humans. In consequence, in order for their gaze to pass in 
both forms of membership, clinicians have to become motile.   
We heard some of this complexity in Dr Fox’s description of her practice discussed in 
Chapter 6,  but what also emerged through this description is how, in expressing her own need 
to appear as nice, Dr Fox is giving the baby and the parents presence as human beings. Thus at 
one moment in their alignment with the gene, clinicians perform a detachment, a gaze, that 
constructs portraits of children and their families that can be made to represent a syndrome, 
and in the suggestion of substance in common, a syndrome-genotype relation.  But at other 
moments dysmorphologists do more than this: they reinstate the family members as persons: 
as much more than the sum of their bodily parts.    
In the following extract the clinicians are discussing a child who has just left the clinic; 
David, an 8 year-old boy with seizures, motor problems, and severe delay.  Here, even in the 
case of a syndrome that is so very pervasive across systems, David is reclaimed as a person who 
is both an effect of and yet as more than his genotype: 
Dr Smith: Isn’t he lovely? 
Dr Jones: Fab, you just get glimpses . . 
Dr Smith:  . . of what he could be like. Do you think he’ll ever speak? 
Dr Jones: No. He can communicate though. He has a good understanding of how the world 
works and how to get people to do what he wants. 
Dr Smith: The majority of kids with polymicrogyria are very happy children. 
Dr Jones: So chromosomes 21 and 22. 
Dr Smith: Yes, I expect them to be normal but worth looking for. There’s one X linked gene 
where they have narrowed down where it could be, that will be interesting for him, he fits 
that mould. It would be useful for the daughter, and people like to know why. 
Dr Parry: If they don’t find it they are chasing rainbows. 
[Dr Smith goes on to explain David as a ‘classic Polymicrogyria’ – dribbling, gait, no speech, 
developmental problems, co-ordination problems, epilepsy]  [my emphasis] 
Sometimes, we are told, you ‘just get glimpses’ of what David ‘could be like’.  As a ‘normal’, 
lovely child living a happy family life.  He fits the mould of an X-linked genetic problem, and he is 
a classic case of polymicrogyria. Yet David, after all, can transcend his bodiedness, because he is 
refigured for a moment as having consciousness, he’ll never speak but:  ‘He can communicate 
though. He has a good understanding of how the world works and how to get people to do what 
he wants.’  
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While a child may be ‘effaced’ (Bauman, 1990) by the genetic, the actors responsible for 
them – the clinicians and the parents - are not effacing their humanity even as they also 
constitute their abnormality.  It is the syndrome-genotype that effaces the face of a child.  Here 
I am thinking of how the child’s as ‘the Other as a face, that is, as an authority without force' 
(Bauman 1989, p. 214) could be erased.  In addition their ‘face’ as the most delicate of effects of 
interaction (Black, 2011; Goffman, 1999, 2005) could also be obliterated, to figure them as less 
than human.  However, while dysmorphologists read the faces of children as objects and 
expressions of a syndrome, through the moves that we have seen in this chapter they reinstate 
the child, erasing their Otherness, to refold them in the category of the human, and as in need 
of protection and love.   This means that at the same time as clinicians draw upon a notion that 
the child’s condition is biologically determined, rather than socially or culturally conditioned, 
they hold to an idea that there is an essence to persons: that people have a real nature, and 
that each child is unique and essentially human. This occurs, despite abnormalities of 
appearances, despite appearances on the surface and ‘essences’ thought to exist in the depths 
of the body.   
In these ways the integral, discrete body is what helps to create the figure of the 
individual. Critically though, in order to be seen as truly human and so transcend their 
bodiedness - the individual must also be able to ‘disembody’.  It is in this last respect, 
distinguished by the observation of his consciousness, that David is reaffirmed as human, as 
having face, and as much more than the sum of his bodily parts, common or not.   
 
The double figure 
 
The current chapter has examined not only when geneticization of the body is in play in 
the practices of the clinic, but also when it is not.  The focus has been on how the clinic 
(and the production and reproduction of body-persons enacted through clinical practices) 
acts as one site in which cultural conceptions of what it is to be human are instituted in a 
post-genomic era.  As has been seen, the clinic switches alignment from the gene to the 
family, to keep other ways of thinking about the human, and persons, in play.  
The ‘defining feature’ of humanist thought, to draw on Jordonova’s (2000) 
productively ambiguous phrase about portraits, is the double figure of an individual 
consciousness incarnated within its own distinctive and recognizable corporeality. At one 
moment a person is deeply connected to enlightenment ideas of their human nature being 
individuated, one that involves the possibility of agency, responsibility, autonomy, 
subjectivity and choice (Strathern 1988, 1991, 1992a, 2006). At other moments it is their 
corporeality that makes them distinctive and can set them apart.  
The relation between the integral, contained, corporeal body and that of the 
autonomous individual helps perform the figure of the human. This figure of the human is 
the cultural icon that underpins most contemporary forms of social organization in the 
West, including sociological theory itself (Skeggs 2004, 2011; Strathern 2006). But 
alongside this idea of the individuated body-self, runs the paradoxical and parallel seam of 
Western thought that detaches rationality from the body:  the individual, at moments of 
choice and autonomous decision-making, has to be rational. They must have knowledge 
from a singular, undivided perspective, a perspective that stands outside the plane of 
personal (that is bodily) action (Strathern 1992a, Latimer 2007a).   
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Against notions of the integral, contained body, individuals to be fully human also 
have to demonstrate a capacity for detachment.  To attain the singular perspective of 
rationality, manxix must be able to disembody:  
Many features of contemporary knowledges – knowledges based on the 
presumption of a singular reality, pre-existent representational categories, and an 
unambiguous terminology able to be produced and utilized by a singular, rational, 
and unified knowing subject who is unhampered by personal “concerns” – can be 
linked to man’s disembodiment, his detachment from his manliness in producing 
knowledge or truth (Grosz 1993: 205).  
Paradoxically, it is the conjoined figure of the person as integral body and a unique 
discrete consciousness that helps to portray the individual as human. To be fully human, 
and transcend their bodiedness, the individual must be able to detach rather than simply 
‘disembody’ as many have read Descartes (Foucault 1979). Yes, it is a capacity to 
transcend the body that distinguishes humanity from its animality, but, in the Western 
tradition, it is nonetheless the detachment of consciousness that remains the defining 
feature of human exceptionalism and potencyxx.   
The human, once distinguished by this detachment of consciousness, is thus able to 
settle into a complex whole. Curiously it is not the envelope of the body, its form, that can 
be caught in paint or in a photograph, so much as it is a detachment of consciousness from 
bodily experiences that defines the individual. Yes, representations of the corporeal body 
must take up most of the painting, photograph or sculpture, but it is the capture of the 
character (the eyes, stance and gesture) that enlivens the flesh and makes these more 
than a representation of a corpse. To be seen as human, persons must exhibit 
characteristics, such as willpower, desire, vulnerability, or moral strength.  
At moments clinicians bring into play grounds that displace bodily biology as that 
which both determines personhood, and reaffirms a child’s humanity, as well as their 
ownxxi. Put simply, clinicians circulate that crucial move in humanist thought: the moment 
when the figure of the individual is performed as transcending their bodiedness.  In other 
words, in the clinic grounds are made available through which people such as David can be 
figured as human, because they are much more than the sum of their bodily parts.  At 
other times, however much they protect the humanity of the present child, clinicians will 
not hesitate to agree that reproducing such a child would be better avoided. That is why 
the doctor mentions that David’s sister needs to know more about his diagnosis, in case it 
has implications for her own reproductive future.    
 
 
Reaffirming medicine’s humanism 
 
As detailed in Chapter 8, the genetic clinic constructs clinical pictures as new forms of 
portraiture: assemblages in which multiple and heterogeneous images of different 
people’s bodies and parts of their bodies are juxtaposed.  These new forms of portriature 
reflect and help constitute the new genetics.  However, rather than these portraits making 
explicit the distributed and hybrid nature of personhood explicit, shifts in ground mean 
that what is being portrayed is the figure of a syndrome, and the possibility of defining the 
features of a syndrome-genotype relation.  Within the perspective provided by the 
alignment of the clinic and the new genetics, the bodies of children and their biological 
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relations - ever more anatomised - are fragmented into objects, and made to represent a 
syndrome, or even, where possible, a genotype.  
 Geneticization of the body at these moments thus risks not so much deconstructing 
the human as destroying this central trope of society – thus setting back the more 
sociologically acceptable ways of deconstructing the C18th notions of the individual we 
have inherited.  Yet, at the same time, the clinic still keeps in play an idea that people - like 
the boy David but unlike their bodies - are much more than the sum of their parts. 
Specifically, all the parts that make up the body of the person can still be transcended at 
moments to refigure the human: the complex individual of humanist thought.   
This is important because, as Haraway (2007) reminds us, the humanist production 
of the individual includes notions of human rights that are critical to social justice, which 
can help rescue those categories of persons at risk of social exclusion, marginalisation, and 
violence.  As it happens, the double figure of the human brought into play within the clinic 
protects against individuals like David being constituted as non-human enough to become 
what Haraway describes as ‘killable’xxii.  Portraiture thus affords the clinic more than its 
ability to detect the origins of the form of bodies and their parts – and all their 
concomitant troubles - from their appearance: it also helps to remind us that appearances 
are, after all, deceiving. As Marx notes, ‘If the essence and appearance of things directly 
coincided, all science would be superfluous.’ (Capital, 3: 797.) 
Alongside its on-going engagement with the posthuman, the clinic reinvigorates 
itself simultaneously as a protagonist of the human. It is this motility, the capacity of 
clinicians to switch grounds, which helps medicine reinvigorate its place as what Foucault 
(2003a) described as the queen of the human sciences rather than the life sciences. Even 
in genetic science’s alignment with the new genetics, medical advances in this field offer 
different ways to see the body. In doing so, medicine revives the notion that persons are 
much more than simply determined by their biology.  
This accepted, the figure of the human being produced and reproduced in the clinic 
remains a vision of the individual agentic self, distinctive by a form of consciousness that 
can transcend its bodiedness and so detach itself. In other words, this is not a relational 
kind of personhood, a vision of ‘dividual’ persons as the creations of the relations that 
make them up ((b drawing on Strathern).  Rather, the clinic in dysmorphology still gives 
presence to the compound figure of the individual of humanist thought, such as that 
portrayed by Rodin in his sculpture The Thinker.  
 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have explored the interaction of genetic science, the clinic, and Euro-
American conceptions of personhood, and I have discussed how there is debate in the 
social sciences about the way the new genetics is changing ideas of what it is to be human. 
This is particularly apparent in the way commentators predict that ‘geneticization’ rewrites 
the body. 
Inasmuch as it lead towards a revolution in our ways of conceiving persons, this 
rewriting of the body is said to hold possibilities for the decoupling of the fundamental 
principles of humanism and the polarity of individual-population that underpins the 
ordering of social relations.  Specifically, there are notions abroad that the new genetics 
undermines the very ideas that underpin modernity: such as the figure of the integrated 
discrete individual body/self.  
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I have held these various ideas against the practices of genetic medicine.  Against a 
straightforward geneticization of the body, including the undermining of the figure of the 
individual, I have shown how medicine in the clinic does not necessarily exclude but rather 
helps maintain the availability of some crucial and basic tenets of enlightenment 
humanism. Surprisingly, perhaps, the alignment of the new genetics and the clinic may 
well be extending possibilities for performances of the human. 
Specifically, switches in alignment afford the clinic moments for the performance of 
persons as capable of transcending their bodies, despite their genes.  It is not just that the 
various parts get reconciled into a whole – the figure of the individual as the basis of 
humanist thought and contemporary forms of governing.  Rather, at moments, the clinic 
reasserts how all the parts that make up the body of the person can still be transcended, in 
order to refigure the Cartesian mind-body relation.  It is this switch in ground that helps 
medicine reinstate its position as the guardian of the complex individual of humanist 
thought that underpins notions of welfare, respect, and justice.   
What I want to emphasise, for the purposes of the present chapter, is that at the 
very moment that children such as David are reaffirmed and given shelter in the fold of the 
human, their difference is also being denied. In doing this, the doctors may be understood 
as reaffirming themselves as more complex humans – as able one moment to ‘attach’ to 
others and in another to ‘detach’ from them in order to read the book of nature.  As such, 
the clinic becomes a site that switches between the objectivity of scientific gaze and a kind 
of banal phenomenology of the subject, which denies particular forms of life and 
relationality, and particular ways of being and becoming. 
In summary, the analysis I have presented so far does more than problematise 
existing conceptions about how medicine is being geneticized.  It also helps us to see how 
medicine switches its extensions and attachments: at one moment it performs the gaze as 
a pure, detached, clinical moment, as processes through which people and their parts are 
objectified; in the next it reattaches to the complex individuals of humanist thought.  In 
making these switches, medicine not only reinvigorates itself as the protagonist of the 
human but, as is discussed in the next two chapters, extends its colonisation of the family 
and what Ginsburg and Rapp (1991) call the ‘politics of reproduction’.  
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Chapter 10 
 
‘The Family’ & Medicine 
 
Whether primacy is given to social ties or biological ones, it seems that the late 
twentieth century affords new possibilities for people who wish to be certain about 
how and why they are related.  This is true of both legal redress (what the courts will 
countenance) and of technological intervention in the reproductive process.  As 
possibilities, these instruments and techniques exist in a cultural environment of 
empowerment or enablement.  (Strathern 1996: xx) 
 
Choice has become the privileged vantage from which to measure all action. 
(Strathern, 1992c:36) 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In previous chapters I have shown how dysmorphology combines classical approaches to 
medical diagnosis with methods of genetic profiling (including molecular tests) in order to 
differentiate the normal from the abnormal, and the genetic from the non-genetic.  In this 
chapter, I review the relationship of medicine and the family against a background of 
discourses of child development.  
An entangling of family in discourses of health and consumption has instituted 
parenting as a specific site of identity-work. So much so that ‘parenting’ emerges as being 
a qualitatively different experience from being either a mother or father. I illustrate how 
the bodies of children have become the visible manifestation and measure of ‘good’ 
parenting within these discourses, both in terms of children looking ‘good’ (in a double 
sense - as of aesthetic and moral value),  and looking healthy.  My aim is to show how 
these aspects of good parenting are prefigured by a consumer culture with an emphasis on 
‘lifestyle choice’.   
Contrastingly, at the same time as the alignment of the clinic with the family 
intensifies the responsibalization of parents as reproducing the future of healthy progeny, 
it also helps to institute parents as more than agents providing the right kind of 
environment for their child. Significantly, it treats them as biological beings whose 
substance may be problematic, particularly in the context of reproduction.   
In what follows, therefore, I explore how the dysmorphology clinic specifically stands 
at the intersection of genetic techno-science, the family, and persons. Critically, I argue 
that this intersection sets up an intimate involvement with the family that helps produce 
new forms of identity for parents on the one hand, including figuring people (parents, 
children, and siblings) as ‘future parents’, and enables dysmorphology to hold its special 
place in genetic science on the other.   
 
 
The Family and Public Health 
 
It is well rehearsed that the clinic has been critical to the formation of the family as a social 
institution.  For example, Foucault (2003b) discusses how the family became instituted as 
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a site of responsibility for the health of children as a consequence of the alliance between 
Christian discourses of the flesh and sexual psychopathologising in the 19th century. More 
specifically, he argued that medicine somatisized masturbation in ways that helped 
legitimate ‘a new organisation, a new physics, of family space’ (p.245). As well as opening 
up parent-child relationships to medical rationality and discipline, a part of the contract 
was that the family give the child up to the state for wider aspects of his or her education. 
The duties of this new responsibility included intense surveillance over who had 
contact with the child’s body and vigilance over the child’s own relationship to its body, 
particularly while asleep. Only parents should be involved in the care of the child, no one 
else should have access to their body (servants, for example, should be excluded).  And 
parents should be most watchful to prevent the child from becoming a masturbator, 
because masturbation was being considered as the root of most illnesses. Foucault 
suggests this combination of discourses helped deconstruct the extended family and 
constitute the cellular family as the key site that takes responsibility for the body and life 
of the child.  
 Surveillance over health and development also became instituted as technology 
through child health checks and clinics; especially after the Second World War, when 
primary health policy extended the medical gaze to the body of the growing child. In the 
UK this policy of surveillance was explicit and was instituted as a legal requirement. Within 
these child health screening and surveillance programs, the bodies and behaviour of 
babies and children were compared with developmental norms. These were derived from 
the alignment of paediatric medicine and developmental psychology with population 
based statistics.  
 As a site of biopolitics, discursive formation of the family focused on the body of the 
child and this gave legitimation for the family and even the home to be entered and 
surveyed. This was the task of primary health care professionals, such as health visitors 
(Bloor and MacIntosh, 1990) who were charged with monitoring and measuring children’s 
bodies and behaviour and holding these against norms of healthy growth and 
development (Purkis, 2002, 2003). The effect was to further intensify the cellular nature of 
the family, as well as raising its significance as a site of care for children’s’ health. 
Alongside the intensification of the family as a cellular social unit and the institution 
of parenting as a site of children’s health promotion, there is also the management of risk. 
For example, the US Environnment Agency (undated) directs parents over how they can 
protect their children’s health, such as helping children to ‘breathe easier’: 
 Don't smoke and don't let others smoke in your home or car. 
 Keep your home as clean as possible. Dust, mold, certain household pests, 
second hand smoke, and pet dander can trigger asthma attacks and allergies. 
 Limit outdoor activity on ozone alert days when air pollution is especially 
harmful. 
 Walk, use bicycles, join or form carpools, and take public transportation. 
 Limit motor vehicle idling. 
 Avoid open burning.  
 
  Parents’ concerns over the progress of their child are inevitably raised intensified 
through these discourses and programmes. So much so that parents’ raised awareness can 
in turn be used to legitimate developmental surveillance as a clinical strategy, both in the 
UK, Europe and the US. However, it is not just child development and protection that 
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becomes pathologized by these discursive practices; aberrations in development and 
growth are being tied to parental practices. So too diet and exercise, as well as methods of 
discipline, are read through observation and measurement of the child’s body and 
behaviour. These measures inevitably become the cipher of good parenting, or evidence of 
abuse and neglect.   
   
 
Parenting the healthy child 
 
As Armstrong (1995) notes, child surveillance renders both the physical and psychological 
growth of the child as inherently problematic.  State surveillance of children is thought to 
have been much reduced in the UK over the past 20 years, with Bellam and Vijeratnam 
(2012) arguing there has been a shift from a screening to a health promotion discourse. 
This has meant greater emphasis on ‘health education’ and the institution of parents as 
having added responsibility for the identification of problems in their own children.   
 These discourses have helped to constitute the very notion of ‘parenting’ as taking 
proper responsibility for the health of the child in terms of stimulation, environment, diet, 
and discipline. For example, Derbyshire (2012) examined research on the growth of 
children's brains that supposedly evidenced the consequences of not providing an 
enriched early learning environment in the first three years of life.  Within this positioning, 
parenting is a part of the actor-network ‘public health’, in which the child is not only 
configured as at risk and in need of protection, but as also needing stimulation and 
enhancement in their environment.   
 The effect is disciplining, in that a view of parents as responsible for the health and 
development of children is reinforced. Consequently, parents are also being made 
accountable for their children’s health and development in ways that go far beyond the 
mere protection of them from health hazards. Accountability for the normal, or even 
enhanced growth and devlopment of children is thus shifted onto parents: so that it is 
parents who are directly responsible for their child’s development as well as their health 
(Lee, 2007).  
 The medicalization of childhood and the family is thus producing a ‘parenting 
culture’ as a modern, political invention. This is something that is itself instituted. As 
Fairclough and Lee (2010) note, parenting is not only a social practice with profound 
existential as well as fiscal consequences, but has become an increasingly politicised site in 
which ‘parenting' has ‘acquired a particular place in contemporary society, in which the 
burden of managing risks is increasingly devolved onto individuals and families.’ Mothers 
and fathers are continuously incited to be parents of a particularly moral kind, and  in ways 
that take no account of social inequalities in people’s means and capacities to be able to 
fulfil these kinds of moral elicitations (Skeggs 2010).  
 Most significantly for my argument, all this pressure to connect parenting practices 
with the physical development of the child (e.g. Kuhla 2008) suggests that a realignment of 
the family and medicine might be taking place. For example, in pointing out that a core 
theme of contemporary UK social policy is based on the view that science leaves us with 
no uncertainty that ‘poor parenting’ is the main cause of social problems, Lee (2012) 
draws attention to the primacy being placed on the significance of ‘nurture’ and a 
commitment to recasting the relation between ‘the family’, ‘parents’ and the State as the 
key to a better society.  That this view implies an intensification of medical research and 
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technology – including perhaps being able to quantify the negative impact of neglect on 
the developing brain mentioned above – is something that has to be squared with the fact 
that provision of the ‘right’ kind of environment for a child to thrive is increasingly cast in 
terms of matters of consumer choice and the management of risk. I turn to this topic next.   
 
 
Looking good, lifestyle and choice 
 
The family is also being reinvented as a site of lifestyle, consumption, and choice (Beck-
Gershwein, 2002; Smart, 2004). The bodies and minds of children can be understood to be 
part of the on-going project in which consumer choice can be displayed and demonstrated 
to be effective. This is presumably more effective than the so-called ‘Nanny State’ in 
matters of managing children’s health development.  
 In this scenario parents are not only to choose the best education for their child, but 
there is actually a global industry aimed at inciting parents to buy them a healthy lifestyle:  
food, clothes, gadgets, toys, and so forth. There is an ever increasing discourse over which 
kind of activity, gadget, toy, or food will or will not stimulate a child’s development, help 
promote their health, and/or minimise their risk of harm.   
 At the same time there is growing emphasis on children’s appearance: not just in 
terms of health, happiness but also in terms of looks and fashion. In contemporary life 
bodily aesthetics is connected to health through consumption: to look good is to look 
healthy (Featherstone 2001).  Here parenting, and parent choice, is therefore also 
entangled in the fold of preoccupations with relations between health and bodily 
aesthetics.  
 Consequently, inasmuch as children looking good help parents to look good as 
parents, it is parents who are under surveillance - notably by other parents, as well as by 
government bodies. In addition for the children to be looking good means that they are 
also read as healthy and good.  Yet things are never this simple.  
 It is not just that children’s bodies can be monitored as a material semiotics that 
assists in the assessment of parenting. The identities of people, not just as parents but also 
as ‘persons’ and ‘citizens’, is entangled in how their children ‘appear’. How their children 
look and behave, how healthy and happy they are, how well adjusted, how successful - all 
these markers conjoin as emblems of good parenting, and of their being a ‘good’ (morally, 
fashionably) person and member. Other researchers have noted some of this relationality 
between parental identities and how a child looks and behaves in the idea of courtesy 
stigma (Birenbaum, 1992; Gray, 2002; Green, 2009; Goffman, 1963; Thomas, 2010). 
 For children to look good and healthy is also seen to be desirable because the idea of 
their ‘looking good’ helps display the parents’ ‘goodness’. What counts as goodness 
depends of course upon context, but people do feel open to being judged through how 
their children appear and particularly so in terms of how they look and behave. Not 
looking good, in both senses of the word, also throws the identity of the child into 
question. And of course children themselves, in assessing what they see others getting, 
also carry out much of this identity work on parents. 
 In summary of this section I am suggesting that children act as parents’ ‘extensions’ 
in making their performances of identity and personhood (see also Hacking 1986).  What I 
want to underline, though, is how parenting remains a moral, as well as an aesthetic, affair 
for parents. In reinforcing parents’ positioning as responsible and accountable for the 
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health of their child, keeping the children ‘looking good’ has today become a priority in 
parental identity work. I now go on to press how these associations connecting the family 
and health make up a complex site of identity work, one in which parenting remains 
enframed by a discourse of children’s health, but where their performance of morality is 
increasingly entwined with consumption and choice.  
 
 
Family and the medicalization of selection 
 
So far it has been argued that the family is seen as the key site for the socialization of 
children as well as for the management of their health and development. Next, I discuss 
the degree to which family, in the context of a proliferation of genetic technologies, is also 
being installed as a site of selection. Rao (1996), for instance, suggests reproductive 
technologies ‘do not simply transform the ways in which we create families. More 
fundamentally, they transform our very understanding of the term “family”’ (p.2).  In 
exploring how the new genetic technologies in my study affect understandings of family, I 
focus on families reproducing children deemed to be ‘genetically’ unhealthy or disabled.   I 
should emphasise that in the clinic even a child (or their sibling) can, for a moment, be 
refigured as what I want to call a ‘future parent’, to legitmate the need to know more 
about their genetic makeup.    
Parenting, in the context of reproduction, cannot be regarded as simply an extension 
of the actor-networks of public health promotion or reduced to the provision by families of 
a healthy lifestyle for their children. Rather there is the vexed question of new eugenic 
possibilities. Here, diversity of choice is expected to iron out cultural dominance in 
selection (Rothman 2004). This is because notions of desirability and perfection in children 
are themselves supposedly diverse (Condit 1999). Bauman (2003), in particular, links this 
last emphasis to the new consumerism - as the New Consumers, people have what he 
refers to as a ‘bewitching prospect’, a world of reproductive and genetic techno-science 
that will give them: 
 
 [T]he chance to (and I quote Sigusch again) “choose a child from a catalogue of 
attractive donors in much the same way as they [contemporary consumers] are 
accustomed to ordering from mail-order houses or through fashion journals” – and 
to acquire that child of one’s own choice at the time of one’s own choice.  It would 
be contrary to the nature of a seasoned consumer not to wish to turn that corner.’ 
(p.40)   
 
For this and other reasons, there is general disquiet among social philosophers over the 
wider and unintended effects of geneticization, particularly with regard to the emphasis 
on autonomy and choice (Egorova et al 2007).  For example, there are fears that discourse 
in genetic debate and policy over the use of genetic and reproductive technology 
promotes individualism in ways that risk marginalising communitarian views (e.g. 
Habermas 2003, Parker 2000). Put bluntly, there are fears that the ways in which the new 
reproductive and genetic technologies are being made available will mean that some 
people will be able to ‘go shopping’ for babies (cf Condit 1999, Human Genetics 
Commission 2004).  What people will look for in children, as objects of consumer choice, 
are cultural notions of perfection (Condit 1999) or ‘value for money’ (Bauman 2003).   
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 Contrastingly, Bauman goes on to observe that children are demanding in ways that 
also jar with ‘value for money’ as the basic ethic of liquid modernity. He suggests this is 
because children are dependent and constitute the kind of obligation ‘that goes against 
the grain of liquid modern life politics and which most people . . zealously avoid in other 
manifestations of their lives’ (p41).  For Bauman, then, offspring represent the stumbling 
blocks to liquid relations and to the rendering of children as mere objects of consumer 
choice.  Children are the residual friction to too much emphasis on the ease of lifestyle, as 
matters of autonomy and freedom of choice.  This, for Bauman, will save reproduction 
from the life politics of liquid modernity: children put a stop on what Bauman calls ‘liquid 
love’. 
However, in the light of issues discussed earlier in this chapter, Bauman’s view does 
not take into account the jointing of morality and choice in relation to children’s health.  
Specifically, ‘soft’ eugenics can be sanctioned as a process of selection in the reproduction 
of children with genetic problems. Such sanctioning, as the analysis in previous chapters 
indicates, takes place in the context of understanding what appears to be rational, 
reasonable, and moral given a particular family’s specific circumstances.   
Within this context there is certainly greater consensus over the need for selection 
as a matter of parental choice. However, as Stewart (2004) amongst others has shown, the 
very notion of choice is performed, not in relation to matters of ‘consumer’ choice and 
individual preference, but as an aspect of responsible parenting in promoting of healthy 
children: 
DNA-based tests are now available for many rare genetic diseases caused by lesions 
in single genes, and couples who know they are at risk of having a child with one of 
these diseases can be offered an antenatal test to see if the foetus is affected. Sadly, 
no genetic disease can as yet be cured in the unborn baby - so the couple's only 
options if the test is positive are to terminate the pregnancy or to prepare for the 
birth of an affected child.  The options for families faced with this situation were 
widened when the technique of preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) was 
developed in 1990. PGD involves producing embryos by ‘in vitro’ fertilisation using 
the couple's eggs and sperm, then removing a single cell from each embryo and 
testing its genetic material to see if the embryo is affected by the disease for which 
the family is at risk. Only unaffected embryos are used to establish a pregnancy. 
PGD, although it carries all the risks and stresses of IVF, nevertheless enables the 
couple to avoid the traumatic decision of whether to terminate an affected 
pregnancy. Previous surveys have shown that most people in the general public 
accept these uses of genetics to enable reproductive choice, provided the decision is 
made freely and without coercion by the couple concerned. (Stewart 2004). 
As can be seen from this citation, there is general acceptance that those facing the 
reproduction of children with genetic problems should be given a choice whether to 
terminate or not, provided they choose in an environment free of coercion.  So wherever 
the characteristics of children are medicalized and seen as pathological – for example, 
where a foetus or an embryo is judged to be affected by a gene disorder – parental choice 
over whether to dispose of some embryos rather than others is sanctioned.  
The consequence of all this emphasis on choice is that family becomes the site of 
selection, with parents being made accountable for their choices over the reproduction of 
potentially ‘unhealthy’ or ‘disabled’ children.  This discourse over selection thus plays into 
and out of a very particular relationship between the family and medicine that relies on 
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the medicalization of relations between parents and their children.  So how does the 
relationship between parents and their children become medicalized in the context of 
genetic medicine?  As I show next, this process appears to rely heavily on the interaction 
of the clinic and the family. 
 
Parenting and Genetics 
 
As I have discussed, the family has long been a social location instituted as a node in the 
actor-networks of public health, a site where mothers and fathers are instituted as doing 
parenting, and who can choose a lifestyle for their children to minimize risks and dangers 
as well as help promote their health and development.  Alongside this positioning of 
family, parental identity work is entangled in how their choices reflect well on them.  If 
these are the conditions of possibility, the historical complexity that prefigures interaction 
in the dysmorphology clinic, what do the various mothers and fathers become in the 
context of the genetic clinic? 
 We have already seen examples of the extent to which the dysmorphology clinic 
enters the family.  Dysmorphology is grounded in the family as a social entity, beginning 
with early visits by specialist nurses (like Susan in Chapter 6) who survey the parental 
home and elicit information about the extended family as made up of both biological and 
social beings. We also saw how parents are involved in the construction of the family tree 
during this home visit, in ways that associate biological family and reproduction with the 
development and health of children, including how they look and conduct themselves.  
The information gealned at the home visit is then carried back to the clinic.  But the home 
visit can also be understood to do more thn this – it paves the way to the family’s  attching 
themselves to the clinic.  In addition we saw how clinicians such as Professor Fox have to 
‘pass’ with the family, as both expert and fellow human being, in order to further attach to 
the family as their extensions – their eyes and ears.  But there is further complexity here.   
 At some moments, the family tree, in configuring the relationship between family, 
reproduction and the health and development of children, simply confounds the health 
promotion discourse with its emphasis on lifestyle choice.  Specifically, in the genetics 
clinic, parents are not particularly figured as consumers who can simply choose a lifestyle 
to promote the health of their children.  Rather, they are figured more as biological beings, 
whose bodies connect to other bodies as complex sites of reproduction.  Here for 
example, is Kevin’s father: 
Father: Just thinking of anything else really about why, like I said, I have got such a 
big family and cousins you know, why didn’t it happen to somebody else in the 
family, why me. You do think that. Me myself now, I’ve got four brothers and they 
have got big families, and why on my side? And the other thing is we’ve always been 
the fittest . . before Kevin was born we had Tim obviously, we were always the fit 
family because we’re always doing things, running, going on holidays abroad, 
everything sporty and then it happens to you, so you think ‘why me’? You know, it 
shouldn’t happen to people like me because we’ve always had a lifestyle sort of 
busy and always doing things, no ‘it’s not going to happen to us’, but it does 
happen, happens to everybody, no matter how fit you think you are or you know, 
it happens to you (my emphasis). 
In Kevin’s father’s account we can hear that he knows what every parent knows: that he is 
himself under surveillance even while he is surveying others, in this case his brothers as 
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parents.  But we also hear more than this: the questioning, the disappointment, and the 
bafflement.  Kevin’s father cannot understand why him? He was the very one amongst his 
brothers who most chose ways to live that would produce a ‘fit’ family.  As far as he is 
concerned, he is the one who has been active in promoting a healthy lifestyle for his 
family. The logic is that, as a consequence of his choices, they should all be healthy.  It also 
moves him to reassert his belonging – he is not just one of two parents, managing the 
lifestyle of his cellular family, he is one of many brothers, his children have cousins, and so 
on and so forth.    
 Under the conditions of possibility already discussed, Kevin’s father made the right 
lifestyle choices; he has been doing ‘good parent’.  As I noted earlier, in the usual relations 
between medicine and the family, the health and conduct of children’s bodies are the 
material semiotics through which parents are judged.  Under the usual deal through which 
parental identity is accomplished, he should have had healthy children: his children should 
look good on him. But he hasn’t. Instead, he has got Kevin. His bewilderment expresses 
something else – that he feels that this is something out of his control.  
 Specifically, the clinic in dysmorphology makes people like Kevin’s father very 
vulnerable because it takes some of the ground from under his feet as an agent: he is 
confronted by the view that making (good) lifestyle choices is not enough to make good 
children.  Within his account we can hear how parents like him are exercised by both 
surveillance and a notion that they should be able to do and be good parents through the 
lifestyle choices they make. Yet we also hear that there is something about a genetic 
problem with a child that seems to confound autonomy and the power of choice. While 
the clinic in dysmorphology helps reinstitute parents as family members, it reminds them 
they are procreators, people who make families.    
 
 
Family matters in dysmorphology 
 
As we have seen, geneticists’ diagnostic practices, or categorical work, in dysmorphology 
constitute ‘family’ as a set of partially interconnected relations, one that may express a 
phenotype.  The analysis earlier in the book noted how the child is a proband and 
documented how the referral of such a child to the genetic clinic is just the beginning of a 
process of investigating the family and building a family tree. The child thus acts for the 
clinic as a point of access to these family relations.  So, as I have illustrated in previous 
chapters, the clinic grooms these relations in order to make visible what the laboratory 
cannot yet reveal:  how to differentiate between occasions when some syndromes are the 
expression of a phenotype-genotype relation and times when they are not.   
In this perspective of dysmorphology, family is far from being performed as the 
nuclear family of contemporary Euro-American social organization.  Nor is it just the 
extended family constituted through a proliferation of social relations. Rather, family in 
the dysmorphology clinic is extended along the lines of biological relatedness, up, across 
and down the generations. While biological family members may or may not have been 
socially close previously (Strathern 1992c), the family tree and other aspects of diagnostic 
practice in dysmorphology open up the possibility that those who were socially ‘far’ 
become ‘near’ because they display parts in common. MacLaughlin and Clavering (2011) 
refer to this as the ‘rekinning’ that goes on in paediatric genetic clinical practice. 
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As such the family in the clinic is fabricated from the stuff of nature, but a nature 
that is organized through social and cultural associations – by marriage and so forth – not 
just by biology.  It is these ideas that are made manifest in the image of a family tree or 
medical pedigree.  So this way of enacting family brings the extended nature of family back 
into view.   
Parents are re-instituted as mothers and fathers, bothers and sisters, daughters and 
sons. No longer just parents, they are reinstalled as procreators, as people who inherit the 
stuff of life from previous generations and pass this on when they make children, including 
those parts that are creating problems: 
 
Sally’s Mother: But you blame yourself, you know you blame yourselves, like 
we had done it, it’s our fault she got this because it’s genetic, that’s what 
you’ve got to remember, it’s genetic, it’s come from the family, that’s how I 
connected . . genetic is followed down the family, we were trying to think 
who had anything wrong with them in the past. [Sally’s was diagnosed with 
Cri du chat syndrome, a new genetic mutation, soon after birth] 
 
But clinical processes in dysmorphology do more than face families with the possibility of 
defective genes. As I showed in Chapter 8, it makes some families stand for a syndrome-
genotype-phenotype relation.    
Poppy and her mother provisionally have become a portrait. A portrait not of a 
mother and child per se, but instead a portrait of the genotype that produces a 
phenotype, Kabuki syndrome.  What such a portrait is suggesting is that somehow or 
another Kabuki is a family matter, in two senses of matter.  The family has both something 
the matter with it, and the matter is to do with the substance the family is made up from: 
the matter that forms the basis of their living form.   
And here is the rub: such portraits emphasise that this substance is as much socially 
constituted as it is genetically composed. This is because these portraits record how family 
is made through social as well as biological associations.  
Thus, in contrast to discourses of child health promotion, the bodies and conduct of 
living children – melded together with their distribution of signs across the family - are 
neither being scrutinised in dysmorphology to assess the parent’s competence as parents, 
nor being judged over their capacity to choose a lifestyle and nurture a child into health 
and good citizenship.   
In the genetic clinic the relationship between parenting, lifestyle choice, and nurture 
is not viewed as greatly relevant. Even the diagnosis of the living child’s troubles is only a 
small part of the story. In their place, as we hear in Sally’s mother’s and Kevin’s father’s 
accounts and as we have seen in how dysmorphologists work in previous chapters, there is 
an entry into the biological life of the extended family that reinforces a relation between 
the flow of matter up and down the family line on the one hand, and the health, shape, 
and form of a child on the other.  
In the dysmorphology clinic parents become engaged in a discourse that connects 
kinship, and biological associations to the troubles their children display.  As I have already 
evidenced, clinical surveillance of children’s bodies is very much a part of both clinical and 
parental work – children’s bodies are scrutinised as well as measured against particular 
statistic-based norms of child development and growth. However, the surveillance, as we 
have seen, also extends to other family members. Children’s troubles are refigured less as 
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the effects of lifestyle choice and nurture, and more as the effects of Nature - the hidden 
matter distributed across the family. So procreation, the bringing of people together into 
reproduction, is risky and needs, like everything else, to be managed through counselling 
people over the genetics of their reproductive relations.   
 
 
Genetic Counselling 
 
The genetic clinic has explicit work to perform: the management of the reproduction of 
genetically problematic offspring. Thus the clinic is not only charged with diagnosis, but 
also with providing what clinicians and others refer to as ‘non-directive genetic 
counselling’.  
Genetic counselling is represented as an event through which families become 
informed of the facts about their family and the risks of reproducing a child with a genetic 
problem.  Genetic counselling is also represented by geneticists as non-directive - that is as 
concerned with providing information about ‘what is’, rather than involving itself in ‘what 
ought to be’.  It is a process which is informative and supportive but in which: 
Patients and their families are expected to formulate their own decisions, based on 
their personal, social and financial circumstances, and their religious convictions. 
(http://www.usd.edu/med/som/genetics/curriculum/3CGENER3.htm) 
 
The difficulties of actually managing to fulfil the ethical standards of non-directive 
counselling in practice are well rehearsed by practitioners (e.g. Clarke 1991, Mahowald 
1998).   
This work of counselling is not represented by clinicians in my study as ‘curing the 
flesh’ or as intervening directly in any disease processes - there are no surgical operations, 
transfusions, or other treatment regimes offered in the dysmorphology clinic.  Instead, the 
main thing offered to parents by the clinic in dysmorphology is information: 
Yes. And also I mean how we talk to patients . . That's part of what they take away 
um, really. And part of their treatment really because we don't really have, most of 
the time there's not a tablet or something you can do to change your genetic 
makeup. So what you can do is to allow people to have sufficient information and to 
inform their perception of what's going on. (Dr Barry, expert in dysmorphology) 
Many of the clinicians I spoke to emphasised the extremely delicate nature of this work of 
‘talking to patients’ and of giving them information. This is because, they suggest, talking 
to parents is about making them aware that their child’s troubles may be something 
genetic and that it may have been passed on. In their accounts this requires an 
intervention in how a family thinks of itself.  
Clinicians enact this process as a matter of helping people like Kevin’s father to 
‘think’ family, not just parenting.  In the clinic, this means getting him to think of himself 
and of his family not just as a place that nurtures and socializes children, or even as a 
biological entity. Rather it is a matter of getting parents and other relations to think of 
themselves as ‘growing’ progeny, as embodying the basic materials for growth; that the 
substance the family is made up from may have a problem when it comes to the shape 
and form of the children that they make.   
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In order for this to happen, clinicians say that they have to go very slowly. In the 
following extract Dr Williams, a leading expert dysmorphologist and one of the recognised 
mothers of dysmorphology, describes these aspects of doing dysmorphology with the 
family as follows: 
Aah, well, that's [sussing out what it is all about for the family] what you have to ask 
them (the family].  And this is what you have to start by ascertaining at the beginning 
of [the assessment of the family], you know, ‘Who sent you? What are the 
questions? Who's asking them, is it you [the family] or is it the doctor?’ You know? 
Who's got worries? Sometimes they say, ‘Well I'm not worried but the doctor sent 
me.’ Or, ‘I don't know what it's about.’ 
Dr Williams is pointing to the intricacies of the consulting process and how she needs to 
assess the family in terms of how it already thinks of itself, including whether it has any 
inkling that there may be something wrong with its basic fabric.  
She is suggesting that she needs to suss out its knowledge of itself and its motivation 
– what does it, the family want to know.  She goes on to explain why: 
But you’ve got to know there's other stuff uhm because that becomes awfully 
important in the way that you transmit the information back, because I look at it 
very much of, in genetics in general, I think of it [the family’s situation] as a, uhm, a 
garden. And that you've got to assess your soil and your sunlight and your bits and 
pieces and your shadows and whatever, before you plant your information, and 
occasionally there's a hell of a lot a mess in that garden that has sometimes you just 
got to just clear that out before you even attempt to plant anything in at all; so I 
think of the communication and the consultation as planting information in a garden 
and you, for it to take or to, not to wither or to or to be constructive, or to be 
helpful, or not seen as another mess (laughs), you got to actually assess where 
you're putting it (laughs), at what time you're putting it, you know, and what, what 
else is going on because you're just one (laughs) little factor in these people's lives, 
which is enormously complicated, and so, you come in and you go out and you 
know, you, so you're effect is, you know, can be unpredictable and so you got to 
think about what you're doing.  
In Dr William’s metaphor, families are partly natural - but they are not a wilderness; in her 
view family is more like a garden.  
This is a complex idea because a garden is a form of (dis)organization (Munro 2003): 
a nature-culture site.  And, like gardens, the organization of the family-garden can be 
problematic, disorganized, and in need of cultivation: it can be overrun with weeds, just as 
the soil can also be poor. But weeds here are to do with both knowledge and the family’s 
conception of itself, as well as the products of conception.  ‘Family’ needs nurturing and 
tending in order for the strong plants to grow and the weeds to be quashed.   
 As such family is being performed here as a site of nature-culture, but one that 
needs an expert to manage it. It is being managed through changing its knowledge of 
itself. It is not that culture (scientific and medical knowledge, genetic medicine) can help 
improve on nature (the family garden) in any direct way. The consultant geneticist in this 
extract is not talking about genetic engineering. Rather, the genetics clinic is reinstituting 
the family as a social and biological group, and, as such, as a site of biosociality (Rabinow 
1992).   
The clinic is being refigured as a site not just where diagnoses are made but as where 
information about the family produced by the clinic can help the family to re-cultivate, and 
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re-form, itself.  To achieve this the family needs to change how it sees itself.   
Before the garden can be seeded with new information, the gardener needs to 
assess the light and the soil and clear the mess. The light and soil is the nature of the 
family, the mess is not just its deformity, but also the way that it sees itself. The 
implication is that its self-understanding is deformed and based on misinformation, and 
that it needs to be reformed through becoming informed.  The deformation of the family 
is the effect of the syndrome itself on family members and relations, as well as the effect 
of misunderstandings and the family’s incorrect knowledge of itself and its parts. The 
genetics clinic is as much about working on the mess and confusion of the family-garden to 
prepare it for reseeding as it is about reseeding the garden with new information.  
Implicit to Dr Williams’ discourse here is the idea that seeding information in the 
family garden will re-form the garden: by becoming in-formed (about itself) the family will 
then grow into the future in a different way to the de-formed way it has been growing in 
the past.  This image of the family as possibly deformed and in need of transformation 
legitimates a process of informed choice making. Thus, when the clinic is in the mode of 
ordering that it calls genetic counselling, family is produced as both a site of reproduction 
and of biological relatedness as well as being like a garden; a nature-culture site, a space of 
biosociality made up of matter.   
In this mode the clinic itself becomes a site of social transformation, while holding 
together two grounds between which it can switches. Reformation of the family can only 
be accomplished through changing how the family-garden imagines itself, particularly in 
terms of its own biology and nature, its matter. And this change is to do with the family 
becoming in-formed.  In this discourse, the clinician emerges not as embodying the 
scientific gaze, ready to answer questions on her or his work at the whiteboard of collegial 
discussion (saying what they see), but visualises her or himself as the ‘gardener’, one that 
has the expertise and the know-how to bring about transformation. In this way 
information is never neutral but is constituted as germane material through which the 
family tree can grow differently in the future. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have been at pains to elaborate how ‘family’ doubles for both conceptions 
of family: as a social institution hosting the lived relations people have with one another 
and as the carrier of biological matter of which a family is made up.  It is a twin institution, 
holding together both that which is lived and living and the biological matter than is 
passed on through generations. In this doubling we can see how the biopolitical aspects of 
clinical work in dysmorphology extend from the behaviours and health of family members 
to their very fabric. This then is a site deeply engaged in the biopolitics of matter 
(Papadopoulos, 2011). 
As we saw in Chapter 8 on dysmorphology’s portraits, family is produced as 
embodying the features or shape of a phenotype. To reiterate, by assembling and 
juxtaposing different images of ‘affected’ persons who are biologically related in the work 
of establishing the pathological, the genetic clinic is also enacting the relation between the 
syndrome, phenotype and an invisible genotype. Specifically, a phenotype distributed 
across different persons who are (assumed to be) biologically related to one another, is 
suggestive of a genotype that may run across a family. In addition, there are relations 
between the phenotype-genotype expressed across different generations of a family – as 
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in the case of Poppy and her mother. These suggest the possibility that there are processes 
of inheritance at work here, but that the genotype is either passed on in an indirect way or 
in a direct way not yet fully understood.  
In this perspective the family is transformed into a site of science, not in the sense of 
a laboratory experiment, but of a science observing the laboratory of life, one in which 
classification is still primary. The result of diagnosing (or not) abnormalities in children, is 
one of family being enacted as a potential site of science in which the relation between a 
genotype and a syndrome may be being produced and reproduced.  Thus there is the 
question of risk, and of whether the abnormal phenotype or syndrome, and the particular 
formation of persons and their parts typical of a syndrome, can be passed on down the 
generations and through a family line. And this is something that the geneticists that I 
interviewed often mentioned: how genetic accidents can run in families to produce a 
phenotype/syndrome. 
As I have clarified in this chapter, while dysmorphology overlaps with previous 
discourses of health promotion and earlier programmes of surveillance, it is not directly 
concerned with policing or assessing their mothers’ and fathers’ parenting skills. Even 
when it rides genealogically on such discourse, we have seen in the case of Kevin’s father 
how genetic possibilities bring the parenting culture up short – ‘good’ parenting alone 
won’t help him in the face of a genetic problem. 
Where families produce syndromes they are enrolled into the discourse of genetic 
counselling as sometimes in need of re-formation.  Assessment in the dysmorphology clinic 
here, though, is more about people’s procreative powers, not in relation to their fertility 
but in relation to the kinds of babies they make and the kinds of babies that they might 
make in the future. Indeed assessment, as we heard from Dr Williams, is also about 
something even more than this: assessment is also of family, extensive families and family 
members, their social associations and reproductive powers.  So at the same time as the 
clinic reinstitutes the family as a site of biosociality, it also harbours its access to the 
family, not just to parents.  In the following chapter I show how transformation of the 
family is accomplished in its exchange of gifts with the clinic.   
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Chapter 11 
 
Transforming Family 
 
Having a baby has always been one of life’s lotteries: boy or girl; dark or fair; 
large or small; will the child be free of inherited disorders, or affected by 
them; will the baby be completely healthy or will he or she have health 
problems? In recent decades this powerlessness in the face of chance and 
biology has begun to change. (Human Genetics Commission, 2006: p.4). 
 
 
Introduction 
 
I have begun to press how in genetic medicine the clinic is concerned with much more 
than either individuals or parents, or even, for that matter, treatment.  Indeed we have 
begun to perceive how the family is reinstituted as much more than either a social 
institution or a site of parenting and lifestyle choice.  Rather, how genetic medicine helps 
reinvigorate the family, takes it beyond being a site of biosociality, and institutes it as the 
place where syndromes are produced and reproduced as entities, which require managing.   
I ended the previous chapter with a discussion of how medicine’s entry into the 
family is not only legitimated by the need to diagnose a child’s troubles, but also by a 
‘moral’ concern to investigate whether a family may need reformation in order that the 
reproduction of genetic disorders be managed. In this view, any member of the family  
(offspring, sibling, parent, cousin) who may be affected by an aberrant genotype becomes 
a ‘future parent’.  This has led me on to suggest how the clinic in dysmorphology is being 
installed as a site of biopolitics of identity, ontology and ‘matter’ (Papadopoulos, 2011).   
Some of the vulnerability of parenthood incited by the medical gaze in extension 
with genetics is captured in the above epigraph; in which Baroness Helena Kennedy QC, 
Chair of the UK Human Genetics Commission, states that, as procreators, we are at the 
mercy of chance and biology, as though this were a matter of fact.  This rendering of 
reproduction is, of course, not a matter of fact but is a discursive construction that invokes 
the matter of need: the need to think carefully about our decisions and our social and 
biological associations, including who we reproduce.   
Baroness Kennedy goes on to say that there is already technology and knowledge 
through which we might begin to manage this difficult state of affairs:  
 
Techniques of prenatal testing and imaging can now reveal if the unborn child has 
one of a number of serious disorders; parents can seek to terminate an affected 
pregnancy. Developments in genetic analysis and reproductive technology have now 
driven the point of decision making to the very origins of the embryo. Although still 
minimal in scale, limited in scope, and controversial in practice, some choices about 
the genetic make-up of our future offspring are already a reality.  
 
Kennedy’s rhetoric here emphasizes the enabling and empowering aspects of new 
technologies to reduce an impending calamity, and avoid being at the mercy of chance and 
biology. In this discourse, technology extends autonomy and decision-making to choices 
over the genetic make-up of our offspring, and even to ‘the very origins of the embryo’. At 
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the same time she is stressing the ethical profundity of such power.  So, her discourse is 
set up in ways that install the need to regulate our decision-making and our choices.   
As I have suggested in the previous chapter, regulating choice is partly a matter of 
both instituting the family as a site of selection, and instituting the clinic as a site that 
oversees how decisions are made.  In the UK this is the space of genetic counselling, a 
space in which selection over reproduction is legitimated through the pathologizing of 
particular kinds and forms of life.  But what discourses over genetic counselling as a form 
of regulation do not illuminate is how genetic counselling, in the current context of clinical 
practice, is not a separate mode of ordering from the diagnostic process.   
My point here is not that genetic clinicians set out to influence people’s choices 
through transmission of their own values. It is more, as we have already witnessed in 
earlier chapters, that arriving at a definitive diagnosis in dysmorphology is far from 
straightforward.  We have seen, for instance, the endless deferral over classification.  We 
might also understand this deferral links back to the root of the problem of establishing 
whether or not there is a need to exercise choice over reproduction.   
In the context of what I have already shown about the genetic clinic in 
dysmorphology, the positivism inferred by discourses of genetic counselling rests on a 
notion that, as Baroness Kennedy puts it, there are tests that can reveal problems in 
unborn children and embryos. Yet this way of regulating reproductive choice masks the 
realities of how classification is accomplished on the ground.  In addition, following 
Foucault (1976, 2003), the positivism performed in discourses of genetic counselling is not 
simply hard to defend; but actually ignores how the need for choice is itself constructed.   
In the chapter that follows I focus on how diagnosis as a protracted process of 
deferral engages families in very particular ways.  Focussing on the interactions of family 
members and clinicians, I examine what is distinctive about these interactions.   
Specifically, what I illustrate is how parents in dysmorphology are not policed or 
disciplined in such ways as happens through the actor networks of public health.  Nor are 
they simply excluded from diagnostic process.  While my data suggests they are never 
simply ‘informed’, what the current study demonstrates is how families are gathered into 
the diagnostic and classificatory work of the clinic.  In looking at this, I go on to explore 
how participation in the epistemological practices of the clinic has its own ontological 
effects, particularly where diagnosis is often elusive and where clinical practices are 
marked by explicit deferral and undecideability.   
 
 
Performing Good Parent 
 
In the dysmorphology clinic parents are not simply told the results of investigations, or just 
installed as witnesses.   On the contrary there are complexities here, with some parents 
bringing the results of investigations with them. In fact, as we have already seen in earlier 
chapters, parents bring many things with them to the clinic: not just their child, but also 
sometimes their other children, as well as other family members, either literally or 
virtually, in the form of photographs and descriptions. These complexities are now 
discussed to illuminate the different ways in which the family is involved with the clinic 
and incorporated into its processes.    
 Parenting in the genetics clinic, as discussed in the previous chapter, is performed in 
ways that reinforce both traditional and contemporary notions of ‘good parenting’ (Daly 
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2004). On the one hand parents are enrolled in the clinic through the invocation of 
traditional cultural repertoires. By figuring children as ‘becomings’ (Lee 1998), interactions 
incorporate parents as the agents of society, working hard nurturing and protecting the 
young, controlling and disciplining them to aid their socialization, monitoring their 
progress and helping them to ‘become’ adults as normally as possible.  On the other, in a 
more contemporary mode, parents are enlisted as experts – on their children: ‘I always say 
to parents that you are the judge of quality of life if he gets ill. You are the experts.’ (Dr 
White to a parent).   
 This enlisting of parents might be thought to reflect the current emphasis in health 
care policy and practice of involving parents in the work of child health promotion 
discussed in the previous chapter, but there is more going on in the genetics clinic than 
this.  In the dysmorphology clinic parents become fully engaged in the processes of 
objectification through which the abnormalities of their child’s condition can come into 
view as of clinical significance.  
 The systems of distinction through which both abnormality and the genetic are 
evidenced engage the participation of the family in the definition of the problematic, and 
even the pathological.  Specifically, to constitute something as abnormal, there have to be 
processes of comparison in play; systems of distinction by which comparisons can be 
made. Sometimes these are social, everyday systems of distinction.  For example, a 
grandmother says of her grandson, Roger, that he ‘runs like a poof [a homosexual]’, thus 
drawing on a gendered discourse that distinguishes between how boys run from how girls 
run, and, further, that a boy that runs like a girl is like a homosexual. 
 This finding is important because earlier research on clinical contexts involving family 
members, particularly paediatric clinics (e.g. Derbyshire 1994, Purkis 2003) has 
emphasised how both patients and family members are excluded from participation in the 
definition of clinical problems.  Specifically, these studies emphasize that the 
understandings and knowledge of patients and other family members are marginalized 
and excluded in relation to the clinical aspects of a condition.   
 Critically, as a social institution made up of differential relations of responsibility 
through which the pathological can be normalised (Foucault 2003), family is reinforced 
through clinical work. In particular, David Silverman’s (1987) studies of paediatric clinics 
shows how the clinic is a site in which family as relations of responsibility is accomplished 
and policed. This said, while Silverman shows how parents and children alike are 
disciplined by clinicians’ discourses to comply with medical orders, there is not the same 
degree of parental participation in the definition of clinical problems as there is in the 
dysmorphology clinic.  It is this observation that prompts me to ask, first, how is this 
participation accomplished? And, second, what does it in turn accomplish?   
 In what follows I press how this participation in clinical process engages parents in 
exchanges of perspective on the dysmorphic child; exchanges through which possible (and 
sometimes implicit) explanations for their child’s troubles come into view.  Thus the child 
becomes, at moments, the complex and diverse object around which relations between 
parents and clinicians are accomplishedxxiii.   
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Encouraging Participation 
 
A practice that objectifies and reifies persons is nothing unusual and not necessarily 
diminishing (e.g. Fernandez 1986, Latimer 1999). What is interesting, however, is how, in 
their relations with the clinic in the current study, parents are encouraged to participate in 
systems of distinction grounded in domains of expertise and techno-scientific discourses in 
the definition of their child’s clinical problems. That is, in their relations with clinicians 
(performed around the epistemological practices through which the child as clinical object 
is constituted and known) parents are being mobilised in a very particular way. 
 For example, one mother says about her son that ‘the only thing that wasn’t delayed 
about him was his smile’.  Another corrects the doctor to speak of her baby not as floppy, 
but as ‘lacking tone’.  The concepts of ‘delay’ and ‘tone’, and of measuring a child against 
norms of progress, are very much the staple practices of paediatric clinics, ones that 
parents sometimes resist as incongruent with their own perspective on their child’s 
development (e.g. Purkis 2003).  Yet the ways that some parents in the genetics clinic draw 
on these discourses indicates that they are engaged in the clinic as knowledgable and 
informed consumers of expert discourses. They are performing themselves as ‘good 
parents’, as the kind of people who know how to use experts in relation to the care of 
their child’s body and health.  As Skeggs and Wood (2007) have pointed out, knowing how 
and when to use expertise is all a part of ethical and respectable personhood and 
parenting. Just think of the range of reality TV shows (such as Supernanny) and magazines 
that perform this relationship.  
What appears extraordinary against this background, is that the genetic clinic 
specifically encourages, and indeed elicits, parental participation.  Unlike in accounts of 
other medical contexts, parent’s knowlegdeability does not appear to disturb clinicians at 
all.  To the contrary, clinicians frequently engage in long discussions with parents about 
the significance of particular effects that draw in detail from scientific and other 
discourses.  Sometimes they even adopt the expert methods of representation of a child’s 
malformations provided by the parents themselves.   
These exchanges are very unusual in medical contextsxxiv, and indicate a shift in how 
medicine is relating to its client over the definition of clinical problems. For example, in the 
following extract Johnny’s father had accessed an Internet site that graded scans of brain 
malformations (pachygyriaxxv) from grades 1 to 5.  Johnny is a toddler who has severe 
epilepsy, and severe physical and learning difficulties, including feeding problems.  He 
requires total care. The consultant adopts the grading system provided by the parents to 
rate the child:   
[Both the Consultant Geneticist and Johnny’s father are standing at the light box 
examining the brain scans of children with severe pachygyria.  The mother is slightly 
back from the group and very quiet, looking on carrying Johnny on her hip. The scans 
are changed back to Johnny’s scans and a scan of a normal brain.] 
Father: These dark lines are too thick in effect (pointing at a scan of Johnny’s brain). 
Clinical geneticist [CG]: Yes, this is what the normal convolutions should look like 
[points to a normal scan] in the front.  Johnny has poor gyri (the folds of the brain) 
but the cortex is not as thin as normally. 
Father: So Johnny’s brain is (like) none of these (pointing to the abnormal scans)? 
Dr White: Yes, he is on the milder end.  So Johnny has a pachygyria where the cortex 
is not as thick (as other worse cases of pachygyria). 
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Father: Which is good? 
Dr White: Definitely milder, it only affects the front two thirds of the brain and 
spares the back of the brain. 
Father: Is it possible to link the parts of the brain with function? 
Dr White: You should be able to but it doesn’t always work that way.  The back of 
the brain in the integrated view (of Johnny’s brain) doesn’t seem to be affected, he is 
visually alert and inquisitive and a lot of learning depends on the connections they 
can make. There are a few things where it is understandable why he is milder, so 
generally this is a much milder scan than we would normally see. 
Father: Good. 
Dr White: It is also more unique. I’ve probably seen 6-7 children with more of a 
pattern like this (pointing to a very abnormal scan), [Johnny’s scan] is more marked 
in front but grey matter is not that thick, so unique in the pachygria 
Father: In the US there is a grading system, 1-5, from the Internet.  Based on what 
you said it sounds like a 4.5. 
Dr White: I could do that, he’s milder than that, 5B.  Shall we sit down and I’ll explain 
them? [They move into the other room] 
For a moment, at the light box, all Johnny’s troubles are being given definition as the 
effects of his misshapen brain. Johnny’s father performs himself at the screen as not just 
informed by systems of distinction and processes of comparison, but as learning to make 
readings of the scans by engaging in the epistemological practices of the clinic.  
Surprisingly, in a reversal the usual interaction order of medically centred interactions, it is 
the father that asks the questions and makes comments on the clinician’s judgments. 
The scans reify Johnny’s brain and enable his father to perform a detached view. At 
no moment does Johnny’s father re-personify Johnny’s brain scan.  In contrast, the 
consultant shifts between moments in which the scans are reifying Johnny, and moments 
where he is re-personified (‘he is visually alert and inquisitive’, ‘he is milder than that’). So 
Johnny’s father and the consultant talk about these parts of Johnny in a way that is cool, 
collected and politically correct: Johnny’s father is folded into the clinic as, like the doctor, 
rational and detached. As evidence the scans are hard to move out of the way, but rather 
than just reducing Johnny to his scan, the doctor is issuing a more holistic, interpretative, 
and inconclusive view of Johnny and his troubles.   
In this way, the consultant’s response to Johnny’s father is inclusive as at the same 
as time it massages his perspective.  It is reminiscent of the old adage that the most 
persuasive kinds of moves are those where the person to be convinced is allowed to think 
they thought of the idea first. The comparisons between normal and abnormal brain scans 
particularise and materialise Johnny’s disorder: they make visible in material form ‘what is’ 
and what can be rated through processes of comparison. In so doing the application of 
statistical technologies brings into play the question of how extreme Johnny’s disorder is.  
While his scan is milder than most cases that the consultant has seen, it is still very 
abnormal. But, and this is critical, it is not normally abnormal.  Johnny’s pachygyria 
(misshapen brain) is unique, and so is Johnny.  Johnny’s brain is at one moment being 
constituted as the same, and the next as different.   
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Inculcating Motility 
 
The call is for Johnny’s father to be more than a good ‘somatic citizen’ (Rose and Novas, 
2005): that is,  someone who has the will or desire to have knowledge about his child’s 
troubles. The encounter between the consultant, the brain scans and Johnny’s father, goes 
beyond grading Johnny’s abnormality through processes of comparison.  What is 
happening at the light box is a way of defining Johnny’s troubles, and evidencing their 
severity, at the very same time as it holds Johnny’s brain on ambiguous ground: it is 
neither completely fish, nor completely fowl (Douglas 1966).  As an effect of this 
undecideability, Johnny’s father is also caught in this space of motility, shifted back and 
forth by the consultant’s shifts between definition and deferral; between processes of 
objectification and processes of personification, between material evidence of abnormality 
and processes of interpretation and judgement in which everything becomes tentative 
again. 
When parents become engaged in surveying and assessing their child, they take part 
in processes for gauging their child’s health and development. In this way they become 
enrolled in technologies that help visualise their child’s health, including measures of 
assessment and practices of comparison. Thus, through the processes of ‘becoming 
informed’, parents are at moments moved by the clinic to help to hold specific aspects of 
their child against the technologies of ‘normalising judgement’ (Foucault 1976).  In so 
doing they seem to be performing a different kind of parent to the one who is tired and up 
all night with a hyperactive child, or one who is attempting to encourage and support their 
child’s socialization and development through practices of control and stimulation.  These 
parents are consumers of expert and scientific discourses, willing and able to talk the talk 
of the clinic.   
Yet in the specific moments in which they are being encouraged to engage in these 
discourses, they are also being exercised and moved by the epistemological practices of 
the clinic.  As we have seen in the case of Johnny, these epistemologies may hold a child’s 
diagnosis in a space of deferral, uncertainty, and undecideability.  Thus in being engaged in 
the processes through which they are becoming informed, parents are entangled in 
motility - the motility that shifts them between definition on the one hand, and 
undecideability and deferral on the other. 
We should be careful here.  This kind of motility is not to be conflated with Victor 
Turner’s (1967) liminoid space of sequestration, the occupation of a space in between two 
status positions.  While a space of motility heightens the parents’ susceptibility to the 
exercise of power, it is accomplishing something different to the Ndembu rites of passage. 
Unlike the neophytes of the Ndembu, the parents are being moved about through 
participation, rather than sequestration and subjection. 
Parents are shifted back and forth between a space of definition on the one hand, in 
which they are helping to see how their child’s troubles can be known as a belonging to a 
medical category, and a space of deferral on the other, in which the category is not yet 
fully known. The hinge between definition and deferral is the promise of a future of 
knowledge, provided the right path, the path that the parents have already experienced in 
the framing of what is already known, is followed. Whether to follow or not is of course 
left up to Johnny’s parents.  But what I want to emphasise, is how the framing of Johnny’s 
troubles has prefigured this idea of choice.  
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Making it unique 
 
As evidenced in earlier chapters, dysmorphologists spend a lot of time taking, examining 
and circulating photographs and slides and composing family histories and medical 
pedigrees. As already discussed, the photographs include family photographs with which 
they can compare family members.   
Parents bring much of this material to the clinic and pass it on to clinicians.  They 
provide photographs of the child over time, and of their siblings and other family 
members, and sometimes of themselves when they were younger or as children.  We also 
saw in Chapter 6 how during the home visit parents give their accounts, histories and 
descriptions of other family members to the clinic. They continue to do this during the 
clinical sessions. 
In these ways, parents pass accounts, photographs, and other representations of 
family members to the clinicians.  These representations of children and other family 
members become signifying clinical objects through processes of scrutiny and comparison.  
The use of slides and photographs helps reify aspects of family members through effacing 
their face as signifying personhood and identity (Goffman 1999, Bauman 1990, 1991). As 
effects, the photographs are not only treated as if they are immutable mobiles (Latour 
1987), they help make people’s most personal, social and human of parts (particularly the 
face) into things, the currency of the clinic.  
Dysmorphologists enrol family, especially parents, not just in the work of supplying 
photographs, but also in the work of interpreting features and of distinguishing what is 
‘familial’ from what is unique or syndromic.  They elicit family participation in the practice 
of looking across family members for similarities and differences. This work of 
distinguishing things that are familial from things that might be ‘just him’ or ‘just her’ runs 
alongside the work of differentiating features and other aspects of children as signifying 
pathologies.  If it’s ‘in the family’, it may be an inherited condition or may just be familial; if 
it is not in the family, it may be a de novo event.  For example, the extract that follows 
involves Patsy and her Mother.  Patsy is a sixteen-year-old girl with suspected Noonan 
Syndromexxvi: 
 
Mother: One thing I have mentioned to the other doctors, before I knew I was 
pregnant I was taking paracetamol and antihistamine. 
Dr Little: I think that is unrelated . . I think it’s a change that has occurred for the first 
time in Patsy. 
Mother: I’ve got a couple of cousins and one has a couple of similarities. 
Dr Little: What about Patsy’s father’s side? 
Mother: He has a small family. 
Dr Little: What’s his height? 
Mother: Normal. 
Dr Little: It’s possible Patsy might be the first person. [Turns to Patsy] You’re unique; 
you’re a special person, the first person to develop these problems.    
Patsy’s mother begins to enact a discourse of parenting that is caught in the mode of 
public health: that something to do with her actions has had effects on the child - in this 
case taking antihistamines and paracetamol while she was pregnant.  But Dr Little disposes 
 146 
of this as irrelevant – the change has occurred in Patsy for the first time.  Patsy’s mother 
then passes more information to the doctor: that she has cousins who have similarities.  
Then in response to the doctors questions about the father’s side, Patsy’s mother 
comments that his was a ‘small family’ – the doctor checks whether she means in height – 
the mother responds, no, height was normal.   
Family members get enrolled in the work of ascertaining whether some of the things 
about the child that appear unusual or abnormal, such as their height, are clinically 
significant as signs by holding them against other family members. Features and parts of 
children in the clinic are thus compared with features and parts of parents, grandparents, 
siblings, cousins, aunts and uncles.  Particular faces, sizes, and shapes may not be 
abnormal, but ‘in the family’. Other parents, like Patsy’s mother, engage in this work of 
distinguishing the things about their children which are like other family members, but 
which may also be signs of a syndrome, particularly where they run through a male or 
female line.  
As in Johnny’s case, the consultant thinks Patsy is unique.  Further, as with Johnny, it 
is the consultant who, however clumsily, re-personifies Patsy (‘you’re a special person’). 
Once again, we arrive at a moment where having been looking for what is the same, the 
clinician arrives at what is different; and in this case unique. 
 
Is it in the family? 
 
Importantly, clinicians involve parents in the work of tracing a feature or characteristic 
through the family and in the work of differentiating the familial and connecting it to the 
work of identifying the pathological. In the following extract, the consultant is examining a 
young boy called Thomas while his Mother is with him.  They have already ascertained 
that Thomas has significant developmental and behavioural problems. Having taken a 
history, the consultant does a physical examination: 
 
Dr White: [She flexes Thomas’ arms and asks him to squeeze her hands. Uses a tape 
measure to measure his head circumference. Feels his head, looks and feels his ear, 
looks at his face - one side and then the other side. With her finger she traces the 
space from his eyes to the top of his ears. She holds Thomas’ head and looks at the 
back of it and leans over him to look at the top of his head and his forehead. CG 
looks at his ears and the back of his ears. She then uses her stethoscope to listen to 
Thomas’ chest.] 
Mother: It’s interesting mine’s 52 [her head circumference], I’m on the lower end of 
the ‘centile. 
Dr White: We’ll have to look at you later. 
[Dr White looks at Thomas’ feet and checks his reflexes. She notes a birthmark] 
Mother: Yes, I had one of those apparently. 
[Dr White asks Thomas to stand and examines his feet. The nurse takes Thomas out 
of the room to measure his height] 
Dr White: Can I measure you? 
 [Dr White measures the mother’s head] 
Mother: Yes, I have a small head. 
Dr White: 53.3. 
[Nurse and Thomas return] 
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[Dr White and Mother check her head circumference on the charts] 
Mother: That [small head] could be the Polish genes [the mother’s own father is 
Polish], unless that’s what you get with syndromes. 
 
Thomas’ mother and the doctor together do the work of tracing a feature of the child (his 
small head) through the family and hold it against population-based technologies of 
normality (percentiles of head circumference).  The mother herself suggests that the small 
head is in her family, and may be an expression of a ‘Polish gene’ rather than a syndrome.  
At other times it may not be the size or shape of a body feature, but a medical 
condition or a particular characteristic or behaviour that parents help to trace through the 
family, both back through the line of the family and across generations: 
 
Father (of Johnny): He has a bit of eczema. 
Dr White: Is it in the family? 
Father: Not really. 
 
Parents thus help do the work of comparison and are engaged in the construction of 
representations of the family that trace characteristics and pathologies across different 
generations or help ascertain where something about the child is different. From these 
tracings the clinic construct the medical history of the family as well as a family tree.  
These technologies materialise, and therefore make present, the possible relation 
between developmental problems and other pathologies of the child’s body, the family 
and reproduction.  But they also highlight what does not yet fit, what needs to be known 
because it is different.   
  
 
Is it in the Genes? 
 
I want to emphasize how parents and others bring the family to the clinic, so to speak, by 
passing on information, accounts and material representations of family members to 
clinicians.  But it is also important to stress how clinicians either hold these things in play, 
or dispose of them as with things such as Patsy’s mothers comment about taking drugs in 
pregnancy.  In this way, medical discretion is operating in the clinic through parental 
participation in the clinical work of classification.   
 As I discussed in Chapter 3 the genes that are constituted as disordering bodies 
(and minds) are performed by the clinic as not easily seen.  Clinicians cannot always send 
off blood or other samples of DNA for laboratories to look at to reveal the specific genetic 
pathology, although they are committed to a future of such certainty.  Rather, as has been 
noted, clinical dysmorphology draws various clinic-based technologies together in the 
work of categorizing patients.  
I have already shown in Chapter 8 how the presence of the gene as the force behind 
the child’s condition is made present through the alignment of multiple materials attesting 
to abnormality.  The assembling and alignment of photographs and slides, test results, 
brain scans, medical pedigrees, family trees, and charts of growth and measurement not 
only helps make the abnormal visible; it positions the genetic as the origin of the 
abnormal, [whether] present or absent. Through these assemblages, what/ich I have 
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called dysmorphology’s portraits, the gene is given material extension as the ground of 
explanation for a child’s troubles. 
The accumulation of accounts and materials evidences (or not) the possible relation 
between the phenotype (features and medical histories traced across individuals and 
families) and the genotype. It is the very multiplicity of these materials, and the specific 
ways in which they are assembled and aligned, that supports the presence (or absence) of 
the genetic. In particular, even where a genetic diagnosis is not fixed, these assemblages 
magnify the possible presence of the gene and attest to the probability of a genetic 
explanation, as opposed to some other explanation for the troubles a child displays.   
 The accumulation of this material evidence means that the genetic is made visible 
over time in other ways than, say, Johnny’s brain is in the scan. Indeed, through these 
processes of alignment, the materials of extension feed off one another. So much so that 
the gene becomes enlarged, even huge. Meanwhile, other possible explanations for the 
aetiology of pathology are diminished.  
 As we are beginning to see, processes through which the genetic becomes visible 
rest upon the participation of family members – particularly for the construction of these 
materials as forms of evidence.  Critically, for a genetic explanation to begin to take a hold 
on parents, the evidence has to exclude other possible grounds of explanation for a child’s 
troubles.  As we have already noted in the exchange between the consultant and Johnny’s 
father, parents are being prepared for a lack of definition.  Where this is so, they may need 
to rely on the clinician’s judgement and a more holistic and interpretative form of 
knowledge.  Let us return for a moment to the consultation with Johnny’s parents.  
 Dr White has arrived at the moment when the doctor can introduce the idea that 
Johnny’s troubles have a genetic base.  She has engaged his parents in processes through 
which Johnny’s abnormalities have been evidenced and the association between 
reproduction, family and these pathologies put into play. Then this exchange takes place:  
 
Father: So definitely a gene? 
Dr White: Yes. 
Father: I was worried about radioactive radiation, I’m worried that may have 
damaged my genes. 
Dr White: That’s unlikely; sperm is produced all the time, if you had him straight 
after that I’d be worried but less likely. My experience is environmental and infection 
problems don’t really produce problems such as this. So we’re left saying that most 
likely it is a genetic cause, which doesn’t mean either of you carry this, it can just 
occur for the first time. If that’s the reason then recurrence would be low.  If there 
was a DCXxxvii  change, we could look at you [Mother] but he hasn’t and there’s no 
indication it is due to the DCX gene. If we had to classify, then I’d put him in 5B. 
 
Dr White confirms that it is ‘definitely a gene’. Johnny’s father says he is worried that 
something he may have done (such as working with radioactive material) could have 
damaged his genes, and thereby Johnny’s.  So here Johnny’s father demonstrates how he 
has incorporated a perspective: he incorporates a substance that is genetic, and which is 
mutable at the moment it is involved in reproduction.  The doctor reassures him it is not 
anything in the environment that has affected the genetic material carried by his 
sperm,which went into making Johnny.  
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 Dr White also asserts that things in the environment or infections do not ‘really 
produce problems such as this’.  She also states she thinks that neither he, nor Johnny’s 
mother, carry the gene. At the moment that enough evidence for the genetic as a ground 
of explanation to hold has been assembled, and despite the absence of a definitive test, 
the doctor also draws on the negative DCX test result to support the view that the 
problem is not inherited. So now the issue of any risk of a recurrence arrives quite 
naturally; namely that, because the condition is not inherited, the ‘recurrence would be 
low’.   
 In the way the exchange develops it appears that the father wants certainty (‘so 
definitely a gene?’), while the consultant shifts between a space of categorical definition 
(there’s no change in the DCX gene) and deferral – if that’s the reason, if we need to 
classify.  Thus the consultant exercises the parents on the grounds of deferral at the same 
time as a genetic explanation for Johnny’s troubles is able to exclude other possible 
explanations.  So that the choice they see is from the perspectives that they are given. 
They do not choose of their own accord: they only see choice from the perspective given 
by one of the frames – definition or deferral.   
 The space of definition gives an essentialist framing, ‘look here it is, this is what it is, 
it’s genetic’.  And the framing provided by the space of deferral constitutes these as 
matters yet to be known, and promises categorical definition in the future.  Parents are not 
choosing these frames, but are instead being moved from one space to the other at, for 
most practical purposes, the discretion of the clinician. 
 
A Moment of Arrival 
 
Following this phase of the consultation, Johnny’s father goes on to ask about prognosis.  
Dr White suggests that Johnny’s case is ‘milder than most’, and that he will reach 
adulthood:   
Father: The horrible question, we know it’s not good [punctuation?] 
Dr White: Its very individual, the information is very old and gives general survival 
rates. He’s milder and a lot of these problems are feeding problems, and aspiration 
and epilepsy treatment has improved. Seeing him today, there’s no reason why he 
shouldn’t grow to adulthood, but the overall lifespan is reduced. He’s a very healthy 
young man and there’s no reason for him not to grow into adulthood. 
The presence of death is made explicit in the clinical assessment of Johnny’s troubles.  
Johnny is re-personified – he is strong and healthy, he should live but only into adulthood, 
not beyond. The presence of the gene rules out other explanations for Johnny’s troubles – 
his premature death and terrible troubles (epilepsy, delay, learning difficulties) are genetic 
in origin.  
 This motility between definition and deferral excites consciousness of danger and 
risk. The need to calculate risk over future acts of procreation is legitimated.  Jonny’s 
father is moved, from being a parent to becoming a ‘future parent’. And, as such, it 
becomes imperative for the father to ask the next question, although Dr White has already 
slipped issues of recurrence into her assessment in the previous sequence.  In doing so 
Johnny’s father gives an account, an account that momentarily and temporarily disposes 
of any future children that might reproduce Johnny, not a reified Johnny, but Johnny as 
the child who is dependent and demanding:  
Father:  . . Also a question was ‘What’s the risk of recurrence?’ 
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Dr White: Unfortunately, the children I know don’t have siblings.  I don’t know, 
about 6 (a 6% chance).  He (Johnny) doesn’t have any other problems. DCX is normal, 
the gene is normal. I’ll ask a research group in Italy I work with to look into this. Then 
we are left with the uncertainty, this is a unique situation, I may need to check if 
there were any other siblings. 
Father: Of course we’d like to (have another baby), but for obvious reasons we don’t 
want another Johnny, he’s a lot of work. 
CG: You’re still young. 
Father: I took drugs [amphetamines and marijuana] when I was young . . 
CG: Don’t worry, I’ve not seen any association. It’s genetic but not necessarily 
familial. 
 
Dr White offers a calculation – a 6% chance of recurrence. In the clinic and in the family, 
only some genotypes are represented as inherited, others are identified as particular to 
individual persons, as spontaneous genetic anomalies.  But when it comes to the risk of 
recurrence, families and future children can be constituted as susceptible to such 
spontaneous effects even if the risk is low.  To be more certain regarding the risk of 
reproducing Johnny, the doctor will need to ask other experts.  
 In these ways the need for calculation, running alongside deferral, legitimates the 
need for more research, more investigation, more science, and more knowledge. But what 
for a moment gets disposed of is Johnny, or at least the spectres of Johnny reproduced 
into the future.  Johnny is ‘a lot of work’ so ‘we don’t want another’. And to make things 
just a bit more sure, the father makes another confession – he’s taken drugs. But he is 
reassured and absolved, it really isn’t anything he’s done: it’s genetic, but it’s not familial. 
 It is the practices of the clinic, and the constitution of the abnormal as matters of 
fact, that legitimate disposing of a reproduction of Johnny: by making Johnny’s troubles 
the effect of his nature (his genotype), it becomes possible to dispose of him, figuratively, 
as ‘a lot of work’. But critically, Johnny’s father is now in a perspective, a perspective that 
at one moment enables definition and the next takes it away.  The perspective troubles his 
conscience and moves him between his consciousness of his past and his future acts of 
procreation. 
  Ways of representing genes are not value free - only some codes and their 
expression are identified and categorised as ‘normal’, others are considered anomalies. 
The normality invested in some phenotypes and genotypes, rather than others, makes 
visible the kinds of characteristics of persons that are being valued, at any one time or 
place. Thus the ways in which genes and their effects are imagined, and classified, make 
visible the grammar of cultural codes of normality.  
 Significantly, it is the genes that are made pathological in the clinic: nature and 
substance are made aberrant, not persons.  And it is the genes that are medicalized.  In 
addition, it is Johnny’s father, not the consultant that gives utterance to the disposability 
of a reproduction, not of himself but of Johnny.  Johnny, through processes of 
objectification, has been detached – the reductive version of Johnny flows not from his 
father but from an aberration in nature.  Johnny’s father’s detachment, and his shift in 
perspective, is facilitated by his engagement in the clinical processes of definition and 
objectification.   
 The need for a decision over whether or not to reproduce is thus passed back to 
Johnny’s father, but only after it is enframed through the interaction in which Johnny’s 
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troubles are both medicalized and geneticized. While the ambivalence and uncertainty of 
cases like Johnny’s can only be calculated and probabilities suggested, what is nonetheless 
being put into play is the view that a stop on the reproduction of a genotype like Johnny’s 
is desirable and necessary. Although the doctor appears to retain her ethical delicacy as 
non- directive, she is at the same time managing reproduction.  She is turning ambiguity 
into a resource (cf Munro 1995) with which to manage the risk of reproducing people with 
long term, chronic conditions like Johnny’s.   
 
 
The exchange of perspectives 
 
In the clinics studied this is how genetic counselling is carried out. These different ways of 
representing genes and their effects interact in use with lived relations between people, 
primarily in the ways in which relations between persons are imagined (for example, in 
ideas of inheritance).  But they also interact with the ways in which relations are ordered; 
for example, in terms of notions of responsibility for those characteristics of children 
considered anomalies.  
 We can see something of this trend in the next excerpt when we turn to Roger’s 
mother again: 
Mother: I was so relieved when I got your letter [saying that her son’s condition has 
nothing to do with her kidney disease during pregnancy] I blamed myself all these 
years. 
Dr Smith: We can completely rule that [an event in pregnancy] out . . there’s some 
type of genetic problem likely to have occurred with him, there’s nothing running 
through your family, we’ve looked for fragile X and chromosomes. 
In being given an explanation for Roger’s troubles, that they are genetic in origin, Roger’s 
mother is momentarily absolved of responsibility for them. It is nothing she has done: her 
identity as good parent, like that of Johnny’s father, can be affirmed.   
Yet, even at the moment of definition and absolution accomplished through the 
exclusion of other possible grounds for Roger’s troubles, the tone of deferral is held in 
play, ‘there’s some type of genetic problem likely to have occurred’.  This is one aspect of 
the exchange: Roger’s mother brings Roger, and representations of other members of the 
family to the genetic clinic; and in return what she gets back is a sense of relief, a moment 
of exoneration of responsibility.  Like Johnny’s father, she is for moment being affirmed as 
a good parent. 
In my earlier discussion of the work of Marilyn Strathern, I noted how the child is the 
object of clinicians’ and parents’ relations of exchange. Questions arise therefore as to 
what it is that is actually being exchanged? I want to go on now to press that what are 
being exchanged are perspectives.  
Participation in the construction of re-presentations of family substance creates 
perspective and reframes past and future acts of reproduction as potentially pathological. 
At the same time, the space of deferral excites the need for reproductive calculation and 
for more knowledge and more technology. Choice is framed and the need for ‘information’ 
elicited and prefigured. Parents receive a path of knowledge to follow, a perspective from 
which to ‘see’ things more clearly, now or in the future. This may well include 
intensification or exoneration of their own responsibility for their child’s troubles.   
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Where the disordering of the genes is not being constituted as directly inherited, 
moments of reflexivity are incited through the ways that the genetics clinic materialises 
the potential relation between pathologies, death, family, and acts of procreation: 
Mother: I just thought Ross and I coming together had done something terribly 
wrong. I felt perhaps I’d done something wrong, with genetics I felt my child could 
die . . I’m not a medical person so I’m very ignorant but I felt a bit like cerebral palsy, 
something like that you know, or the sort of genetic problems that I’d encountered 
were turning up [ . . ] so they weren’t nice instances, you know, it wasn’t a case of 
something wrong but you can lead a normal life, they were ‘This is going to be hard 
for my child’ [No diagnosis at time of study]. 
This blaming of oneself is repeated by parents across the study. In these particulars, 
medical genetics offers some comfort to parents but, as we see next, this is not always so. 
 
 
The exchange of hope 
 
At the same time as dysrmophology may offer parents hope by giving them a detached 
perspective that shows how, through scientific methods of categorization, the potentially 
unbearable can be partially ordered. This emphasis on the disturbance of self, instantiated 
by engagement in the genetics clinic, both overlaps and contrasts with Cussins (1996, 
1998) and Moreira (2004).   
Moreira, for instance, demonstrates how patient participation in the socio-technical 
organisation of medical work both calls for and mediates the ‘re-establishment’ of self, 
including processes of detachment. In contrast, I am arguing that as parents become 
detached from one set of materials, they are attached to another. It is these shifts that 
change perspective.   
What I turn to now is [that] the possibility of a genetic diagnosis may at moments 
take something away from parents, and even lead to ‘all the hope’ being killed off.  The 
death of hope is expressed by Sally’s mother in the following extract, Sally is a teenage girl 
with a teenage girl with a diagnosis of Brachio-oto-renal Syndromexxviii: 
Sally’s Mother: But to be told that it wouldn’t be made better took all the hope 
away. To know it wouldn’t get better. When we were told that it was not likely to be 
made better by Dr. Jones when we first came here [to u[U]niversity t[T]own] it was a 
shock. And all the hope was taken away. We were both in tears. 
As this brief interchange makes clear, perspective is not set apart from the theatre of 
action, a ‘being outside’. Rather there is a shift, back and forth, between spaces that grant 
perspective, and which enframe a view  of the situation. 
As we have seen in the analysis of the interaction with Johnny’s father, the gift of 
participating in the clinic is a space of motility that offers a path to knowledge. This affect 
is expressed in the following extract in which Sally and her mother are talking about their 
experience of the dysmorphology clinic in an interview: 
Sally’s Mother: They [the geneticists] did tests. Well, the scans had already been 
done, so Dr. Page [the consultant geneticist] looked at those and put it together. 
Because of the hearing and the holes and it fitted the criteria I suppose. 
Sally: And she looked at my hands and I had to do things like this [bends fingers] and 
she looked at the shape of my face. I think it was to see if it all fitted. 
Mother: Yes, she looked at both of us, didn’t she? 
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Sally: Yes, and we didn’t have the characteristics. And she took photos, too, to see 
[if] it fitted in with other people who have it. 
Mother: Yes. I’d forgotten about that. Yes, she was very thorough. 
Interviewer: It sounds like you were looking for a diagnosis or [were] unaware of this 
for a long time. How did you feel when they referred you to genetics? 
Mother: We were very pleased. Because we had nothing in Muddletown, and 
suddenly here they wanted to get to the bottom of it too. Before, I was a fussy 
mother who wanted to get to the bottom of it, but Dr. Page did too. It was so good 
to have people doing stuff at last. 
Sally’s mother and Sally describe themselves as being transformed in the dysmorphology 
clinic: from people who have no idea why they are like they are, into people whose bodies 
are the objects of interest because they may represent something, something to get to the 
bottom of – an ‘it’.   
In this way, the clinic entangles people like Sally and her mother in an exchange of 
gifts (Strathern 1988; Sykes, 2005).  Parts of their bodies are objectified – ‘she looked at 
my hands’, the ‘shape of my face’, the scans - and ‘she was very thorough’. They describe 
how they are in the gaze of the clinician, and their appreciation of the care that is taken.  
The doctor also tells them that they don’t have the characteristics, but takes photos, to 
see if they fit with others.  In turn, they feel that the encounter is full of promise: — ‘a 
way’ that enables them to ‘put it together’, ‘get to the bottom of it’, ‘see if it fits in’, ‘have 
people do stuff at last’.  
 
 
‘Unless you do research you can’t find out’  
 
The gifts the family pass to clinicians include access to the family and their genetic 
material, and consent to use these materials in future research. In return there is the 
promise of what Mary-Jo Delvecchio Good calls ‘medical imaginaries’: 
[People] invest in the medical imaginary – the many-possibility enterprise – culturally 
and emotionally, as well as financially. Enthusiasm for medicine’s possibilities arises 
not necessarily from the material products with therapeutic efficacy but through the 
production of ideas, with potential although not yet proven therapeutic efficacy. 
(2001:397) 
The gifts the clinic pass to the family are of a future, a future of definition, a future of 
classification. Hope. 
That family members are being enrolled as allies in the making of these futures 
becomes at moments quite explicit. Here, for example, is another extract from the 
interaction in the clinic with Roger’s family: 
Dr White: I’m interested in movements. Roger was really good up there [on the 
examination table]. I’m interested in movements because a new gene has been 
identified, these boys have learning difficulties and some funny movements . . we’re 
setting up this test in University Town and we could add Roger if you would like to go 
down that route . . that’s the only idea I have at the moment . . I may have others in 
the future. 
Roger’s Grandmother: Unless you do research you can’t find out. (my emphasis) 
This excerpt exemplifies the gifts being exchanged. The clinician will get to test Roger’s 
DNA, and he will become a part of her research study on the genetic makeup of boys 
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with funny movements and learning difficulties -- boys like Roger.  The grandmother 
gets the gift of participation in a medical imaginary and a future of defining the genetic 
unknown, and the promise of eventual classification and definition that this future 
promises.   
I am therefore suggesting that parents are moved by the materiality and the motility 
of the clinic in ways that construct particular moments of reflexivity. Parents become not 
just informed, but transformed.  Transformation is accomplished not so much through the 
transfer of information, but through interaction with discourses and technologies that 
exercise consciousness and shift perspective.  
At the same time as the clinic gives family members perspective (perspective on a 
way to knowledge, to definition and a future in which the disordered can be ordered and 
classified), the clinic gets the family enrolled into giving them the material they need to 
research – the opportunity to ground the relation between the genetic, dysmorphias and 
the pathological.  
 
 
Definition & Deferral 
 
It is the child that becomes, in the genetics clinic, the boundary objectxxix (Bowker and Star 
2000, Star 1989, Star and Griesemer 1989) that facilitates access and communication 
between the world of the family and the world of genetic science. Recalling Foucault’s 
(1994) analysis of the two moods of science, as, on the one hand, being called to seeing  
‘the same’ (the closed, that which is already fixed and categorised), and, on the other, to 
understanding ‘the different’ (the open, that which is still to be known and named), I want 
to suggest that participation in clinical work reinforces contemporary ideas of parenthood, 
including entangling parents in the ontology of a way to knowledge.   
The space of definition – diagnosis - shows parents where things are the same. It 
emphasises that categorisation is possible, that medical knowledge practices have already 
been able to ‘fix’ things and are able to show ‘what is’.  This is, of course, an essentializing 
space.  Contrastingly, the space of deferral reminds parents of the need for a path to 
knowledge that can deal with what is not the same, with what for the moment seems 
different.  The space of deferral identifies the different, and promises that that which does 
not yet fit will be known. It will be fitted in and categorised, providing, of course, that the 
right way to knowledge is followed.  The motility of the clinic between decision and 
deferral helps to hold (some) parents in the hope of a future of definition; and so 
entangles them further in the ontology of scientific understanding.  
Doctors in the clinics I observed are thus managing reproductive choice, and the risk 
of the reproduction of children with potential chronic conditions, not through direct 
intervention but rather by drawing on ambiguity as a resource. The work of identifying the 
causes of troubles (as genetic in origin, or not, as inherited, or not) is marked by definition, 
undecideability and deferral. Therefore, participation in the specific epistemological 
practices of the genetic clinic moves parents between definition and deferral to entangle 
them in a ‘space of motility’.  Immersion in this space of motility, however intermittent 
and relatively brief, excites consciousness of the riskiness of reproduction, elicits moments 
of reflexivity and shifts in perspective through which the very need to ‘make informed 
choices’ comes into view.   
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As such, perspectives that are not of the parents’ own choosing frame choices.  So 
that as at the same time as participation in the clinic tasks mothers and fathers with 
choices through which the future can be determined, the clinic also entangles them in 
deferral, and the need for more knowledge, more genetic techno-science and more clinical 
judgement.  The choice is to follow the path of clinical understanding, so that what is 
identified as different can be - if the well-honed path to clinical knowledge is followed - 
categorised as the same; as something that fits, something that can and will be 
categorised. 
I suggest that the practice[s] through which the clinic enrols parents and other family 
members in the re-representations of a child’s troubles is a process of intervention in its 
own right that accomplishes shifts in parental, not clinical, perspectives. As Dr Williams in 
Chapter 9 puts it, the clinic works on the family like a gardener works on a garden with the 
tools of very specific and interactive communication practices and medical technologies to 
cultivate it and reform it.  But the way of reformation is something the parents have to do 
themselves once their view of things is reframed.  The outcome, as Dr Williams asserts, 
can be unpredictable: it is the unpredictability of persons, left to choose, that is 
accountable for poor decisions in the future, not genetic counselling.  As other research 
has shown, what people do with what they get from the clinic is translated through their 
lives in ways that may differ from those intended by geneticists (e.g. D’Agincourt-Canning 
2001, Konrad 2005).  
 
 
Keeping the non-genetic in play  
 
In raising these issues I do not want to be misunderstood as simply showing how practices 
of genetic counselling are socially constructed and socially constructing.  Rather, I am 
suggesting participation in the epistemological work of the clinic raises the possibility that 
genes can have the kinds of effects that parents are seeing in their children. It makes the 
genetic as a ground of explanation for particular effects present, intermittently and 
temporarily, but still potently.  At the same time this perspective helps exonerate parents 
from blame.   
I am underlining, therefore, how genetic counselling practices can be understood as 
intervening, not just because they ‘shift perspective’, but instead because they give 
parents perspective. Indeed, they give them a perspective that moves them between two 
interrelated places from which to ‘see’: definition and deferral.  This is not to suggest that 
what we have seen in the clinic is simply a process of geneticization – it is not a totalising 
effect.  On the contrary, many things in the clinic are not considered ‘genetic’.  In addition 
parents are encouraged in their nurturing and managing of the child to believe that 
biology is not all, that nurture and care have their place.  But critically, rather than 
practices of representing being only concerned with a way of legitimating forms of 
intervention (Hacking 1983), representing in the genetics clinic is intervening.  
Genetic medicine, then, is a critical site through which the genetic, as a domain of 
classification, is being embedded through the social fabric, at the same time as it is a site in 
which choice is prefigured and elicited by the motility of clinical knowledge practices. 
Choice in the genetics clinic is not performed as a matter of individual preference.  Rather, 
in the genetics clinic reproductive choice is worked alongside the construction of risk, risks 
of abnormalities as the expression of aberrant genes.  
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As we have seen, rather than ideas about what constitutes goodness, well-being, or 
normality being left to cultural diversity, in the clinic choice is prefigured through 
processes of objectification and the practices of the clinic that institute conceptions of 
abnormality as matters of fact.  The clinic exercises parents as reproductive choice makers, 
but as choice makers whose choices are constructed not (or so it seems at first glance) by 
cultural expectations regarding normality and goodness, but by rational processes of 
objectification through which the abnormal can be defined and the causes of abnormality 
detected.  
But of course clinicians are not representing themselves as doing that, as 
representing – they perform their assessment of the child and the family as a process 
grounded in the application of tools which allow them to reveal ‘what is’. They perform 
their gaze as scientific.  They make their way of representing the child’s body objective 
through the application of statistical and other technologies. It is through the ways that 
parents themselves are engaged and moved by the epistemic practices of the clinic that 
they are moved, in-formed and their identity as calculating reproducers elicited.     
Specifically, the genetics clinic brings death and acts of procreation in relation to one 
another, thus confronting parents with a profound and shocking portrait of the latent 
potency of their own and their child’s materiality.  So, rather than these findings merely 
being evidence of a process of geneticization of medicine, and of the family, I want to 
stress how the alignment of clinical judgement, genetic science and the family gives 
greater opportunities for differentiation, not less, affirming the need for more discretion, 
reflexivity and calculation, not less.   
In summary, the clinic certainly puts into play ways of conceptualising ourselves as 
already incorporating the genetic as something ‘that is’. Yet, through entangling parents in 
a space of motility, it also excites the need to know (more) about the embodied self in 
relation to science in order for us (and this may eventually be all of us) to make (good) 
reproductive choices. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
There are two problems with the emphasis on autonomy and choice in current discourse 
over the use of genetic technology in relation to reproduction.  First, as discussed in 
Chapter 10, recent research suggests consensus over the need for processes of selection 
where pregnancies risk reproducing children with severe disabilities, providing there is the 
science and technology to support informed and autonomous parental choice.  As other 
commentators (e.g. Roeher Institute 2002) point out, this makes people with aberrant 
genes, such as Johnny, Roger and Patsy, readily disposable, and warrants a form of social 
exclusion.  However, as Konrad (2005) has already shown, the conditions framing parents 
reproductive choices extend far beyond the boundaries of the clinic, so that practices of 
inclusion and exclusion are emergent upon a complex ethics that is also local, relational, 
and specific.    
The second problem concerns the way that a relation between being ‘informed’ is 
put into play alongside the stress on autonomy and freedom of choice. This emphasis de-
socialises ‘decision’, and decouples information as merely a means to select ends: as if 
choices can be informed and yet remain autonomous.  This is not just to press the point, as 
others have done, that reproductive choices can hardly be taken in a social and cultural 
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vacuum (Human Genetics Commission 2004).  Rather it is to press the need to understand 
better how becoming ‘better informed’ involves processes that are never just means to 
ends, but are always to some extent (obliquely, indirectly and partially) constitutive.  
The analysis presented in much of the book has demonstrated how the alignment of 
genetic science and the clinic gives medicine particular access to the family. It reinforces 
and plays upon contemporary conceptions of family as a site of parenting, a site that 
‘takes responsibility for the body and life of the child’. But it also does more than this.   
Specifically, the clinic becomes a site of ‘gathering’ for the family, made up of both 
biological as well as social relations. Here family is being constituted as more than cellular: 
at least for the purposes of genetic assessment, the family gets re-extended.  The notion of 
good parenting also becomes extended to include becoming responsible as ‘future 
parents’, both over how and with whom people reproduce and over how and by whom 
families are made. As we have documented, becoming ‘informed’ engages the 
participation of mothers and fathers, stepparents and grandparents, in the work of 
defining children’s troubles – and by extension, possibly their own. And yet, for all that 
reproductive choices are emergent upon these processes of definition that redistribute 
family across many parts, the moment of reproductive choice still reconstitutes the 
cellular family as a site of parenting.   
What gets black-boxed in professional and policy debate is how the very process of 
‘becoming informed’ is not value neutral: it gives particular perspectives.   Practitioners 
and policy makers may constitute clinical knowledge practices of diagnosis in genetics as 
simply revealing the facts of the matter. But in so doing, they reproduce medical theories 
that constitute the medical gaze as simply detecting and describing ‘what is’.  The problem 
with this view is that it effaces how medical knowledge practices are constitutive in 
themselves, only recognising the effects of diagnosis if it is are poorly executed or 
(however unintentionally) mixed up with moral agendas. This view of genetic counselling 
practices has already been critiqued as ignoring how clinical processes in genetic 
counselling construct the potentially affected future child as the abnormal Other (e.g. 
Roeher Institute 2002).  
For the purposes of the present chapter, I have been pressing a different 
problematic. The analysis of parental participation in the genetic clinic offered so far has 
shown how the effects of parental participation go further than eliciting their performance 
as good parents, or even as good ‘biological citizens’ (Rose and Novas 2005).  Indeed, I 
have shown that participation in the definition of clinical problems in the genetics clinic 
gives parents perspective in ways that have particular and important effects. Specifically, 
parents’ engagement in the epistemological practices of the clinic entangles them in a 
space of motility that moves them to become more consciousness of the riskiness of their 
own and other’s reproductive powers.  
The ways in which parents and other family members are enrolled in the 
representational practices of the clinic is itself a process of intervention through which 
reproductive choices are framed, prefigured and elicited. That is, participation in the 
epistemological practices of the genetic clinic ‘moves’ parents in particular ways. 
Specifically, through clinicians’ shifts between moments of definition and moments of 
deferral, parents are held in a ‘space of motility’.  The space of motility excites a sense of 
reproductive risk and elicits moments of reflexivity to institute mothers and fathers as 
calculating reproducers, tasked with choices as if these can determine the future.   
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These findings show how the processes through which the need for calculation in 
reproductive decisions is elicited, in turn, helps to constitute a particular kind of 
personhood, a contemporary Western personhood.  As at the same time as these Western 
persons are being made aware of the riskiness of their reproductive powers, they are also 
being figured as having the capacity to choose the future; but, and this is the point being 
mandated and pressed upon all of us, choices can only be responsibly made where the 
future is rendered knowable through the alignment of techno-scientific innovation and 
clinical expertise. 
At the same time, by shifting family members back and forth between the 
experience of definition and the experience of deferral, the clinic also constitutes parents 
as persons whose current choices cannot fully determine the future because ‘more always 
needs to be known’: in the absence of definition of what currently appears to be ‘different’ 
choices are being left to the vagaries of speculation and guesswork in the name of 
calculation and prediction.  Parental immersion in the space of motility thus enrols them 
not just in the need for expert judgement, but in the need for more genetic techno-
science. A techno-science that is yet to come, but one that will – through following the 
path to knowledge already presumed to be effective in the definition of problems - render 
the unknown knowable.  
While I am noting how this participation exercises a new form of consciousness of 
people’s own biosociality, including the riskiness of reproduction, I have also illustrated 
how families become the allies of the clinic.  This is achieved through relations of 
exchange.  Specifically, in their passing on information as well as bodies, accounts and 
histories of family members to clinicians, the family help the clinic become a site of 
gathering that reinstates it as the centre of discretion over the identification of need and 
the classification of genetic syndromes.  In return, the family are given perspective on their 
disabled children, including exoneration of responsibility, and participation in a way to 
knowledge that promises classification of their troubles in the future.    
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Chapter 12 
 
Conclusions 
 
 
The gene, hunted, inspected, tamed, or in the process of being 
tamed, participates in the construction of long and highly differentiated 
sociotechnical networks, transforming monsters into human beings in 
their own right, well integrated into constantly evolving webs of relations. 
     (Callon and Rabeharisoa, 2008, p. 40) 
 
 
Introduction 
 
A central argument in this book has been to show how an association with the gene is 
reinvigorating medicine. In looking at medicine’s association with the gene I have also 
demonstrated that we are seeing a rebirth of the clinic, whereby the natural histories of 
‘syndromes’ are being written in the clinic’s immersion in the world of families. I carefully 
documented how this classification work in dysmorphology is helping to identify and 
differentiate certain syndromes as genotype-phenotype relations. I then illustrated how 
the clinic acts as a site of crossings between the ‘grammar and codes’ of molecular science 
and the ‘living flesh and substance’ of the phenotype. These findings led me to consider 
how the repercussions of thinking of family as partial expressions of a phenotype becomes 
embedded into the wider fabric of society. 
In investigating this resurgence of clinical interest in congenital abnormalities, I 
widened the study to focus as much on the clinic’s links with family as with its associations 
to the biological sciences. Here I have attended to what is termed ‘identity work’ in 
sociology and given particular emphasis to how clinicians must ‘pass’ with the family, one 
moment as ‘expert’ and the next as ‘fellow human’. In return family members must ‘pass’ 
as worthwhile sites of scientific investigation, although the work they do in passing on 
family insights and stories to the clinic acts as a necessary but not sufficient condition for 
their inclusion. Over and above these exchanges, the clinic retains the authority to weed 
out what is unusual but not pathological.  
In examining these complex relations been the clinic and the family, I have 
evidenced how the clinic constructs itself, carefully and cleverly, as a space of gathering 
into which the family are enrolled to ‘gift’ self-descriptions, photographs and histories, as 
well as material representations of themselves in the form of blood and other body 
products. In exchange for their involvement in the clinic, I traced what the family gain is a 
‘perspective’ that promises a future understanding of what is wrong with their child. Hope 
is deferred to a future of more research that will bring greater knowledge of themselves 
and their family. 
Critically, and significantly, I noted how this engagement with the clinic includes 
family members experiencing switches in ground. Discourse in the clinic moves between 
methods of diagnosis that individualize at one moment to focus on the ‘proband’ – the 
child with troubles - and ‘assemblages’ that re-institute wider social relations in the next – 
as partial representations of a poorly defined and hard to see genotype.  At the same time 
as the latter perspective appears to exonerate them of agentic responsibility for the 
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condition of the present child, discussion over further reproduction faces them with the 
possibility that their genes may be ‘out of control’. So simultaneous to the clinic helping 
parents to see that their offspring are not simply a matter of managing their lifestyle 
better, parents are nonetheless inculcated with the view that they may need to manage 
their procreative activities to ensure that they do not reproduce another child with 
aberrant genes.   
Dysmorphology produces and reproduces its powers of authority in all this through 
building and enacting a way to knowledge – an expert gaze - that is routed through a social 
and cultural assessment of family life, as well as involving assiduous clinical attention to 
the shape, form and function of its members. At the same time as this clinical gaze 
engages in procedures of refutation and crosschecking through the assembling of 
evidence, it sets up processes of differentiation which continuously press the possibility of 
doubt and uncertainty. Through these processes of deferral, the clinic greatly enhances its 
powers of discretion to differentiate between ‘natural curiosities’ and what is a sign of 
pathology.  
 It is this deep immersion in the family together with its enactment of the scientific 
method of doubt that re-accomplishes medicine as the site that can both ‘see’ and ‘say’ 
syndromes while differentiating their causes. And it is through this work of differentiation 
that the clinic re-enacts itself as a site of classification, although its work today is not so 
much the traditional role of separating the ‘sick’ from the ‘malingering’ but one of 
identifying those who may be genetically aberrant from others who are not.  
What caught my interest though was the work of deferral in which probands whose 
diagnosis is uncertain were retained in the clinic. This last finding suggested that pivotal to 
the clinic maintaining its status as a science (and in rebuttal to views that would position it 
as the mere handmaiden of experimental science) is the way clinicians deploy this 
possibility of doubt and so balance decision with deferral in their consultations. This 
argument rests on two initial premises: first, and here I was drawing on the seminal work 
of Foucault on modes of science, that medicine is most dominant at the point where 
classification is central to its mores; and second, if less contentiously, that the clinic is at its 
most scientific when explicitly deploying the method of doubt.  
The implication, although the point may already be obvious to many readers, is that 
science is only science when it is still ‘in the making’. The genetic is thus for medicine a 
new frontier that is powering a resurgence of medical dominance because it reinstalls the 
clinic as the location of discovery. What is of particular interest in all this is that discovery 
here is not a matter of technologies or interventions, but of understandings about how 
humans are formed and grow. The discoveries of the genetic clinic concern garnering 
knowledge of how offspring are deformed and focus on when these deformations 
constitute things that are clinically problematic, not just in terms of individuals but also of 
families.   
Additionally, and related to the on-going struggle for dominance between the 
medical and biological sciences, this close reading of how these two forms – classification 
and deferral - are worked together has also led me to conclude from the study that 
retention of the mode of deferral is as essential to the exercise of power as is the mode of 
decision. People may come to the clinic for diagnosis in the first place but they are only 
enrolled as material for scientific investigation where there is also room for deferral. I 
return to these matters below. 
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The theme of medicalization 
 
What is compelling about the clinic is how it grounds its way to knowledge about the 
growth and form of persons within the actual relations of reproduction: the family and the 
mess of bio-sociality. This led me on to see that an end biopolitical result is how normal 
family reproduction is being medicalized through attention to the abnormal.  As I have 
pressed, the normal is shrinking in the genetics clinic, so that the need to distinguish how, 
when and in what combinations, reproductive material may produce a syndrome is more 
and more engrossing – not simply to those families who have already reproduced what 
seems to be faulty but indeed to all and sundry. 
Heightened forms of medicalization have interesting ramifications in terms of 
responsibility, but my point is not only with how the clinic augments its powers to 
exonerate or rationalize practices of exclusion. Rather the concern is over cultural 
preoccupations and mores, particularly to what ‘fear and fascination with the deviant may 
lead’. As Dikötter’s (1998) study of Chinese policy over reproduction illuminates, the urge 
to draw clear boundaries between the normal and the abnormal’ combine with medical 
discourse to form ‘a program of eugenics’, including  
 . . “the implementation of premarital medical checkups" to ensure that neither 
partner has any hereditary, venereal, reproductive, or mental disorders, the 
ordinance implies that those deemed "unsuitable for reproduction" should undergo 
sterilization or abortion or remain celibate in order to prevent "inferior births" 
(http://cup.columbia.edu/book/978-0-231-11370-0/imperfect-conceptions).    
For all that genetic inheritance may be incomplete as grounds of explanation for human 
variation and complex human traits as a science, Kaplan (2000) helps us see how these 
kinds of explanations for human problems (and difference) not only helps construct the 
problems but denies other fields of explanation for their origin (p.184).   
Contrastingly, what we have seen in the current study is that the clinic – especially in 
its mode of ordering referred to as genetic counselling - precisely acts to engage parents in 
clinical work, including uncertainty and undecideability over the classification of some 
troubles. In line with the neo-liberal way of contemporary biopolitical life, rather than the 
State legislating who should or should not reproduce, it is parents and what I am calling 
‘future parents’ that the clinic involves parents as people who need knowledge. This is 
because it only installs them as decision-makers once their perspective has been framed 
through their participation in the motility of the clinic as a space of decision and deferral.    
  In pointing to these trends I am not at all proposing that the association of the gene 
and the clinic reinvigorates medical dominance for its own sake. Rather my thesis is that 
the historical place of the clinic as a social institution is being reborn in genetic medicine; 
and this draws on earlier contentions that medicine is the queen of the human rather than 
the life sciences.  This isn’t just because medicine, as my discussion of Rabinow in Chapter 
1 suggests, is likely to be the key site through which the new genetics becomes embedded 
in society.  Certainly I am suggesting that the clinic is the ‘obligatory passage’ through 
which the gene participates in the construction of the long and highly differentiated socio-
technical networks referred to by Callon and Rabeharisoa in the citation at the opening of 
this chapter. But I am also suggesting that the clinic reinstates itself as a site for the 
protection of the human, because it shows how it is the syndromes that are the 
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‘monsters’, not human beings. At the same time the clinic, to its credit, sees those who 
collaborate and shelter within it as human beings of a very particular kind; that they have 
consciousness and are agentic and in need of knowledge. Genetic medicine in the clinic 
gets reinstalled as necessary because its combination of classification and deferral allow it 
to moderate how the genetic is embedded in society.   
As I argued in Chapter 2, the clinic is historically a space of dividing practices 
between the needy and the legitimate and the rest. It is only medicine that has the 
authority to legitimate when to interfere in reproduction and when not to interfere on the 
basis of clinically defined problems rather than personal values. Thus it is the clinic in its 
association with the gene that, acting on behalf of society, starts to be instituted as a site 
to regulate the potential Tsunami of genetic technologies. This is not so much, as I have 
shown in Chapters 9 and 10 that medicine overtly directs people with regard to their 
reproductive decisions. Rather medicine reasserts its ability to account for selection on the 
basis of need, rather than say consumption and desire. In this way medicine is also being 
reinvigorated as a social institution because its dividing practices, between the genetically 
problematic and other beings, acts as an indirect form of arbitration that mediates some 
of the excesses feared and foretold by the marriage of new genetic technologies and a 
culture of enhancement.   
This biopolitical dimension of the clinic can be seen in how it works the family not 
only as a site for the production of syndromes, or reproduction as site of potential risk, but 
to legitimate selection as a new dimension of contemporary parental responsibilities.   
Parents are not just to choose a healthy lifestyle to ensure the future of their family’s 
health, they are also shown a way to produce the progeny that will ensure that future, 
provided they follow a specific way to knowledge – that offered by clinical discretion in the 
identification and classification of reproductive problems.    
Drawing on my fieldwork I illustrated how doctors may do the work of categorization 
in different ways, but my analysis underlines how medicine continues to accomplish this 
classification work on persons in the realm of the clinic. This puts differentiation and 
classification, rather than therapies and interventions, as central to medicine’s power.   
The key concern for medicine is not its dividing practices, separating the sick from 
the deviant, or the normal from the abnormal (although in many ways it is here that 
medicine operates as a centre of discretion and so gains much of its power), but with 
performing itself as scientific. As Robert Nye has recently argued: 
Aiding and abetting the state in the growth of carceral regimes that segregated the 
deviant or marginal seems to have been far less important a motive than that of 
adding to scientific knowledge and practice that would redound to individual 
practitioners and to the independence and status of medicine as a whole (Bleker, 
1997; Lawrence, 1996; Loudon, 1986). Scientific medicine, it would appear, and the 
continued rise in medical educational standards, was very much a product of the 
competitive dynamics of the profession, the ambitions and realism of young doctors, 
and of efforts to enhance the prestige, if not yet the efficacy, of the medical 
profession (McClelland, 1997; Solomon-Bayet, 1986). (Nye 2003, p. 122) 
 
In making these points I acknowledge that I am writing in the face of the many social 
science arguments that point to how medicine’s dominance is on the wane; and on the 
wane because of the erosion of medical discretion and the demise of the clinic. In what 
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follows I therefore revisit these arguments before offering a theory of medical power 
that helps us understand how medicine continuously maintains its dominance.  
 
 
Rethinking medical dominance 
 
As discussed early in the book, the thesis of medical dominance has long been a key 
debate in medical sociology. Its recent extension into STS is linked to the proliferation of 
molecular and genomic technoscience and has led not only to ideas that medicine will be 
totally geneticized but also the theme that the clinic will be deposed. In Chapter 2 I began 
to suggest how medical dominance is partly achieved through medicine’s alignments with 
other bodies and discourses in networks of associations and I now expand on this theme 
gets developed in the rest of the book.   
In Chapter 3 we saw how in the association of the clinic and genetic science, 
bioscience is being ordered and reordered. The need for more knowledge about the gene 
is being legitimated when it is demonstrable that more research is needed. Increasingly, 
however, the need for more research is demonstrable only if it can be shown how it will 
improve health or help the fight against chronic diseases in the West. This is partly an 
effect of the entanglement of ELSI and functionalist programs that call on the biosciences 
to be more relevant and address societies problems and ‘health needs’, but is also 
happening because it is thought that it is medicine that adds values to science in ways that 
make it of value to society, including its translation into capital. Interestingly, then, what 
we are seeing in this deflection from ‘bio’ towards ‘life’ sciences is a medicalization of 
bioscience.  
Potently, since bioscience has to show government and other funding bodies how it 
addresses medical problems in order to give it moral as well as economic purpose, I am 
suggesting that what may actually be happening in these alignments and shifts is an 
intensification of medical authority and discretion.  The effect of such an intensification of 
medical authority can be seen, for example, not only in how ‘access’ and the entry into the 
domain of health care have become such crucial foci of health and social care organization 
and practice, but also with the intensification of medicine as ‘gatekeepers’ to the 
distribution of social goods, such as beds, investigations, medicines, and care (Hillman et al 
2011; White et al 2012).   
In Chapter 4 I began to show how and when it is the clinic where the identification of 
the pathological occurs, not just the description of what counts as abnormal. My argument 
here is that, instead of witnessing a diffusion model of discovery moving from the 
laboratory to the clinic, what witnessed in the classification of genetic problems is rather 
that it is the clinic that is enacted as the key site for the identification and description of 
abnormalities in the growth and form of human organisms.  So it is the clinic that acts as a 
‘centre of discretion’ over the making of genetic clinical categories; and does so in ways 
that are infrastructural to new scientific enterprise and not just to health services.  
In making this argument I identified several problems with how medical dominance 
has been thought of; and which I think has misled people into thinking that medicine’s 
power is on the wane.  First, there never was a ‘golden age’ of science and medicine as 
pure, discrete spaces for the production of knowledge about the natural world. It is not 
just that science and medicine have always been entangled politically, economically, as 
well as philosophically, socially and culturally, it is the attempt to split medicine from 
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science that is a problem. In saying this I do not want to stress the social construction of 
scientific knowledge, but focus more on how any separation of medical and scientific 
domains is an effect.  An effect that in turn is constitutive of culture, and a particular 
politics of the body, of persons and of families.   
Second, in many debates about the relation between bioscience and medicine, 
science is conflated with the laboratory, while medicine is associated with the clinic.  As I 
have suggested there is an intricate entanglement between medicine and science through 
which the clinic does not just use laboratory science but itself becomes a part of the 
scientific endeavour. In making this point I should stress that I do not mean an 
experimental scientific endeavour, so much as an engagement in the reading of nature 
concerned with the identification of problems, that is pathologies, that need to be solved.   
Third, innovation and discovery are often more visible in science than in the clinic, 
because what we see in everyday clinical practice is usually what is already sedimented 
repetitively into routines. Typically classification is naturalised even though, as both Mol 
and Atkinson separately help to recover, diagnostic classification in the clinic is itself an 
effect of practices and processes of debate, negotiation and adjudication between 
different forms of evidence.    
Fourth, there is a problem with dividing medicine and science into separate domains 
and then conceptualising the flows of knowledge, discovery and innovation as just running 
one way.  As has been discussed in Chapter 3 the diffusion model has many problems, not 
the least of which is that it underestimates the extent to which the emergence of biology 
and the molecular is also a history of the intensification of medicalization.   
Fifth, there are questions over what are the ‘commons’ between bioscience and 
medicine, for example in terms of their sharing metaphysics, politics and ethics, not to 
mention the production, consumption and disposal of cultural preoccupations, values and 
mores, including, ways of imagining relations themselves (Strathern 2009).  When it comes 
to commons, the ground that bioscience and medicine share is not only connected to 
underlying notions of seeing/saying and assumptions that accredited ways of knowing can 
take us to the truth, to positive knowledge. There are also deeply embedded Euro-
Western notions of progress lying in the realm of our will to ‘master’ nature; conceptions 
here including our own internal nature as well as nature external to us (Clarke et al 2003). 
As Fuller (2007) puts it in his consideration of how science maintains its dominant 
position in society:  
On both the technical and the ideological front, science’s power as a form of 
knowledge has rested on its ability to justify practices that might otherwise appear 
illegitimate.  This speaks to the transformative character of science. . even of the 
human condition. (p.2-3)   
In reflecting on the profundity of this thought, we might go beyond just acknowledging a 
need to remember how both medicine and science are material practices; or recognise 
how the jointing of the market and metaphysical values capitalize technoscientific 
domains (re-emerging perhaps as ‘Biomedical Technoservice Complex, Inc.’ Clarke et al 
2003, Rose 2005).  
 
 
Spaces of ontic politics 
 
What I would stress more than the topical themes of material and capital, important as 
 165 
these are, is that science and medicine are also sites of ethical and metaphysical battles; 
or, to use Verran’s (20011) term, spaces of 'ontic politics'. In In this respect I have pressed 
how it is the categorical work of medicine, and how it not only defines what counts as 
need, but rather how it commits categories on persons – either in the form of diagnosis by 
‘othering’ them - that is key to understanding medicine’s power.   
There is though something particularly subtle in what I am addressing under the 
rubric of ontic politics that goes beyond traditional thinking about social exclusion. What 
has fascinated me in the present study is how medicine deploys its categories to include 
things and persons in one moment and uses them to ‘other’ these things or persons in the 
next. Much of the newer categorical work has been linked to the emerging relation 
between technoscience and medicine and commentators stress how new and emergent 
identities and subjectivities (Finkler, 2000) are being fabricated. To give just a few 
examples: carriers (Attard, 2009; Parsons et al 2003), pre-symptomatic patients (Konrad 
2005), prepatients (Rose 2007) and biological citizens (Novas and Rose 2000), as well as 
new kinds of social formations (Callon and Rabeharisoa, 2003; Rabeharisoa and Callon, 
2003; Rose, 2006) and new kinds of body-persons that imply different kinds of possibilities 
for ontology and biopolitics (Dillon and Reid, 2001; Kelly 2006; Latimer, 2012; 
Papadopoulos, 2011; Rabinow and Rose, 2006).  
Critical investigation I feel is especially important over the relation between bioscience and 
medicine and its legitimation of innovations and new technologies as matters of need and 
expediency. Here we should try to interrogate how it is that the effects of bioscience and 
medicine in their alignment always go beyond the functionalities they promise – the 
prevention and cure of disease or the optimization and enhancement of bodies to 
promote health. The point here is to learn to see how they rather help produce, consume 
and dispose of particular meanings and moralities, as well as persons. In this I am bringing  
the politics of imagination (Latimer and Skeggs, 2011) alongside biopolitics to understand 
how medicine continuously extends its power.  
In arguing these positions I am purposefully extending Foucault’s basic contribution 
to identify a way of thinking about how medicine extends its power. Following Strathern’s 
(1991) lead I should say that I accomplish this in my fieldwork primarily through noticing 
the processes of attachment and detachment. I look for the folding and unfolding of 
bodies. And I watch for the pulling and pushing of persons into and out of medicine’s 
reach. Significantly, as I have illustrated in many of the chapters, the reach of medicine is 
extended in genetic medicine: from the locating of disease in the genes, and individual 
bodies, to the family: as I have noted many times, it is when a phenotype is visible across 
the bodies of family members that the genetic aspects of syndromes can be evidenced.   
In this way I never see medicine as simply one thing rather than another.  Rather it is 
bio one moment and social the next.  Here we can understand that medicine’s power and 
potential dominance comes from its shifts in extension, and not from its purity, except 
that as we have seen medicine still performs diagnosis as a moment of clinical purity.  
Critically, we need to understand more how medicine shifts between its hybrid 
associations to moments of clinical purity. So rather than go with views that talk about the 
molecularization, and colonization, of medicine and the birth of a subjugated 
technoscientific medicine, I want to suggest that capitalization, technoscience and the new 
molecular biology has already been offering opportunities for medicine to extend and 
perhaps even intensify its power. Indeed, as I suggested in Chapter 3, the reverse may be 
happening in the medicalization of science.  
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To be sure, this requires thinking about contemporary medicine, and science, as well 
as their historical relations, differently from much current opinion. And perhaps in ways 
that I have been evidencing throughout the book, giving greater recognition to the view 
that medicine’s detachments are as potent as its attachments. Including, as I have also 
documented, those exclusions and inclusions that are so momentary that, in the next 
minute, they are gone. So I want to go on now to offer a different view on medical power 
and suggest a dimension to understanding medical dominance that has the possibility of 
problematizing Rose’s and others claims. This approach may also help us to understand 
better how the genetic, like the car before it (Latimer and Munro, 2006), is not just 
engrossing science and medicine, but the social body.   
 
 
Towards an alternative theory of medical dominance 
 
Setting aside arguments for the demise of the gaze and the flourishing of technoscientific 
medicine, I have been examining occasions when medicine ‘does’ something and carefully 
noted when it displaces its gaze to other technologies. Keating and Cambrosio’s thesis of 
medical platforms, discussed in Chapter 4, in the constitution of medical entities is useful, 
but they do not quite engage with how alignments are accomplished on the ground. The 
question that needs to be asked instead is how, and when, does medicine attach to 
technology? And how, and when, do technologies magnify or diminish medical authority? 
Throughout this book, for example, I have been asking when does medicine do bodies as 
information and when does it do fleshy bodies as illness and disease?  
Medicine’s momentary attachment to and from technologies and other’s materials 
and discourses help magnify medicine in ways that maintain rather than diminish its 
authority (Latimer 2005).  For example, people can now pay directly for a myriad of scans, 
or online tests of their DNA, and they can acquire endless amounts of knowledge and 
information about their bodies and their health. At one level this availability of technology 
appears to bypass the need for doctors to order the tests. But can the results really be 
made to matter, for example in an insurance claim? Or legitimate absence at work? Or do 
they not usually require for their fiscal authority the sanction of clinical interpretation and 
opinion?  That is, medicine’s authority may appear displaced at some moments, but its 
intermittent exercise at key moments, and across key social processes, helps substantiate 
its orderings and stabilise its power.   
Stability and social order can be understood, as in Actor-Network theory, as a 
process of aligning interests. As noted in Chapter 3 this is often thought to take place in 
‘the process that is called translation which generates ordering effects such as devices, 
agents, institutions, or organizations’ (Law 1992, p. 366). However, contra Actor Network’s 
notion of alignment as having to be stable to produce its effects, my argument is that 
alignment is often partial rather than total, or consistent. Indeed, the more partial the 
alignment, the greater opportunities there are for medicine to make switches in ground.  
In this perspective intermittency and multiplicity offer more, not less, opportunities to 
generate power effects (Munro 1995). 
Specifically, what is missing from much research is a way to bring together notions of 
complexity (including the possibilities of multiple sites of medicine and possibilities for 
interpretation and conduct in the clinic) alongside this different perspective on power.  
Silverman (1987) captures some elements of this perspective in his conception of how a 
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discourse of the social extends medicine’s power. In my earlier work I tended towards 
showing how medicine’s power and authority is extended, at particular moments rather 
than others, by its attachment to and translation of other disciplines and domains, 
including managerial technologies such as collaborative care, triage, multidisciplinarity 
(Hillman et al 2010, Latimer 2005, White et al 2012).  
In this book I have chosen to emphasise how it is first in its moment to moment 
shifts between extensions (including deploying the gaze itself on occasions as a 
technology), and second in its enactment of deferral, that helps medicine maintain its 
power.  My argument is that we need to attend to translation in the emergence of the 
genetic in terms other than a simple takeover of medicine by science and technology. We 
need much richer analyses of when and how science and technology extends and 
magnifies medical power and when and how it curtails and diminishes it. Here there needs 
to be analysis of how, and at what moments, medicine attaches to technologies and 
discourses, and when it detaches. In Chapters 9, 10 and 11 we saw how the clinical work of 
dysmorphologists helps exclude other grounds of explanation, such as lifestyle or 
environmental factors for a child’s or a family’s troubles.  
We should also ask at what moments do clinicians attach to a scientific mode of 
operation; and when do they do something else?  Similarly when does medicine perform 
certainty and positive knowledge and when does it do uncertainty and doubt (Seale et al, 
2001; Star, 1989).  Further, when does it do fixed, managed medicine and when does it do 
the unknown? When does it do specialization and when does it do generalist?  When does 
it medicalize and when does it de-medicalize? And critically, what gets accomplished at 
these moments of attachment and detachment, extension and diminishment? And 
especially who or what benefits (cui buono)? 
 
 
Diagnosing dysmorphology 
 
In the light of these remarks I now take the opportunity to review my findings noting that, 
throughout the book, medicine has been treated as a site of biopolitics as well as a social 
institution. What I want to summarise is how tracking the various and complex relations 
between the clinic, the gene and the family in dysmorphology has helped unpick ways in 
which medicine is reinvigorated as a site for the production not just the consumption of 
knowledge,  
 As we saw in Chapters 4 and 5 dysmorphologists figure themselves as discovering 
and establishing what they call ‘syndromes’ and this work includes passing the discipline 
on to neophytes. While in some cases the genetic basis of the more common syndromes 
can be ‘seen’ through the application of special tests, for many syndromes there are no 
tests. As such the genetic basis of a syndrome remains provisional, but is implicated by the 
assembling and interpretation of clinical evidence. Considerable stress was put by 
clinicians on the visual aspects of expert recognition, as well as their methods for making 
syndromes ‘visible’ by establishing patterns of signs and symptoms across bodily systems 
and across family members.   
In Chapters 6, 7 and 8 we saw how dysmorphology makes use of genetic techno-
science, some of the time at least.  Surprisingly, however, methods of genetic profiling 
include many clinic-based technologies (such as the compilation of medical pedigrees, 
photographs and family trees) as well as laboratory-based methods of analysis. 
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Specifically, clinical evidence of the genetic is generated through the various technologies 
enrolled in the clinic, including the gaze (Foucault 1976) of the dysmorphologists 
themselves as well as their methods of genetic profiling. Collectively these technologies 
materialise what is abnormal or unusual about a child, as well as make a relation between 
these specific features and pathologies and the possibility of a genetic basis. In this 
perspective the disorderings of the child’s body (and perhaps those of other family 
members), taken together, become a phenotype. As such they are being constituted as an 
expression of an aberrant, if invisible, genotype.  
This possibility of clinical representation of a phenotype-genotype relation is partly 
instituted through its portraits. In my examination of dysmorphology’s portraits in Chapter 
8, I showed how the genetic clinic emerges as a space in which the relation between genes 
(codes and information) and living, fleshy bodies is given form.  While ‘morph’ (from the 
Greek) denotes shape, it is worth us remembering that morphology is not just a branch of 
biology that deals with living forms; it is also a branch of grammar that deals with the 
formation and inflexion of words. The two disciplines seem worlds apart, like the study of 
living forms, and the ‘post-genomic’ representations of genes as information, codes and 
rules. Yet in a sense what dysmorphology’s portraits do is bring these worlds – the flesh 
and the grammar - into a relation because they help see/say a genotype-syndrome 
relation.  Specifically, the ways in which dysmorphology makes its portraits creates a space 
of crossing, through which form is given to information (the aberrant genes) such that the 
gene is made visible and the gene is not just given presence, but is, for a moment, 
magnified.  
I should take a moment to stress the kind of scientific work being enacted here: the 
method of assemblage and juxtaposition discussed in Chapter 8 is a mode suited to a 
correlational science looking to take forward classification, rather than it is compatible to 
an experimental science seeking causes. What I suggest these clinical methods of 
portraiture both reflect and constitute is the shift in genetic science from one gene as 
responsible for one disease, to the complexity of classifying a syndrome-phenotype as the 
expression of a genotype. Thus, the portrait is a way of representing syndromes that does 
not reduces them either to a single gene or to the figure of an individual and, instead, 
allows syndromes to emerge in the partial connection between the assemblage and 
juxtaposition of materials deriving from different, biologically related bodies. In this we 
can see how the clinic really is doing the ‘new genetics’.  
These findings suggested to me that the models and textual discourse of the 
molecular and the gene mimic or simulate digital machines in ways that perform a 
different texture to fleshy bodies.  As such the molecular gene brings with it a different, 
incompatible world to that occupied by fleshy, living bodies: these two worlds seem 
irreducible, they are in a non-relation, much as Foucault helps us to see the extraordinary 
space that is constructed through the non-relation between words (titles) and pictures 
(paintings) in his exposition of Renee Magritte’s ‘This is not a pipe’ (Foucault 1983). The 
implication is that the relation between the new genetics and strategies for the governing 
of life is qualitatively different from being the very long chain of translation that Rabinow 
and Rose (2006) think links the molecular and the molar – between information codes and 
the fleshy vitality of the individual human organism. 
What we have seen is something more than this. There is not simply a shift from the 
molecular to the molar from ‘becomings’ to the individual and the figure of enlightenment 
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thought. It is not simply that medicine cuts down the solid figure of the individual in their 
differentiation of the molecular and the molar described by Deleuze and Guattarri: 
There is no becoming-man because man is the molar entity par excellence, whereas 
becomings are molecular...Man constitutes the majority, or rather the standard on 
which the majority is based: white, male, adult, 'rational,' etc., in short, the average 
European, the subject of enunciation.  (Deleuze & Guattari, A thousand Plateaus, p 
292) 
What I have evidenced instead is how dysmorphology moves from clinical pictures of 
representative subjects to portraits of genotype-phenotype relation. This is a move, yes, 
from the molecular to the molar; but then it goes on beyond the individual to the 
distributed nature of genetic substance.  So that the central thrust of biopower in genetics 
is in this movement because it radically extends medicine’s gaze from locating disease in 
individual bodies, and all the individuating effects that follow from this, to locating the 
pathological across different bodies and in the family.    
They also do more than this. In the place of contemporary forms of medical disposal 
and decision-making, in which the display of expertise entails speedy closure, what is 
found in the genetic clinic is a slowing down of clinic process, and explicit moments of 
undecidability, uncertainty and instability over genetic diagnostic categories.  Equally, and 
at the same time, a firm commitment to the possibility of certainty, of fixing diagnostic 
categories in grids and codes through the future development of technoscience, is also 
implicitly being performed.   
Thus dysmorphology helps us to see how the clinic is a centre of not only calculation 
but also discretion. Even where there are tests, dysmorphology performs clinical 
judgement as deciding whether or not a test result is accurate or salient.  Furthermore, by 
maintaining uncertainty dysmorphology also legitimates the need for more genetic-
technoscience, and more clinical judgement in the future to help fix diagnostic 
possibilities.  
 
 
Medicine’s humanism 
 
The constant division between the normal and the abnormal, to which every 
individual is subjected, brings us back to our own time, by applying the binary 
branding and exile of the leper to quite different objects; the existence of a 
whole set of techniques and institutions for measuring, supervising and 
correcting the abnormal brings into play the disciplinary mechanisms to which 
the fear of the plague gave rise. All the mechanisms of power, which, even 
today, are disposed around the abnormal individual, to brand him and to alter 
him, are composed of those two forms from which they distantly derive.  
(Foucault 1979, Discipline and Punish)  
 
A medical way has very specific features. It is a way of conceiving the body as a) an object 
to be known: this legitimates examination and entry into the body to make it visible. Young 
(1997) helps us to see how this process, and the complicity of the patient in it, is still 
performed by the clinic: ‘the history-taking is still the realm of the self, though one in 
which the self is becoming detached from the body, the physical examination is a realm of 
the body, and one in which the body is rendered an object’ (pp 26); and b) as both organic 
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and machinelike, made up of functional parts, that when these go wrong legitimates 
intervention in the body.  
The body is often imagined within the bio-physiological mechanical model as a 
functional machine needing fixes to its parts and its ills. That the detection and the cure of 
disease is possible (provided the right way to knowledge is followed) legitimates particular 
interventions, particular forms of experimentation, and of course the need for more 
technology to help make the body and its ever smaller parts visible to the gaze. 
But the anatomy and the physiology of the body in medicine are also dividing 
practices that define the normal and identify deviations from the normal.  These are not 
value neutral: ‘medicine formulates the human body and disease in a culturally distinctive 
fashion’ (Good 1997: 65) and in ways which are normative.  
Here there is real slippage in the notion of normativity.  Canguilhem (1991) suggests 
that in medicine the "[n]ormative in the fullest sense of the word, is that which establishes 
norms." (p.127).  It is a vital principle of living organisms to maintain life (see also Greco 
2008).  But what many theorists have shown, after Foucault, is how in medicine there is 
slippage between this sense of normativity and a moral or ethical sense of normativity, 
through which the normal becomes both a quality of the person and a reference point or 
‘standard’, or critically does not.  Capturing some of this in his discussion of the 
anthropological problem of the relation between the social body and the biological body in 
medicine, Taussig (1980) argues that ‘medical knowledge is not just a description of, nor 
an attempt to treat, disease and illness, but may also be used to reproduce and reinforce 
existing social structures and values.’ 
What gets hidden, Taussig is suggesting, are not only the social relations that create 
a disease, such as poverty and exploitation. The very language of disease – that which 
constitutes diseases as if they are naturally occurring phenomena - conceals the social 
relations that have gone into the making of this language, into the making of the specific 
diseases.  This includes ways in which some attributes are valued over others to create the 
very standards and norms upon which the creation of the pathological, of diseases, 
depends.  
These standards and norms once reified appear as objective facts, not as creations 
that embed value. For example, cultural notions of what does or does not count as 
brainpower informs the standards by which what does and does not count as a healthy 
brain are measured.  Where a person deviates from these standards they are also 
vulnerable to being devalued, because they are being rendered as deviating from, or even 
transgressing, cultural conceptions of what it is to be a full person, or even human.  Within 
this perspective medicine is a site of biopolitics in which difference can be recast as 
abnormality, as unnatural and even as pathological.   
 
 
Dysmorphology and deferral 
 
With hindsight dysmorphology has proved to be an obvious site in which to study the 
relation between the new genetics and medicine. Yet what the study has uncovered is that 
this relation is far straightforward. To the contrary, dysmorphology performs an 
unanticipated need for clinical discretion in the production of genetic knowledge.   
 Specifically, dysmorphology draws together conventional clinical methods and 
techniques with new ways of thinking about the origins of abnormality and pathology to 
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reinvigorate the substantive importance of the clinical gaze.  In the various ways 
delineated in the study, dysmorphology performs the clinic as critical to the production 
not just the consumption of medical knowledge. As an emergent category and system of 
classification, the genetic is performed in dysmorphology as needing clinical judgement in 
the work of distinguishing the genetic from the non-genetic.  
 Genetic science thus emerges as a new frontier, in which so much is not yet known 
or not yet standardised. Here I suggest, tentatively and provisionally, how undecidability, 
uncertainty and instability of genetic diagnosis – as prominent features of clinical practice 
in dysmorphology - perform something about the genetic clinic that is highly significant.  
This sustained pressure of ambiguity and uncertainty requires additional explanation when 
it runs alongside a firm commitment to a future of diagnostic certainty. In this view it is 
precisely those moments of ambiguity and uncertainty that help to make a space of 
deferral.  The clinic holds patients and parents on the genetic ground and establishes the 
very space of deferral which is needed to secure that future: a future in which 
classification becomes sedimented in a techno-science that will continue to press back the 
boundaries of the genomic unknown, but a techno-science that also creates opportunities 
for more clinical judgment to secure its proper interpretation and salience.  Here I need to 
elaborate.  
 The point is to suggest how members in the clinic create a space of deferral in which 
the genetic itself is performed as very much still open, and its categories as revisable.  Thus 
the dysmorphology clinic emerges as a site in which we can observe the complex, practical 
work of classification. Clinical uncertainty and the trope of deferral mean that the logic of 
the clinic appears to call for advances in technoscience that foreshadow its own demise. 
This is the way of the clinic. Clinical findings are legitimated by the outcomes of laboratory 
genetic science. The clinic performs an apparent commitment to future facts that are 
secured in the laboratory. But this projection is itself always being deferred. This deferral 
creates the space in which the clinic and pathological entities are irreducible to mere data, 
to codes and numbers, including molecular biology. Thus the colonization and subjection 
of the clinic augured by commentators such as Rose (2006) is premature. Rather, the clinic 
in dysmorphology is being reperformed as a site of knowledge production in the 
identification and classification of genetic pathologies.  
 
 
Alignments and power 
  
The question that arises then is not that of settling the matter of medical dominance as if 
this was an abstract issue pure and simple.  The issue is more one of understanding how 
and when medicine exercises its authority and discretion.   
 The territory I have explored in the book is how and when does medicine maintain 
its dominance even in the context of apparent challenges to its professional powers, the 
proliferation of techno-sciences such as the new genetics, and the deconstruction of a 
standard, normal and natural body that undermines its statistical base in fact rather than 
fiction.  How is it that medicine keeps going even in the face of all its apparent 
technological, epistemological and ontological failure?  And, crucially, what is the place of 
the clinic in all this?   
 Central to this more subtle and intricate thesis of medical dominance is a 
reconsideration of the relationship between power, medicine and society. While 
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acknowledging earlier accounts of biomedical dominance the perspective offered 
depends upon investigating the clinic as a ‘complex location’ (Latimer drawing on 
Cooper, 2000).  Specifically, the clinic in this perspective is treated both as a discursive 
space that has system properties and as a site of culture through which it works as a 
social institution.   
 My particular focus is not to offer a political economy of the medical profession’s 
dominance, or chart its decline, after Navarro (1988) or Willis (2006), although I hope 
what I have shown goes some way to helping us understand how it is possible for 
medicine to be so deeply implicated across very different and disparate political 
economies enlisted as a senior partner of post-genomic ‘biocapitalism’ (Kaushik, 2006).  
Instead, I have updated emphases in earlier accounts of medicine as a social institution 
by drawing together a theoretical framework that offers a more contemporary 
understanding of power.   
 Specifically, I have shown how medicine keeps its dominant place alive through its 
alignments, extensions, disposals, attachments and detachments as well as extends its 
power through the specificities of its associations with the new genetics, including new 
forms of biopower that individuate society into persons. But alongside this I have also 
underlined those moments that undermine the dominant figure of the individual, if 
temporarily, so that it is medicine that has to rescue persons from the inchoate of being 
merely DNA and be returned to forms of being human that make people much more than 
the sum of their bodily parts, including their genotype.  
 In this medicine is not so much dominating through the heroics of intervention and 
cure, and the accomplishment of  ‘medical miracles’ (Becker 1993).  Rather what we have 
seen is a shift from heroic, functional medicine, healing the sick and ‘raising the dead’ 
(Becker 2003), back to the clinic as the site of scientific medicine involved in 
classification, discretion and the biopolitics of selection. Nonetheless medicine remains a 
site where classification, and participation in the clinical work of categorising people’s 
troubles, acts as a form of intervention.  What we have seen is an extension of 
medicine’s power in which representing is a form of intervention, one that has the 
potential to not simply put right something that is wrong with a persons body or mind, 
but one that gets at the very fabric of what people are made of to change how they think 
of themselves and their children and their family at the most basic of levels.   
 I am suggesting therefore a very different way of looking at medicine. As discussed 
above earlier theorists explored how management technologies can each be considered 
in terms of posing challenges to medical authority and power. These technologies have 
included financial and management accounting, the rise of patient consumerism and the 
widening of access to medical information and knowledge, the proliferation of techno-
scientific knowledge and alternative conceptualisations of the body as well as the 
meanings of health and illness. Instead of seeing these as competing technologies, I am 
arguing that the very processes and practices that seem to challenge medicine, such as 
genetic science and technology, can on closer inspection be seen to become medicine’s 
extensions and allies; and do so in ways that magnify and enhance, rather than 
undermine clinical authority, particularly at the opening up of a new frontier.   
 In the past, I have analysed how attempts to make medicine more accountable 
through introduction of management technologies does not so much challenge medical 
power, but provides available grounds with which medicine can intermittently align in 
unexpected ways to reproduce its dominant position (Latimer 1999, 2000, 2005). In the 
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current analysis it is the very intermittency and partiality of the interaction of the gene 
and the clinic, as well as the incompleteness of the phenotype-genotype relation that 
helps mobilise, translate and revive medicines’ place.    
   
 
Working society 
 
There is little doubt that medicine’s history is one of association and alignment, rather 
than it has ever aimed, as Freidson suggested, for closure and purity. Yet the present study 
indicates its dominance today arises as much from its readiness to work partial 
associations and momentary alignments, and to do so intermittently.  
 The third part of the book, Family and Identities, continues this theme by elaborating 
how family are enrolled in the clinic in ways that help institute the clinic as both a site of 
science in the description and classification of genetic aberrations, and as centres of 
calculation in the management of the reproduction of abnormal forms. Here I have shown 
how the clinic in dysmorphology attaches intermittently to the family and plays into and 
out of discourses of parenting and nurture as a site accountable for the healthy bodies and 
development of children. So while I have also suggested the clinic is concerned with 
disorders of the body that imply long-term, sometimes disabling conditions, it does more 
than this.  
Chapters 9, 10 and 11, as I detail further below, show how the clinic’s access to and 
enrolment of the family allows the clinic to become a different kind of laboratory, one in 
which the relationship between genetic aberrations, the social relations of reproduction 
and aberrations in human development and form is being observed and classified. Here 
the clinic because of its immersion in families can do what laboratory based science 
cannot. It can trace, describe and classify the effects that are the consequence of who 
marries and procreates with who. Thus the clinic in dysmorphology is the site of a 
‘naturalist science’, in which humans, rather than plants or animals, as they engage in 
sexual reproduction are the subjects observed and classified into syndromes.   
 In accomplishing this work, the clinic begins by assessing the risk of the presenting 
condition, in terms of prognosis, as well as in terms of recurrence in future pregnancies 
and other family members. It makes family aware of itself as just that, family, and of how 
not only lifestyle needs to be managed in the production of healthy citizens for the future, 
but nature itself requires management, because nature is risky. Indeed it is society’s need 
for genetic counselling to manage the reproduction of children with long-term and often 
disabling conditions that gives the clinic as a site of science access to families, and vice 
versa.  Family are enrolled through careful and long-winded processes of attachment, 
including helping to recover the humanity of the genetically aberrant as well as parent’s 
face.    
In Chapter 9 I explored the effects of clinical practices in terms of the kinds of 
persons being produced and reproduced by clinical processes and practices.  I discussed 
contemporary debate over postmodern biology that augurs the destruction of the 
humanist individual.  However rather than the totalizing effects of a geneticization of the 
body that destroyed the figure of children as individuals, I showed how through a shift in 
ground, children are rehumanised as much more than the effect of a syndrome.  Through 
for a moment refiguring them as people who need to know and who are capable of 
knowledge as well as agentic and wilful their Euro-American personhood is reinstated.  As 
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such medicine reinstitutes syndromes and bodies as the effects of a genotype-phenotype 
relation, while they as persons are refigured as the complex figures of humanist thought 
whose consciousness, or mind, is able to detach from and be elevated over their body.  
Medicine thus reasserts its own humanity in ways that help attach it to the family. 
Specifically, paediatric genetic medicine, in all its crossings, reperforms the clinic as at the 
‘pinnacle’ of the human rather than the life sciences.   
 Chapter 10 revisited the relationship between medicine and the family, particularly 
in the context of contemporary discourses that institute parenting as an extension of 
actor-networks of public health. Specifically, moments of prediction and calculation are 
arrived at during processes of diagnosis.  In dysmorphology, these moments are 
‘occasioned’ by these diagnostic processes; they are not managed by clinical staff as 
discrete events. And parents and other family members are encouraged, from the home 
visit through to clinical consultations, to participate in these knowledge practices.  Hence, 
the alignment of the gene and the clinic in dysmorphology creates access to the family as a 
site of reproduction of these long-term, chronic conditions and allows medicine to 
intervene in this site.   
 In all this I showed how the bodies of children become the visible manifestation and 
measure of good parenting, both in terms of looking good, being good and being healthy.  
However I also discussed how good parenting in these discourses is directed at lifestyle 
choice.  I then went on to explore what family becomes in the genetics clinic and how at 
the same time as clinical processes intensify the responsibalization of parents as 
reproducing the future of healthy progeny, the alignment of the genetic clinic and the 
family institutes parents not merely as agents providing the right kind of environment for 
their child, but as family members whose biological matter may or may not need 
reforming. I thus argued that the family gets reinstalled in genetic medicine as a site of 
selection.  Within this perspective individuals are not constituted as  ‘prepatients’ (Konrad 
2005) but as ‘future parents’, whose future acts of procreation may or may not produce 
genetically aberrant children. Genetic counselling emerges in these discourses as 
processes of interaction with the family through which the biological substance of the 
family, and thus the shape and form of its individual members, can be reformed.   
 In Chapter 11, I focussed on these interactions in the clinic and on parents’ accounts 
of their experiences of encounters with genetic medicine.  Examining consultations 
between families and clinicians, I showed that family members are not so much disciplined 
in these encounters but are enrolled in the everyday work of clinical differentiation. Thus 
the mechanisms through which the abnormal is classified and disciplined are extended in 
genetic medicine from the individual to the family.  It is only by extending its existing 
alignment with the family that clinical medicine makes itself an ‘obligatory passage’ 
(Latour 1987) to the new genetics.  Specifically, dysmorphology not only helps to create a 
new space of medical intervention in the management of long-term, chronic conditions 
through mediating their reproduction. It installs itself through deferral and undecideability 
as at the heart of the classification of the relation between the genetic and the 
pathological. 
 In this context I interrogated the nature and extent of this participation to show how 
interactions between the clinic and the family constitute relations of exchange, in which 
family members gift the clinic access to the family, both virtual and literal, in the form of 
bodies, photographs, histories and accounts, while parents are given a perspective, a way 
to knowledge that gives hope of a future of classification for what is wrong with their 
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child/family. Specifically, family members are not simply informed about ‘what is’, rather, 
the clinic becomes a site of gathering, which engages parents in the epistemological work 
of objectification and differentiation, through which what is unusual or abnormal about 
their child and other family members, including themselves, is defined alongside clinician’s 
performance of deferral. The chapter showed how participation in this motility of clinical 
work moves parents between definition and deferral to excite consciousness of the 
riskiness of reproduction elicit moments of reflexivity and accomplish shifts in perspective.  
 The clinic in dysmorphology is thus performed as a space in which medicine, aligned 
with genetics, can help to make a difference to the future shape of a family, and therefore 
of society.  Medical intervention here does not, as we have seen, involve direct action on 
the genes.  This is not a space of genetic engineering, although the work of dysmorphology 
does help to legitimate the need for technology with which to engineer the genetically 
aberrant in the future.  Rather it creates a space that problematizes reproduction as a 
possible source of particular kinds of chronic conditions.   Reproduction here doubles, for 
cellular reproduction and sexual reproduction.  Intervention consists of modes of 
representation or ‘genetic counselling’ that mediates how people imagine the effects of 
their procreative relations and excites consciousness of the need for them to manage their 
reproductive lives reflexively.  
Whatever else can be said about it, dysmorphology in the end is about the study of 
the misshapen.  So it gets to the heart of much of the contemporary preoccupation over 
identity and belonging that drives contemporary consumption. Its field of operation, as I 
have been indicating throughout is the work of distinguishing the normal from the 
abnormal body, at both the level of the body’s surfaces as well as of its invisible spaces. 
Dysmorphology is thus a site that helps to institute a new relation between abnormality 
and its causes.  
In the contemporary clinic, rather than notions of sin, it is parental lifestyle and 
neonatal environment as well genes that provide the grounds of explanation for 
dysmorphias.  Each of these possible grounds shifts the relation between biology, nature, 
human agency and reproduction. Neither God, the soul nor the supernatural play much of 
a part in the dysmorphology clinic.  Rather the very etymology of the word dysmorphology 
as well as its practices helps to put into play a different set of relations, these help 
reproduce what constitutes the abnormal as well as circulate new ways of thinking about 
the causes of abnormality and deformity.  
Critically, dysmorphology then is a site in which we can see how the work of 
geneticizing certain conditions sanitises the marking of the abnormal, making it ethically 
acceptable. In a cultural context which celebrates diversity and difference and in which the 
very notion of a normal body is being problematized this is an especially important part of 
the work that genetic medicine does because it helps legitimate both the consumption 
and the disposal of the genetically aberrant. Thus genetic medicine in dysmorphology is 
different from that critiqued by Tausig and others cited in the introduction.  Specifically, 
dysmorphology needs to make explicit the social relations of reproduction as creating 
congenital abnormalities.  And sensitivity to difference is a fundamental aspect of the 
dysmorphology gaze, one that helps both divide off and also reinclude the most 
genetically aberrant in the fold of the human.   
Through switches in ground and attachment to the family and the fleshy bodies of 
babies, children and their families, dysmorphology gives presence to them as human, as 
much more than the sum of their bodily parts.  We have seen how this affirmation holds 
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children so easily reconstituted as killable in the fold of the human, and reinstates 
medicine as itself on the side of humanity, thus reaffirming its own humanism in terms of 
the detachment of consciousness.  This said we have also seen how at other moments as 
in the case of Johnny clinicians do not hesitate to consider putting a stop on the 
reproduction of children such as Johnny.  But as I have discussed the kind of human beings 
being distinguished and affirmed by the clinic is itself exclusive: it is a human being 
celebrated by enlightenment humanism, and as such it cuts out other perspectives on 
what it is to be human. 
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ii
 There is a wonderful wood engraving of an Alchemist's laboratory in Petrach’s 
Phisicke Against Fortune by Weiditz, Hans, the Younger (um 1500-1536) Created in 
1532 (http://www.fine-art-images.net/en/showIMG_11647.html.)  
iii
 This original work formed the basis of a classificatory system that is continuously added to and 
updated – OMIM (Online Mendelian Inheritance in Man)
 
®http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/omim 
iv
 I have not the space to explore these kinds of technologies fully, this has been done elsewhere, for 
example Newman (1996).   
v
 ‘Karyotype: A photomicrograph of an individuals chromosomes arranged in a standard format 
showing the number, size, and shape of each chromosome type; used in low- resolution physical 
mapping to correlate gross chromosomal abnormalities with the characteristics of specific diseases.’ 
http://www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/Human_Genome/glossary/glossary_k.shtml 
 
vi
 ‘The name "CHARGE" was a clever way (in 1981) to refer to a newly recognized cluster of features seen in 
a number of children. Over the years, it has become clear that CHARGE is indeed a syndrome and at least one 
gene causing CHARGE syndrome has been discovered (see below). The letters in CHARGE stand for: 
Coloboma of the eye, Heart defects, Atresia of the choanae, Retardation of growth and/or development, 
Genital and/or urinary abnormalities, and Ear abnormalities and deafness. Those features are no longer used in 
making a diagnosis of CHARGE syndrome, but we're not changing the name.’ (from 
http://chargesyndrome.org/about-charge.asp accessed September 2011) 
 
viii HANS GRUNEBERG, ‘distinguished for his work on animal genetics in relation to medicine’ died in 1983. 
He worked at Medical Research Council Group for Experimental Research in Inherited Diseases, University 
College London. (BMJ, 1983) 
ix
 http://oxgrid.angis.org.au/mouse/human/500_index.html 
 
x
 A knockout mouse is a transgenic mouse with a deleted gene – it is an engineered mutant, unlike the Bleb 
mutant mice, which are ‘naturally’ occuring.   
xi
 Photographs are one of the immutable mobiles (Latour 1987, p.227) through which the signs (or absence of 
signs) of dysmorphia are inscribed and circulated. The significance of how diagnostic work in dysmorphology 
constitutes and disposes of slides and photographs is discussed at greater length elsewhere (see Featherstone et 
al 2005; Latimer, 2004; Latimer et al 2005; Shaw et al 2003). 
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xii
 Velocardiofacial Syndrome is an autosomal dominant condition. Genetic studies of children with 
this condition show that a microscopic segment on the long arm of chromosome 22 is missing. The 
genetic test for diagnosis of this condition is called "FISH analysis" and can be performed in many 
medical centers. (http://www.faces-cranio.org/Disord/Velo.htm) 
xiii
 “Marfan syndrome is a genetic (inherited) condition that affects the body's connective tissues. 
Connective tissues provide support and structure to other tissue and organs. The symptoms of Marfan 
syndrome vary from person to person, as the condition can affect the connective tissues in different 
areas of the body. For example, it can affect: blood vessels, causing damage to the heart; skeleton, 
causing long, thin limbs; eyes, causing the lens (the transparent structure at the front of the eye) to fall 
into an abnormal position (lens dislocation)” http://www.nhs.uk/conditions/Marfan-
syndrome/Pages/Introduction.aspx (accessed June 2012)  
xiv During this period research was being undertaken that challenged the clinical picture of 
Marfan syndrome in ways that was revising its ‘nosology’ to put more emphasis on heart 
problems and the confirmatory FISH test than on the overgrowth of bone (Loeys et al 2010). 
 
xv
 Th. Sydenham, quoted by F.Boissier de Sauvages Nosologie methodique, vol 1, p.88 (Lyons, 1772). 
xvi
 I am grateful to Paul Atkinson for some of this detail over the history of photographs in medical work.  See 
also Featherstone et al (2005). 
xvii
 Just to remind the reader, chromosomes carry 200 genes a piece. 
xviii
   Propagules in sexual reproduction are seeds. 
xix
 As Lynda Lange (2003) in her essay on Aristotle’s biology notes in the phallocentric world view 
there is a conflation of male and human, with woman’s biology rendering her animal and irrational.   
xx
  Agamben (2002) draws attention to a double paradox here –classical and medieval religious texts 
portray how at the moment of their return to paradise humans are restored as animal, because it is 
their consciousness that is both a cause and effect of their fall from grace.   
xxi
 The clinic has long been a site in which body-self relations have been performed.  As Leder (1990) 
asserts in many ways the body in medicine as lived is absent, except as a corps.  Rather, the body is 
only interesting for some as site for the location of disease. 
xxii
 In a conversation with Paul Rabinow I began to understand how Haraway’s project in When 
Species Meet could be understood as a manifesto of connectivity with non-humans that brings them 
into the fold of the best of humanist thought and institutions. 
xxiii
 Thanks to Marilyn Strathern for this observation. 
xxiv
 There is some evidence in the study that suggests that to be fully included in the clinic parents need 
to demonstrate their commitment to finding out about their child’s condition, indeed this seems, from 
informal conversations with practitioners, to be one of the things that the specialist nurses as well as the 
doctors are, As Dr Smith puts it, ‘sussing out’ (see also White et al 2012).   
xxv
 Neuronal migration disorder which results in broad, flattened gyri and occasionally is described as 
incomplete lissencephaly. Typically, children have developmental delay and seizures, the onset and 
severity depending on the severity of the cortical malformation. Infantile spasms are common in 
affected children, as is intractable epilepsy.  In some patients there are mutations of chromosome 17 
and Xq22 but others will have no specific chromosomal marker. Those with chromosome 17 mutations 
more frequently have areas of pachygyria in the frontal and temporal regions, whereas those with Xq22 
abnormalities often have abnormalities in the frontal lobe. 
http://www.amershamhealth.com/medcyclopaedia/medical/Volume%20VII/PACHYGYRIA.asp 
xxvi
 Noonan syndrome was first recognized as a unique entity in 1963 when Noonan and Ehmke 
described a series of patients with unusual faces and multiple malformations, including congenital heart 
disease. These patients were previously thought to have a form of Turner syndrome, with which 
Noonan syndrome shares a number of clinical features. The observation that patients with Noonan 
syndrome have normal karyotypes was important in allowing the distinction to be made between the 
Turner and Noonan syndromes. The cardinal features of Noonan syndrome are unusual facies (ie, 
hypertelorism, down-slanting eyes, webbed neck), congenital heart disease (in 50%), short stature, and 
chest deformity. Approximately 25% of individuals with Noonan syndrome have mental retardation. 
Bleeding diathesis is present in as many as half of all patients with Noonan syndrome. Skeletal, 
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neurologic, genitourinary, lymphatic, eye, and skin findings may be present to varying degrees.  
Pathophysiology: The pathophysiology of Noonan syndrome is not fully understood. Linkage analysis 
performed on a Dutch family with autosomal dominant Noonan syndrome suggested that a gene for 
Noonan syndrome is on chromosome arm 12q.  Frequency: In the US: The incidence of Noonan 
syndrome is estimated at 1 in 1000 to 1 in 2500 live births. Internationally: The incidence of Noonan 
syndrome appears to be consistent worldwide. Mortality/Morbidity: The primary source of morbidity 
and mortality in these patients depends on the presence and type of congenital heart disease. Race: 
Noonan syndrome is panethnic. Sex: Noonan syndrome occurs in either a sporadic or autosomal 
dominant fashion. In either case, males and females are affected equally. Age: The disorder is present 
from birth, but age impacts upon the facial phenotype. Infants with Noonan syndrome can be difficult 
to recognize by facial appearance alone. The phenotype becomes more striking in early childhood, but 
with advancing age, it may again become quite subtle. Careful examination of an affected child's 
parents may in fact reveal that they are affected mildly. Emedicine, 
http://www.emedicine.com/PED/topic1616.htm, accessed September 2005. 
xxvii
 Human Doublecortin, an x-linked gene located on Xq chromosome, first reported in 1998.  
Mutations of this gene have been linked with lissencephaly, a brain disorder that results in epilepsy and 
developmental delay. 
xxviii Branchiootorenal (BOR) syndrome is an autosomal dominant condition characterized by ear abnormalities, hearing 
loss, cysts in the neck, and kidney problems. Description: The name ‘‘branciootorenal syndrome’’ describes the body 
systems most commonly affected by this genetic disorder. The term ‘‘branchio’’ refers to the abnormalities of the neck 
found in individuals with this syndrome. Cysts (lump or swelling that can be filled with fluid) and fistulas (abnormal 
passage from the throat to the skin) in the neck occur frequently. The term ‘‘oto’’ refers to the ear disorders associated 
with the syndrome. For example, the outer ear can be unusual in appearance. Hearing loss is also common. Finally, the 
term ‘‘renal’’ stands for the kidney problems commonly seen in patients with this condition. These can be very mild or 
very severe, as can any of the symptoms associated 
with this disorder. Dr. M. Melnick first described branchiootorenal syndrome in 1975. Another name for BOR syndrome is 
Melnick-Fraser syndrome. Individuals with BOR syndrome typically have physical differences that are present at birth 
(congenital). These birth defects are caused by a change (mutation) in a gene. http://health.enotes.com/genetic-
disorders-encyclopedia/ branchiootorenal-syndrome#Definition. Viewed December 2005. 
 
